I. INTRODUCTION

This article deals with jazz improvisation, attempting to find a way to define a model through which it could be conceived, developed and practiced. To begin with, we will investigate the traditional schema through which musical ontology has always considered musical entities, i.e. a prescriptive one. Later on, we will focus on a dynamic conception of formula—i.e., patterns that are able to express the musician’s individuality in a given performative context—and sketch the difference between figural and generative models. Particular emphasis will be given to the distinction between formula and mere licks, that can be defined as conventional, fixed and ossified formulas. In conclusion, we will see how jazz music can be based on a different, not pre-determined kind of structure, which we may call informative model. This allows us to abandon an inveterate prejudice, i.e. that jazz is an anarchic music, and, in addition, to better understand what criteria should we refer to in evaluating the creativity which is at stake into a jazz performance. I do not want to establish a qualitative hierarchy between the prescriptive and the informative model, but I would only like to highlight the fact that they give rise to different productive paths in making music.

II. MUSICAL ENTITIES WITH PRESCRIPTIVE MODELS: THICKNESS AND THINNESS

It may not be true for improvisations, and it may not be true for certain kinds of electronic music. It may not be true in the absence of a notational system. Indeed, it may not be true for most of the world’s music. But for a great deal of the most valued music of the West, since the development of a sophisticated musical notation, it seems to be true that there are musical works, and that there are performances of them (Kivy 1987, p. 245).

Kania (2014) offers us an important springboard to reflect on the role of the so called “high-order music ontology” over (approximately) the last five decades. The core questions of this philosophical area are commonly sketched as follows:

- what kind of things are musical works?
- what criteria do we need to identify and recognize them?
- what is their mode of existence?

As Kivy claims, it seems that the presence of an object called “work of art” and instances of it called “performances” is taken for granted, at least in Western music. In other words, if we do not suppose that these kind of things may have some sort of existence (concrete, abstract or fictional), investigating issues of music ontology could be problematic, if not useless. Leaving aside the undeniable accuracy and depth of Kivy’s inquiries in this field, I think that these lines reveal something that few ontologists of music (in which Kivy is certainly included) are inclined to admit: music ontology, as it has been conceived since its birth, can tell us very little (i.e., “it may not be true” for too much) of...
the musical experiences that technological, social and intercultural practices enable (Born 2005). Even so called “comparative ontology” (Kania 2014) which tries to apply the categories that traditional research has developed in the analysis of Western classical music to other genres (such as rock, jazz, folk and pop), faces the same difficulties. As a consequence, many scholars have raised doubts about the usefulness of the notion of a work of art (Kania 2011; Brown 1996, 2000a). The philosophical tool usually linked to that, the type/token model, has been even more radical and has called into question the whole concept of music ontology (Thomasson 2006; Ridley 2003, 2004). Perhaps it would be excessive and to some extent harmful to throw away decades of philosophical enquiry on music, but it is certainly true that a traditional point of view on today’s musical practice does not help us enough, and that the role of concepts such as work/performance, composition/rendition and composer/interpreter should be sharply reduced. This is particularly relevant in musical contexts involving the complex and the much debated notion of improvisation in which most of aforementioned high-order music ontology assumptions seem to be lacking. However, before focusing on improvisation, it could be useful to make explicit the model that underlies nearly all the ontological perspectives that consider the ordinary musical event as consisting in a more or less faithful rendition of a pre-existent entity or structure (Hagberg 2002, p. 189), whether or not we call it a work of art or not.

