I think that one of the most valuable things that I learnt from Barry Smith, perhaps by a kind of osmosis, was a particular form of naivety. It is strange to say that one has learnt naivety, because we normally think that naivety stops where learning begins. But what I mean is a feeling of epistemological innocence in trusting one’s common, or even not so common, sense and in taking whatever presents itself to one as a self-evident truth at face-value (while bearing in mind that this is just a fallibilistic self-evidence). I do not wish to suggest that this is a position of Barry’s, but this is a position I worked out for myself on the basis of what Barry passed on to me: philosophers should be sometimes more naive than they are and are sometimes more naive than they should be. The challenge is to be naive at the right moment and place.

Here is an example, which I once again should like to stress is not to be regarded as Smithesque but which I would not have thought up (and still less thought out) had it not been for him. These two sentences: “This sentence is false” (the Liar) and “this sentence is true” (the Truth-Teller) give rise to well-known difficulties. The Liar is, or at least appears, paradoxical: supposing it is true it comes out false and the other way ’round. The Truth-Teller is not obviously paradoxical: supposing it is true it comes out false and the other way ’round. The Truth-Teller is not obviously paradoxical, because no contradiction seems to follow from the hypothesis that it is true: If it is true, it is true, and if it is not, then it is not, and that is it. Yet, some philosophers have found the Truth-Teller paradoxical, too (see e.g. Woleński 1993; Billon 2014). I must say that I sincerely admire the ingenuity (and the non-ingenuouness) with which the philosophers who have taken either sentence seriously attempted to disarm or explain away the (alleged) paradox. And ingenuity does not always mean complexity: Joseph W. Smith once formulated an astonishingly simple proof that the Truth-Teller was true (Smith 1984), which I, too, find convincing—except for the initial presupposition that “one is prepared to take the self-referential ascriptions of falsity [or truth] of a sentence such as the liar sentence […] [or the Truth-Teller or their ilk] at all seriously” (p. 219). I am not prepared to do so and I can’t imagine how I ever could. And the problem is that I, as distinct from Barry, am rather short-breathed when it comes to arguing from (what I consider) patently absurd premises, adopted just “for the sake of argument.”

The problem, as I see it, is that both the Liar and the Truth-Teller are poor candidates to the title of genuine truth-bearers. Barry roused my interest in the issue of truth-makers (Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984; Simon and Smith 2007) but starting from this I developed mine own for truth-bearers. Primary truth-bearers are, this is my position, not sentences as linguistic expressions but thoughts, some of which are sometimes expressed in linguistic expressions. Sentences as linguistic expressions have no intrinsic intentionality and for this reason they cannot be primary bearers of truth-values (although they may have a truth-value secondarily, as expressions of a thought). If you don’t have any Thai, then “กุหลาบแดง” or “kuhlāb dæŋ” is bound to remain inarticulate gibberish to you. Now as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a Polish philosopher from the once famous Lemberg-Warsaw school, put it: A thought (myśl) is true if and only if it represents things as being thus and so, in the ontological domain in which the thought places them, and things are thus...
and so (Ajdukiewicz 1983, p. 39). Which thought does then the Truth-Teller (the easier case) express? Going by the linguistic meanings of its constituent expressions and its grammar, it expresses the thought that the thought it expresses represents the things (i.e. itself) as being the way they really are. For this to make (more than just linguistic) sense, or to express a thought, while thinking the thought that the Truth-Teller allegedly expresses you’d have to think about that very thought itself—which appears impossible—but, to boot, you’d have to think about it as representing things the way they are. But what way does the Truth-Teller represent things (i.e., itself) as being? Well, as representing things the way they are, and so forth. Our thought, in a desperate attempt to constitute itself, just can’t go beyond this inchoative stage. This is what I here mean by “not expressing a thought.”