The model is based on a prescriptive conception of the musical phenomenon, according to which a performance is commonly intended as a rendition of a given pattern (Dodd 2007; Kivy 1983, 2002). The way in which this pattern is instantiated allows us to decide if the performance is correct or not. In other words, performance is a medium through which we can have access to a certain musical piece that is, in principle, detached from the specific rendition we hear in a particular occasion. From this perspective, the ontology of music has developed the type/token model in order to preserve the identity of a musical structure despite its repeatability (Bertinetto 2012b) and, secondly, to justify the expressive freedom left to interpreters. Roman Ingarden, for example, intends expressive features as the result of a “fill-in the gaps” activity: for him, musical scores are constitutively partial, because it is impossible to note down every sound inflection on a pentagram (Ingarden 1989). Consequently, the main task of the interpreter is to complete the spaces of indetermination that musical scores open up. Nicholas Wolterstorff (1975), in turn, identifies musical artworks with the notion of “norm-kind”, i.e. an entity that admits both correct and incorrect performances. This allows Wolterstorff to maintain a certain degree of flexibility in sketching the relation between a musical artwork (a kind) and its performances (the tokens) (Wolterstorff 1975, p. 131). Genuine performances do not simply instantiate the kind through a proper sound sequence, but are produced with an idea of what should be done in order to have a correct rendition of it. Wolterstorff here is claiming that despite the fact that one makes every effort to obtain a correct performance for a particular piece, it can well happen that one does not succeed. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from identifying our rendition as one of that musical artwork, i.e., of that norm-kind. Even if Wolterstorff does not consider correctness as a sufficient condition to produce genuine performance of a musical artwork, he maintains that it is at least necessary. This is particularly clear in all those scholars (in which Wolterstorff could be undoubtedly included) who see the relation between a musical piece and its renditions in terms of shared properties (Dodd 2007, p. 201). Julian Dodd extends this reasoning to its most extreme consequence: according to him, the creative process carried out by an artist simply consists in selecting the properties that a performance must possess in order to count as a correct rendition of the composed piece. Furthermore, the only properties that can fulfil this task are the structural-sonic ones played with the timbre that the composer has previously established: that is why Dodd’s view can be understood as timbral sonicism. It should be clear that sonicist theories, both pure and timbral, end up by reducing the creative process to a matter of selection, and this “may not be true” for the great majority of the musical practices we come across in our artistic experience.

Not only in jazz—which is commonly viewed as the “natural realm” for musical improvisation—but also in some contemporary classical composers such as Stockhausen and Cage, improvisation plays a central role in creating a musical piece. In all these contexts, selecting properties does not seem to be the most important feature, because improvisation is a creative activity that does not give rise to a re-performable entity. Stephen Davies, in his well-known book Musical Works and Performances, focuses on the difference between composition and improvisation:

Improvisation are not musical works, I say. Does this mean that improvisers are not composers? Here I think one can say what one likes, so long as the issues are clear. It is plain that composition and impro-
visation involve similar processes—inviting tunes, organizing material, trying to unify the manifold. If “composer” is like “swimmer” or “driver”—if it names the person who creates a certain kind of activity—improvisers are composers. On the other hand, if “composer” is more like “fletcher” or “wheelwright”—if it names the person who creates a certain kind of product; namely, a musical work—improvisers are not composers, I say (Davies 2001, p.15).

Although in this passage Davies reduces the gap between work/performance context and improvisational activity, there is a also prescriptive element in his conception. According to him, a musical artwork can be thin or thick:

If it is thin, the works’ determinative properties are comparatively few in number and most of the qualities of a performance are aspects of the performer’s interpretation, not of the work as such. The thinner they are, the freer is the performer to control aspects of the performance. […]. By contrast, if the work is thick, a great many of the properties heard in a performance are crucial to its identity and must be reproduced in a fully faithful rendition of the work. The thicker the work, the more the composer controls the sonic detail of its accurate instances. […]. Works of performance, however thick they are, are always thinner in properties than any of their accurate rendition (Davies 2001, p. 20).

With the thinness/thickness argument, Davies describes the relation between a work and its instances in terms of shared properties: the more features they have in common, the thicker a work is. But when he tries to argue that a performance is always thicker than the related work, regardless of its thickness or thinness, Davies’ claim is more problematic. In fact, there is a slight difference between referring thickness/thinness to a work and to a performance of it: if for a work being thick/thin means to be more/less binding as regards the production of instances, this couplet of concepts do not have exactly the same meaning when referring to performances. How is precisely a performance itself supposed to be binding, if its determinative properties are already established in the correspondent work? We can presumably say that performances of particularly thin works could be regarded as more relevant in assessing the determinative properties of the work they refer to, in comparison to performances of thicker works. But in a work/performance framework, “binding” seems more appropriate if related to the first, rather than to the second. To make a very partial proposal, it could be said that a performance exhibits, displays or shows some properties, and that these properties are liable to be identified and evaluated according to different criteria, depending on the musical context in which this performance takes place (Davies 2009).

In improvised performances, though, the basis on which their features are judged is not a pre-established work, but a more flexible model. Despite the fact that many scholars recognize that it is impossible to improvise from scratch (see Young and Matheson, 2000; Alperson 1984, p. 22; Tirro 1974, p. 286) the myth of spontaneity concerning this kind of musical practice is far from losing its strength. As we shall say, however, the originality of an improvisation depends on a model, but we should make clear what kind of model we are talking about.