Let’s compare the Truth-Teller with a sentence seemingly even more absurd than it: “The inhabitants of planet Tephlonia worship the good god Elvis” (an example coined by Barry). “This [i.e. the one just read] sentence is true, take my word for it.” All right, let’s discuss it. For all its weirdness, the sentence does represent things as being thus and so, i.e. (and here we are transcending the assortment of words employed in the sentence itself)\(^2\) as involving temples, rituals, processions dedicated to Elvis, bowings, genuflections, prostrations in front of Elvis’ statues, or equivalent (in the widest possible sense) behaviour, or maybe Tephlonians’ inward acts, sorts of orationes iaculatoriae, or perhaps studying some Elvish holy books. I am not saying that the sentence in question can be verified by such findings, yet their contemplation gets us one step forward to establishing the sentence’s truth-value; it is in the direction of such examples that we have to grope, trying to find out whether the sentence is true, and this will keep us busy for a long time. Should we find out that there is no Tephlonia, to start with, we would still vaguely know what would have had (not) to be the case on it if it had existed for the sentence to have a truth-value, and the sentence would have no truth-value yet express a thought all the same, even if a merely hypothetical one. In the case of the Truth-Teller, by contrast, we can find no such considerations, as there is in it, when it comes to representing things as being thus and so, no hint as to what that “thud and so” could be like. The Truth-Teller, aside from the challenge of thinking about the very thought one is now thinking, says only “things are as I am saying they are, that is, they are the way I am saying they are, that is, they are in the manner I am representing them as being, that is….” This gets us absolutely no forr’arder.

As regards the Liar, a current challenge for the “gapper” like myself, i.e. one who thinks that the Liar (does not express a thought and for this reason) has no truth-value at all (Goldstein 2000; Żełaniec 2013) is presented in the form of the so-called Revenge Liar, which, in its most basic form, runs like this:

\[
(1) (1) \text{ is not true.}
\]

Avenger: you say that (1) lacks truth-value; thus, you will admit that it is not true, won’t you?

Me: There is a difference between “s is not true” in the sense “s is false” and “s is not true” in the sense “it is not the case that s is true (because s has no truth-value at all)”\(^4\) but OK, I grant you the point and assert hereby: (1) is not true.

Avenger: So you also concede that “(1) is not true” is true?

Me: I do: “(1) is not true” is true.

Avenger: Now, “(1)” and “'(1) is not true’ ” are two names of the same thing, namely (1), aren’t they?

Me: Depends, but go on!

Avenger: Well, you said just now that “(1) is not true” was true, so substituting synonyms for synonyms you’d get “(1) is true,” thereby contradicting yourself. The Liar has been avenged!

Such mishaps accrue to those who are excessively fixated on expressions as material beings.\(^5\) The expression “‘(1) is not true’ ” is, qua (a type of) material entity, the very same expression wherever it crops up, just as “amor matris” is the same expression regardless of whether it is used in the sense of “love for the mother” (an objective genetive) or in that of “love of the mother (for her child or children)” (a subjective genetive). But exactly like “amor matris”, “'(1) is not true’ ” can be used in two different senses: once as another name of (1), another time as the name of a sentence expressing the thought that (1) (does not express a thought and for this reason) is not true (or false). The Avenger, urging that “'(1)’” and “'(1) is not true’ ” are two names of the same thing, uses the latter expression in the first sense. I, by contrast, when I use “'(1) is not true’ ” in the subject position in the sentence printed in italics above, use it in the second sense, that is, as a name of a sentence which is homographic with (1), but not identical with (1); the latter does not express a thought,
while the former expresses the thought that (1) does not express any.