IV. GENERATIVE AND FIGURAL MODEL: THE MOVING FORMULA

The use of a model in jazz improvisation is constantly related to the possibility of making variations of it. Variation, as Giannattasio notes, could be intended as an intentional questioning of the form (Giannattasio 1987, pp. 239-250). In this huge work I processi improvvisativi nella musica. Un approccio globale, Vincenzo Caporaletti (2005, pp. 47-51) distinguishes two kinds of model: generative and figural. While the former offers us the constructive aspects through which the variation can emerge (in the most common cases, they are harmony, modes and scales) (Davies 2001, p. 12; Baker 1979, pp. 1-2)11 the latter allows us to detect the variation perceptually, and is often identified with a certain melodic-rhythmic outline, that represents a sort of springboard moving from which the variation is distinguishable, due to the fact that it comes from a “regular”, “standard” and clearly defined context.12 It is considerably harder to maintain the distinction between the two models in music making, since playing on a scale or mode using repeated items can well generate a melody, in most cases a seducing and attractive one, which in jazz practice is often called lick.

We could define a lick as a fixed melodic phrase, repeatable by the musician any time they want to make their performance more fluent, recognizable and easier to memorize for the audience (Ware 1977, p. 15). We should make every effort to distinguish between the mere performative expedient, deprived of any individual touch: in other words, licks and formulas.13 More precisely, these are sound pat-
terns able to connote the individual style of a musician, who builds them gradually up through continuous practice on the instrument. The fact that formulas are thought and developed in a performative context—not only repeating them mechanically, rather transforming them depending on the concrete musical situation—gives them an intrinsically dynamic character that is far from the concept of lick. It could well be that a musician uses licks in the generative process giving rise to a formula, especially in their apprenticeship. But it is not sufficient to repeat a lick several times to make it become a formula.

Nevertheless, many scholars (Owens 1974; Kernfeld 1983) have confused the notion of a formula with that of a lick: they claim that without “formulas” playing jazz becomes nearly impossible, and this is due to the fact that there is no score, and musicians need to have a sort of script, allowing them to follow the structure of the piece being performed. The result of such a view is that jazz pieces literally consist of fixed “formulas” put together, one beside the other, and this is precisely the way in which Thomas Owens describes the creative processes followed by Charlie Parker in his improvisations. His study is a rich and detailed catalogue whose task is to store all the melodic patterns which have made Parker performances so remarkable. But this is not a correct point of view on Parker’s legacy, because Bird often uses the technique of “contrafact” to build his pieces, which consists in using the same harmony changing the melody. It is clear that Owens’s “storing” activity is rather useless: firstly, because it would be an endless task. Secondly, because from this perspective Parker’s unique talent is reduced to a matter of mere memory, that is obviously necessary in learning to play jazz, but not sufficient. On the contrary, other scholars tried to dismiss this mechanic interpretation of formula in jazz music: Treitler, for example, in an important study on Gregorian chant, connects the concept of formula with the notion of reconstruction: a formula, he claims, is far from being a fixed and calcified item, but is rather something flexible, borderline, “between reproduction of a fixed, memorized melody and the extempore invention of a new one” (Treitler 1975, p. 11).

As far as melodic aspect is concerned, in such a context, it is really hard to use traditional musico logical concepts as «melodic coherence» (Kernfeld 1996, p. 83; Martin 1996, pp. 34-38). Similar notions, in fact, were elaborated in order to analyze the relationship between melody and harmony, fundamental in evaluating the rate of creativity in western classical music. But in jazz practice the story is rather different: here the creativity of a musician must be valued in terms of getting attuned to a concrete musical situation whose guidelines are totally unpredictable. Hence, the form that a certain musical passage assumes has not to be detached from the generative—i.e., performative—context in which it is built up, accepted or refused and, potentially, developed. Moreover, it has not to be neglected the fundamental notion of interplay, that many scholars have deeply investigated, and the extreme consequences that this aspect may have on the difference between melodic and harmonic sphere.

Let us examine a small example from Jazz at the Plaza, Straight no chaser. In this astonishing piece, played at an impressive speed, the harmonic scheme offered by the piano and the bass is soon completely de-structured, especially in Coltrane’s and Adderley’s solos. They play extremely fluid and ungraspable chromatic figures, creating a surreal atmosphere emphasized by the fact that in the central section of both solos the pianist stops playing, as if Bill Evans wanted them to perform more freely, without any rhythmic-harmonic comment. In this track is impossible to separate the melodic line from the harmonic framework, and this happens not only because in the middle of the piece there is no explicit harmony at all, but also because Coltrane and Adderley do not simply play a melody on a sequence of chords. The two saxophonists build an over-arching, dynamic and interactive layer which is neither melodic nor harmonic, but is able to widen the horizon between the two, until it completely fades away.

This little and partial analysis of Coltrane improvisational style shows that the core of jazz creativity consists not in playing fixed and unchangeable licks along a harmonic background, but rather in making these patterns interact with all the elements of the performative situation: “the player will find that few tunes fit neatly into one formula or another but rather combine two or more formulas, often in modified form.” (Baker 1998, p. 27). This does not mean that spontaneity in jazz only lies in the sequencing and linking of different “formulas”, as Brown (1981, p. 354) writes. While performers juxtapose different licks, they transform them into something else, with their particular touch, developing in the best cases, an individual style. And in jazz music, which counts on the ability of single performers faced with relatively few and extremely famous repertoires of standards, rather than on composers, their unique artworks and interpreters, building a style in accordance with a certain tradition, represents perhaps the most important aspect. The result of our analysis is then a dynamic conception of the formula: we should not say that jazz
pieces are made of formulas, but rather that formulaic items regulate the musical discourse, allowing us to recognize the milestones it includes: i.e., in case of bebop, the chorus, the solos and the reprise (Brownell 1994).

Nevertheless, our insisting on the fact that formulas are not fixed and petrified does not imply that jazz is an art form committed to a total anarchy. Several aesthetic inquiries have highlighted the importance of normativity in this kind of music. Georg Bertram, for example, talks about a “normativity without norms,” (Bertram 2010, p. 36): i.e., in our terms, a context in which the link between different passages are not prescribed in advance, but are constantly exhibited, re-negotiated and renewed in every single performative situation. As Alessandro Sbordoni notes, two complementary dimensions incessantly intertwining with one another are involved in the improvisational processes: the first one, that we may define as vertical, is about the relation between the productive imagination of the single artist and the musical material, whose result is a standing-out style. The second one, that we may term horizontal, includes the simultaneous and extemporaneous contributions of those who participate in the performance: through their reciprocal relations, it is possible to sketch the shared, productive and creative goals which make a performance successful. Here we are facing not an absolute lack of normativity, but only a different one, which does not pre-determine what notes should be played, but offers to performers a range of possibilities ready to explore. As Bertinetto writes (2014, p. 139), the peculiarity of jazz is not to reformulate its normative boundaries in all particular performances, so that they reflect, in a reduced scale, a historical development typical of a musical genre. In every jazz performance, rather, this historical development is directly shown as the music goes on: jazz sessions are not pale mirrors of an abstract artistic path: they tangibly exhibit a process where macro- and micro- levels never cease to intermingle.

V. MUSICAL ENTITIES WITH INFORMATIVE MODELS, DIFFERENT RANGES OF POSSIBILITIES

As we have just seen, jazz is far from being coextensive with a realm of absolute arbitrariness in which unchangeable formulas are randomly put in a row. On the contrary, this musical practice exhibits a discourse whose bases are the constant mutation, reworking and rephrasing of some essential patterns, scales, modes or chord sequences. The simpler a formula, the easier it can be memorized by the performer and, possibly, reshaped to make it sound attractive to those who participate to the musical event—both the audience and the other performers. As has already been said, memory should not be underestimated, because it is only through this faculty that musicians can recover the most interesting passages throwing them into the performance flow again. This opens up an important feature of jazz creativity: we will consider jazz having an informative model. What does it mean, and in what does it differ from the prescriptive model?