Suppose, to make the above consideration clearer by means of an analogy, that "(1)" and "'(1) is not true'" were two names of an object which quite obviously and indisputably was neither true nor false, for instance, a chair. Then, the reasoning just proposed by the Avenger would no less seem to go through. I should say: "'(1) is not true" (meaning: the chair called "'(1)" is not true), and pressed by the Avenger I should concede that that commits me to saying "'(1) is not true' is true," and then the Avenger, using the fact that the expression "'(1) is not true'" which fills the subject position in the sentence I have just asserted, is also a name of the chair, would exclaim: Ah, so you are admitting that (1) is true after all! But this is wrong, because while saying "'(1) is not true' is true" I was not speaking of the chair (I was not using a name of the chair as the subject expression in the sentence that I asserted) but of a sentence (which was such that, unfaithfully and misleadingly, its standard name is homographic with one of the chair's names) expressing the thought that the chair was not true. The expression I employed was a kind of shorthand for: "The sentence 'the chair called "'(1)" is not true' is true" so that the step to "'(1) is true" by dint of the homography of names is not possible, simply because there are no homographic names here.

Similarly, in our case, in saying "'(1) is not true' is true" (the sentence printed in italics above) I am really saying just "The sentence 'the inscriptions called by the Avenger "'(1)" is not true' is true" so that no homography is produced and no contradiction follows.

Much of contemporary philosophy, due to its prevalent naive materialism, has no conceptual slot available for the concept of different, but yet perfectly homographic sentences (unless by endowing their constituent words with different meanings or by exploiting a syntactic ambiguity), without which the above reasoning makes little sense. Again, I do not want to suggest that Barry would have accepted the above reasoning or its conclusions, although I hope that he would, nor do I intend to gauge the extent to which he accepts or rejects the premises of contemporary materialism (in semantics and philosophy of mind). I remember, however, from th' olden days when I knew him, that he would wage war on all philosophical schools which he suspected, rightly or wrongly, of empty verbalism and rhetorical seductiveness. Now the above considerations on the Liar and its ilk are not meant, at least not by myself, to remain an exercise in academic shadow-boxing, but they are meant as serious work towards finding tools and means of testing all kinds of discourse for having or not much content in terms of assertible thoughts. As Barry made me see, by the above-mentioned wars he waged, in the time I worked for him, there is deplorably much discourse—in politics, advertisement, morals, economics, and other social sciences, "life-styles," religion and much elsewhere, including, yes, philosophy—that is less than the Liar or the Truth-Teller obviously, but no less truly, thought-free, all the while being linguistically correct or even attractive, nice-sounding, spellbinding (though not exactly the way in which Keats has been said to have been a spellbinder). One of the most important social tasks, an enlightening task, of philosophy is to debunk this "fashionable nonsense," which, while not quite as evil as the Hobbesian Kingdom of Darkness, is no less demoralising and destructive. I am sure this was Barry's position and Barry has accomplished very much with regard to that task, and it is to be hoped that he will still accomplish much more.

I owe also to Barry the lasting or at least long-time interest in various issues and philosophical areas, such as the early Göttingen phenomenology, especially Adolf Reinach; among the former I would mention, first of all, the issue of the synthetic a priori (in the Husserlian sense rather than in the original Kantian) to which I devoted a few publications (the latest one is Zelaniec 2013), one of them co-authored with Barry (Smith and Zelaniec 2012). The idea was that synthetic a priori judgments/sentences/propositions connect always two or more non-logical concepts in such a way that it is enough to have an ever-so-fleeting familiarity with both of them to (believe to) see that the judgment in question is true. For instance (this is an example from Reinach): every promise gives rise to a claim and an obligation, mutually correlated. It would be protested, perhaps, that this proposition is purely analytic, yet a convincing proof that it is has not so far been forthcoming, and I have argued (Zelaniec 1992) that it would be harder to produce, should anyone take up this task seriously, than one would suppose.

Although I do not in the least wish to pretend that Barry was in any way responsible for it, yet I cannot help feeling that I in part under his influence grew weary of the tendency of some philosophers to let the matter rest at mere assertions that something can be done, and not to move on to actually doing the thing. A given judgment is analytic, for instance, that is (I am presupposing here the Fregean sense of "analytic"): it can be reduced to a tautology on the strength of the original Kantian) to which I devoted a few publications (the latest one is Zelaniec 2013), one of them co-authored with Barry (Smith and Zelaniec 2012). The idea was that synthetic a priori judgments/sentences/propositions connect always two or more non-logical concepts in such a way that it is enough to have an ever-so-fleeting familiarity with both of them to (believe to) see that the judgment in question is true. For instance (this is an example from Reinach): every promise gives rise to a claim and an obligation, mutually correlated. It would be protested, perhaps, that this proposition is purely analytic, yet a convincing proof that it is has not so far been forthcoming, and I have argued (Zelaniec 1992) that it would be harder to produce, should anyone take up this task seriously, than one would suppose.

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tion itself. For while definitions cannot be true or false, yet they can be correct or not, in the sense of correctly rendering the common usage. If someone, then, suggests that it is part of the definition of a promise that a promise gives rise to a claim and an obligation, then let him tell us whether he thinks a normal English speaker, following common usage, would refuse to call a promise an act that happens to be exactly like a promise yet fails to give raise either to any claim or any obligation or both. 9 "The question is quite pointless, as there are no such acts" 10 is a likely answer. No sir, there are no such acts, because ... well ... because not only does every promise give rise to a claim and an obligation, mutually correlated, 11 but also the claim-and-obligation-generating property cannot be removed from the concept of a promise arbitrarily. 12 At least not in such a way as to make appear worth answering the question of an anticipated reaction of an English speaker to an instance of the concept so tampered with. Pressing such questions, and in general, insisting too much on the difference between "in principle feasible" and "actually done" does not gain you much popularity with most philosophers, but Barry did it with a special, and rare, unsurpassable charm.

In this or a similar fashion would I argue in favour of the somewhat old-fashioned category of the synthetic a priori. In line with Barry, I would call it a fallibilist conception of the a priori. That is to say, we should treat judgments synthetic a priori as very well-founded but still "only" hypotheses, and not forget that one day we might encounter facts or entities that plainly contradict them, however unbelievable this might sound to us at the present moment. Yet still, for the sentence "there is no colour that appears as intermediate between yellow and red," which looks like a good candidate for the title of "synthetic a priori," empirical data interpretable as convincing counter-evidence seems to have been found (Crane and Piantanida 1983). It would be tempting to compare this theoretical fallibilism with Barry's personal one, and as a person Barry (as I knew him) was not always very easy to convince that any of his favourite a priori beliefs might after all not fit the facts so well. "All the worse for the facts," one seemed sometimes on the verge of hearing him say in the Hegelian (if such it really be) vein. But sometimes he was right to be stubborn. I remember a longish discussion with him on states of affairs (another topic of his in which he roused my interest), in which I argued, against Reinach championed by Barry (Smith 1987, p. 201f.) that not all languages knew the difference between a sentence ("the rose is red") and a nominal group ("the red rose"); for instance in Thai, both were "กุหลาบแดง" ("kuhlāb dæng" in Latin characters, literally: rose red). This is rather strange, because most languages do make this elementary distinction, 13 but Thai, hardly a "primitive dialect," does not. "They certainly utter it with a different voice inflection, depending on whether they mean to say 'the rose is red' or 'the red rose,'" Barry kept asserting intransigently, and I could scarcely suppress a certain internal chuckle at his hard-headedness. Much later I realised he might have been right, even if he was factually wrong as far as the Thai-speaking community is concerned: you can utter the same expression and express two different thoughts by it, or once express a thought and another time not express any. Much of my argumentation against the 'Truth Teller above depended on that possibility for its persuasiveness, if it had any.