A preliminary (and banal) observation that could be made is that a musician, in building a jazz performance, does not know in advance what will be played: not only because there is no written score (or, when there is one, it is handled with a considerable freedom), but also because jazz is not a tradition of re-performable works, at least in the sense typical of other kinds of music, such as western classical tradition and even folk. This might seem odd, since neither are there scores in folk music: but the goal of traditional oral music is to preserve the structure of a social practice as accurately as possible, not to produce original and interesting performance, and this could be achieved even in absence of scores. In other words, jazz uses a different kind of inscription of the musical text, neither completely based on western notation, nor on oral transmission. Hence, in the informative model, the form of the musical piece is determined from the inside layer, i.e. directly into the performative situation in which it takes place, and does not depend on an external entity, a pre-composed work of music. It coheres with the “theory of information” from which it takes its name, the informative model consists in a pattern which does not prescribe what pitches must be played, but offers a high rate of potential choices. Let us analyse this: it insists on the choices being made from the players, rather than on the structure of a text (written or not) that comes before the performance. The text of a jazz piece, therefore, is developed at the same time in which the main decisions on what in western music are called “expressive features” are made. In other words, to use Giannattasio’s terminology again, the shape given to the sound, which makes it rough, bright, delicate, growing and so on, is not a variant: i.e. an expressive, suprasegmental feature added (and, as a consequence, not essential) to a certain pitch, but represents a formal and essential variation which directly constitutes the text.

The peculiarity of such a model emerges if we compare it with Roman Ingarden’s perspective, one of the most widespread theories dealing with the problem of identity of mu-
sical works. A fundamental issue which Ingarden wants to investigate is why should a musical artwork be unique if it allows different renditions. The answer depends on his original interpretation of the role of scores in musical practice: a notated text gives rise to different possibilities of instantiating it, but to preserve the identity of a musical artwork through different performances Ingarden writes that these possibilities are extremely limited (Ingarden 1989, pp. 240-241). This could be due to the fact that a written score, as Caporaletti (2005) argues, implicitly conveys a visual representation of the musical piece for which it stands a score, in particular, identifies every sound frequency with a symbol having an accurately measured, chronometric duration.

It could be argued that visual representation of musical phenomena aims at strongly limiting and disciplining the paths through which the text has to be developed, because there is a perfect correspondence between a symbol (with a given duration) and a single sound frequency. This view by musicologist Jean Molino, considerably reduces the impact of such a perspective:

We are so accustomed to the rationalization of the musical system that we believe that a note cannot be defined otherwise than on the basis of a precise frequency value: before the rationalization of musical systems, their elements worked exactly as those of linguistic systems still work nowadays, i.e. using all the ranges of variation allowed by the configuration of every system (Molino 2005, p. 488).²⁹

What is important to focus on in jazz practice is not the single note which has to be played with the appropriate nuance, but rather a nebula of pitches that open up to the performer, again, a high rate of possible choices to be made in order to inform the musical piece. Thus, such a nebula of possible sounds has to be explored by the performer, and it is not possible to establish in advance a correct way to do it. This happens not because jazz is included in the oral tradition,³⁰ but because of the conception of limit typical of this musical world. In jazz, the notion of limit is related to the way in which the text is built: i.e. the core of the process that generates a tradition. It does not make sense to talk about “wrong notes” (Bertinetto 2014, pp. 122-132) in themselves, i.e., notes that are not prescribed by the score, or, to say it better, notes that are «melodically incoherent» with a harmonic framework that cannot be changed. Instead, we can say with Miles Davis that «there are no wrong notes in jazz. Only notes played in the wrong place. This is to say that musical pieces built through an informative model are able to dynamically modify the rules according to which a note could be wrong or not: i.e. inappropriate to be included in a certain context, in a given moment, having this or that stylistic features.³¹ It could well happen, therefore, that a note played at a given moment E₁ may sound wrong, while at E₂ the performer, changing for instance the chord underneath it, can make it right. Consequently, what in musical pieces are conceived through a prescriptive model, a mistake remains a mistake, without possibility to erase or correct it, in musical pieces defined by an informative model a mistake becomes an occasion to in-form, to re-form the piece.³²

As Stephen Davies says, jazz improvisation “aims at the presentation of real-time music making constrained only by the grammatical conventions of a style.” (Davies 2001, p. 19). On the contrary, musical practices based on a prescriptive model, such as western classical music or popular music,³³ place limits in order to exclude some notes from the content of the text itself, and the only rate of choice left to the interpreter concerns expressive aspects, the speed, and other secondary aspects.³⁴ In this latter case, a limit traces a path which comes to a determinate sound frequency—that one, and not another—is eligible to partake into the musical text. In jazz, the limit is a frontier to cross, which does not open up the text itself, but rather a way of playing, a language,³⁵ a stylistic tradition: i.e. the conditions to having a text at all. Furthermore, these conditions are always reversible and modifiable in the course of performance, which represents the place where jazz creativity can be conceived and, more precisely, practiced.