With regard to languages and language as such, Barry is, in my memory, extraordinarily gifted and sensitive. He spoke very good German, so he could hold a lecture on a complex philosophical topic in that language freely, i.e. not by reading it off a script, and he could read in a few other languages. He also was eager to pick up various phrases and expressions in every language he came into contact with. He would play small practical jokes on people by throwing in bits like "yes, that's true" in a conversation in a foreign language in his charming way, very much to the amusement of the interlocutors. I sometimes try to imitate him at the University of Gdańsk, where I teach and where there are many students from Spain, in that I, passing by a group of such students, quickly remark "no, no es verdad lo que dice" (no, it's not true what s/he is saying), but not exactly with the Barryesque effects. Yet Barry was, first of all, extremely, but also to a large extent self-ironically, proud of his native idiom, and would often say "English is language par excellence," whatever this was supposed to mean. When I teased him with John Skelton's observation (16th century) that:

Our natural tongue is rude
And hard to be ennewed [...]
Our language is so rusty
So cankered, and so full
Of frowards, and so dull [...]
I wot [know] not where to fynde
Terms to serve my mynde

Barry responded with a variation on Pope:

Our language and its wealth lay hid in night;
God said, "Let Shakespeare be!" and all was light.
One evening in the mid-nineties Barry “threw a party” (a favourite locution of his) at his home; in the middle of a conversation a non-Anglophone guest at the party said that he had never “shaked” hands with a Mr. So-and-So. In response, Barry said: “shook,” in a solemn, teacher-like tone of voice. A few minutes later Barry was telling his guests how skillful he was as a cook and asserted of a cake: “I baked it myself.” In this moment, I cut in and said in an equally solemn tone of voice: “book.” That was my “revenge,” for which I did not fail to harvest amusement.

I sometimes teased Barry’s pride of his “natural tongue” beyond due measure—which he bore with apparently unshakeable stoicism—confronting him with various seemingly absurd properties of English. Here is an example. This may not be obvious to many or most Anglophone readers, but in most languages that are “par less-than-excellence” words are derivable from one another in a regular fashion. For instance, in Polish “wilk” means “wolf,” while “wilczy” means “lupine,” similarly “kot”–“koci” (“cat”–“feline”), and so on. In English, by contrast, the adjective is Latinate, while the substantive is Saxon, and they are not derived from one another, meaning apart. So I once collected a number of such pairs and asked Barry if it was linguistically correct to call the thesis defended by a Dr. Hare a “Leporine thesis,” or a playful invention by a Winola Cat a “Feline invention,” or the conjecture by a Prof. Ben Seal a “Phocine conjecture,” or the assertion by a Frederic Gander-Goose an “Anserine assertion,” or the explanation by a Jane Peacocke a “Pavonine explanation,” or the transgression perpetrated by a Herbert Elk an “Alcine transgression,” or the advance achieved by a Donald D. Duck an “Anatine advance,” or the theory formulated by a Dr. Grail Oxe a “Bovine theory” (and a number of others)—to which Barry responded with a note of stoic resignation: “I am very sorry but none of these would really work in English.” Fair enough.

Barry was, too, very good at coining humorous sayings that exploited various hidden meanings of familiar words. As he was regarded by many of his students and acquaintances (non-native speakers of English) as an authority on “language par excellence,” he was often asked various questions on that language. For instance, once he was asked whether, given that there were the verbs “to overwhelm” and “to underwhelm” (a recent coinage), there existed in English a verb like “to whelm.” His answer: “Certainly. I whelm myself every day just to the right extent, otherwise I’d be seriously underwhelmed.” I have no doubt that Barry keeps whelming himself just to the right extent, I hope, whatever that means. Another example, this time of Barry’s literary wit, was his “Old Nordic Saying,” which I have passed on to many of my students: “To have history without ideas is blind; to have ideas without history is American” (Smith 1984, p. 311).

Another striking feature of Barry’s, noticed not just by me, was his being blessed with an intense emotional attachment to his mother-country England and to things English. As he once quoted a medieval work, perhaps Confessio amantis by John Gower (1330–1408), as (according to its author) “A bok for Engelondes sake,” it suddenly occurred to me that practically every work by Barry could be thus entitled. Only later, as I came to know him better, did I realise that Barry’s relation to England was not as unproblematic as all that (due to the class-ridden structure of the English society); yet most of the time, it is true, one had the impression of hearing the last stanza of Rudyard Kipling’s “Home return” in the background:

If England was what England seems,  
An’ not the England of our dreams,  
But only putty, brass, an’ paint,  
’Ow quick we’d chuck ’er! But she ain’t!

and one felt like asking “but isn’t she really?” Well, this is a sore point, but the last time I talked to Barry about such issues I no longer had the impression that, in his eyes, she wasn’t. And yet, Barry would say “we” in some contexts, such as “we conquered India,” “we ruled half a world,” “we’ve become wimps since WWII” and similar. In imitation, I also took to saying “we” with reference to Poland (“we got partitioned between Germany and Russia in 1939”), for a stretch of time.

For some reason that escapes me now, I once gave Barry a computer file with the famous Nelsonian phrase “England expects that every man will do his duty” printed umpteen times over in different fonts; some time later, paying him a short visit at his place, I discovered that he had printed that out and attached it to the wall in front of his desk. Would he have done so if the text had read “L’Angleterre est une nation de marchands” or even “The more he looked inside, the more Piglet wasn’t there”? Hardly conceivable…

I also remember that Barry was sometimes, if very seldom, rather stern and tough on us non-native speakers of English with regard to certain words and locutions which he thought only English poets were authorised to employ. In my case the “sacrilege” consisted of using somewhere in writing the verb “to asseverate” with reference to philosophers who solemnly affirm, but little more than just affirm, that something can
be done or demonstrated. Years later, when I told the story to another British person the reaction was: “What a funny story about your boss! No right to use certain words? LOL!” LOL indeed but, yet, I am proud of having had a “boss” like that: English may or may not be “language par excellence,” but language is a very valuable tool, and those insufficiently competent should not be left meddling with language unattended. I do not know if Heidegger was right in calling man the herdsman of being, but Barry was and I am sure continues being a brilliant and skillful herdsman of Language (par excellence).

More personally, the Barry I know is a very generous, resourceful, efficiently helpful and (at the same time) modest man. Even when reporting his many brilliant successes, he would never be boastful, arrogant, or presumptuous. There is a consistent streak of self-irony, or perhaps of not taking himself too seriously, present in everything he ever says about himself or quoted as said about himself by somebody else. Last but not least, he has always been helpful to others in a practical sense, not just in the sense of giving moral support. He has always read and extensively commented on draft manuscripts (even those that were not really worth his time) by his students, assistants, and colleagues, providing them with oftentimes caustic (“learn how to use a word-processor”) but mostly very just remarks. He has also readily engaged in serious philosophical discussion even with persons who are by far not his match. Barry’s practical generosity has been also demonstrated in his very efficient and reliable replies to letters and emails. He responds almost immediately, and always very much to the point and constructively. For this reason, a colleague of mine called him once a “philosopher businessman” in good-willed banter. However, while efficiency and reliability certainly are important traits of good businessmen, Barry is not, as I know him, a businessman in a very important sense. That is, Barry has never tried, for aught I know, to “sell” to anybody ideas he did not himself believe in, only to personally profit from another person’s being persuaded by his truly formidable eloquence. There has always been something of a secular missionary (but not a peddler) about Barry, yet a missionary passionately believing in his cause (whether Aristotelianism in philosophy or Free Market Liberalism in economics), and sincerely convinced its adoption is in everybody’s, not just his, best interest.