NOTES

1 This obviously happens because comparative ontology uses the same categories of the traditional one. Some doubts about a similar practice can also be read in Kania 2014.
2 See also the debate between Brown and Kania (Brown 2011, 2012; Kania 2012).
3 For a critical point of view on this model, see Bertinetto 2012. For a limited validity of the type/token model see Alperson 1984.
4 This doesn’t seem true for the concept of performance which we will examine in the final part of this paragraph.
5 I leave aside the issue of intentionality which is of fundamental importance in Ingarden’s theory, but it...
would too long to deal with here. We will go back to Ingarden’s view in the last paragraph.

6 Wolterstorff (1987) writes that not every musical phenomenon must be considered through the duality work/performance.

7 On the contrary, Peter Kivy embraces the so-called pure sonicism, in which every timbral aspect is automatically excluded from the definition of a musical artwork. These aspects are sharply re-evaluated in Levinson 1990, pp. 63-88, 77-78.

Concerning the difference between avantgarde research on improvisation and jazz practice see Sparti 2007, pp. 182-207.

9 An example of the perdurantism of this myth can be found in Brown 2000, pp. 111-125, 117-119.

10 This can also be said of originality in general: see Pareyson 1966, pp. 25-32.

11 We will see the extent to which the mastering material of different styles is important in jazz practice.

12 It is worth noting that our sense of model is slightly different from that of Caporaletti: he focuses on what elements give shape to the model, while the purpose of our dichotomy (prescriptive/informative) is to clarify the relation between the model and the musical text resulting from that.

13 For a general but effective view on this topic’s relation to jazz improvisation, see Gillespie 1991, pp. 147-164.

14 See for example the case of Chick Corea, who developed his improvisational style on Bud Powell’s licks, or that of Charlie Parker, who did the same using Lester Brown’s records. See Caporaletti 2005, p. 131.

15 On contrafacts, see Bertinetto 2013, pp. 101-132; Caporaletti 2005, p. 308.

16 “By acquiring facility with these formulas and committing them to memory, the player greatly eases the task of learning to improvise on new tunes” (Baker 1988, p. 27).

17 A similar view on improvisation can be found in Lewis 2004, pp. 131-162). Here he distinguishes between the Eurological and Afrological approach to improvisation: while the former “insists on ephemerality”, the latter “considers improvisation in terms of re-appropriation, reworking and transformation of received materials” (Bertinetto 2012, pp. 1-22).

18 For instance Monson 1996.

19 This track can be found in The Miles Davis Sextet, Jazz at The Plaza, Columbia 1958.

20 A critic against this view is Gushee 1981, pp. 151-169.


22 A. Sbordoni, Comporre interattivo. Una valida prospettiva, in Id. (a cura di), Improvvisazione oggi, LIM, Lucca 2014, pp. 89-95, pp. 90-91.

23 Nevertheless, there are scholars who tend to deny that improvisation is the main feature of jazz music basing their claims on the fact that many jazz musicians such as Duke Ellington made a great deal of use of scores: see Chevan 1997; Knauer 1990, pp. 20-38.

24 See Arbo 2013, p. 27.

25 On this notion, see Ferraris 2009, pp. 43-45.

26 Ingarden, 1989a, p. 67.

27 “The jazz improviser must grasp the information supplied by the rhythm section to put syntactical order to the language statement, and grammar of the jazz solo” (Tirro 1974, p. 288).


29 “Nous sommes tellement habitués à la rationalisation du système musical que nous croyons qu’une note ne peut se définir que par la valeur exacte d’une fréquence : avant la rationalisation des systèmes musicaux, leurs unités fonctionnaient exactement comme fonctionnent encore les unites des systèmes linguistiques, c’est-à-dire en utilisant toutes les marges de variation premises par la configuration de chaque système”.

30 Molino attributes the high rate of potential choice which we talked about only to oral cultures. But we have to consider that even oral cultures can be considerably binding (See Arbo 2013, p. 27). For critical remarks on the idea of including jazz in oral culture, see Caporaletti 2005, pp. 135-150.

31 See the interesting reflections on the notion of kairós in Goldoni, 2013, p. 145.

32 For a clever insight into these problems, see Bertinetto forthcoming.

33 In this latter case, especially as far as lyrics are concerned.

34 Cadenzas in classical music represent a partial exception (Brown 2011b, p. 59). Although, it is worth noting that in the presence of a cadenza improvisation is prescribed, but it does not give rise to an informative model of creating music. See Bertinetto 2012b, p. 114.

35 On the relation between jazz and ordinary conversation, see Monson 1996.
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