NOTES
1 Sometimes called the “Veridic.” See (Żełaniec 2013).
2 This proviso by Roman Ingarden (Ingarden 1985, p. 143) is meant to help to deal with such truths as that Polyphemus was blinded by Ulysses.
3 An inability to paraphrase a sentence in quite different words is an almost sure sign that the sentence expresses no thought, at least to the speaker. See e.g. Plato’s Gorgias, where Callicles is unable to explain the crucial difference between “better” and “stronger” and his clumsy efforts are commented upon by Socrates thus: “Ὅρᾶς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ἀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδὲν;” (“So you see, you are uttering mere words yourself, and explaining nothing,” tr. by W.R.M. Lamb 489e).
4 Or this passage from Hume on efforts to define causality: “Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. When we consider these objects [...], we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any sensible interval. [...] We can go no farther in considering this particular instance. [...] Shou’d any one leave this instance, and pretend to define a cause, by saying it is something productive of another, it is evident he would say nothing. For what does he mean by production? Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can; I desire it may be produced. If he cannot; he here runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term instead of a definition.” (Treatise, bk. I, pt. III, sect. II). “To say and to say nothing” or “to provide synonyms instead of a [not merely verbal] definition” is, so I should understand it, to speak and yet express no thoughts.
5 The latter is sometimes called the wide-scope negation, see (Horn 2001, p. 226; Brandtler 2006, p. 183).
6 As Hume’s theologians were not, since they “clearly perceived, that the external form of words, being mere sound, require an intention to make them have any efficacy; and that this intention being once considered as a requisite circumstance, its absence must equally prevent the effect” (Treatise, bk. III, pt. II, sect. V). But they, presumably, were no materialists.
7 Cf. these surprisingly highly relevant remarks on style: “Does [the given] writer make me more keenly conscious [...] both of what he is saying and of the events and significance of my daily life? Do I see the world in clearer details after reading him? Or does he just give
me a drowsy feeling in which musical noises agreeably peal and reverberate? It is interesting to note that the older English writers never did merely this. Even great masters of the ornate style like Sir Thomas Browne and Jeremy Taylor have a hard core of meaning which keeps the reader constantly alert. It is only with the nineteenth century that the professional spellbinders appear: Coleridge, Keats, much of Shelley, Tennyson, Swinburne, Morris, Fletcher [...]” (Blackstone 1954, p. 270), a good description of what expressing a thought as distinct from merely spellbinding by “musical noises” can be like. For an interpretation of difficult thoughts contained in Euclid’s Elements see (Reed 1990).

7 Sokal and Bricmont 1998. This is as a rule less spellbinding and less musical.

8 In (Smith 1996) Barry mentions just the concept of being a part of … . The second one is the second-order concept of being transitive.

9 Just as he would deny the name of a brother to everyone who were someone’s sibling but not a male one.

10 There seem to be such acts, to be sure, such as e.g. “promises” given while intoxicated and the like, but as long as we consider them promises we normally think they do generate a claim and an obligation, and if we discover they are no promises after all, we do it not just by seeing that they have not generated a claim or an obligation.

11 Attention: while our original synthetic a priori judgment could have been understood as possibly vacuously true (i.e. if there had not been any promises) this last sentence must not be so understood: there are acts that look exactly like promises and … lo and behold, all of them generate claims and obligations. To make this clear it is apposite to formulate our original judgment as a conditional: “If as a matter of empirical fact an instance of the kind promise occurs, then there begin to exist enduring states of claim and obligation” (Smith 1987, p. 191).

12 By contrast, it is very much possible to separate the property of being male from the property of being a sibling, without changing anything about the latter.

13 For instance, in Russian “rose red” is the sentence, while “red rose” is the nominal group.

14 As a matter of fact, in German, a sister language of English, the old past tense “buk”, of “backen”, to bake, still survives, even if reputed old-fashioned.

15 As a matter of actual fact, “to whelm” once existed and meant “to overturn”, “to capsize” (of a vessel); “over-” in “overwhelm” is just an intensifier. The current meaning “overcome” is figurative.

16 I sometimes heard him quote the Hussite slogan “Veritas praevalebit” or “the truth will prevail” with reference to one of his causes.

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