I am honored and humbled by the kind attention my book has received in this Cosmos & Taxis symposium. I thank the journal, its editors, my friend Bill Butos, and the symposium contributors for their interest, efforts, and comments.

I suppose *Expert Failure* was a confession of sorts: This I believe. Or perhaps I should call it *cri de coeur,* for I believe that the problem of experts deserves our urgent attention. But it is not enough to cry out. One must act. And one’s actions must not make things worse. First do no harm. To help guide our actions, we need a true and proper theory of experts, some way to put that theory to the test, and a way to translate tested theory into action. I am bold enough to think I have made progress on those fronts. I have built on the work of others, of course, including Berger and Luckmann (1966), F. A. Hayek, David M. Levy, Sandra Peart, Vernon Smith, and Stephen Turner. I think I have made enough progress, however, to claim some degree of novelty for my effort. And some of the novel elements in the book probably deserve attention before I comment on the symposium papers.

First, I have provided a novel definition of “expert,” without which progress in the theory of experts may be stymied. In the past almost all definitions of “expert” hinge on the expert’s supposed expertise, driving some writers into futile attempts to somehow distinguish “true” from “false” expertise. Such definitions of “expert” have another irresolvable problem. Because each person occupies a unique place in the division of labor, each person has special expertise. But if everyone is an expert, no one is an expert, and the word can do no intellectual work. Cutting the Gordian knot, I define an “expert” as “anyone paid for their opinion.” Thus, an expert is defined by their contractual role rather than their supposed expertise. Armed with this definition, I can show that economic models of expert choice are not just credence goods models, asymmetric information models, or standard principal-agent models, obvious overlaps notwithstanding. It is a distinct subfield of economics, which deserves separate attention.

Second, I have provided a structural theory of expert failure. The theory is not exhausted by the simple table I give in Chapter 10 (p. 190), but that figure (reproduced below) identifies the most important institutional elements of the theory. There are two main institutional dimensions to expert failure. The first is whether experts are merely advisory or whether, instead, the expert chooses for the non-expert. The second is whether experts are in competition or, instead, enjoy monopoly power. The highest chance of expert failure comes from the “rule of experts,” wherein monopoly experts choose for the non-expert. The lowest chance of expert failure comes from “self-rule or autonomy,” wherein competing experts offer advice without being able to choose for the non-expert.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert decides for the non-expert</th>
<th>Rule of experts</th>
<th>Competitive experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-expert decides based, perhaps, on expert advice</td>
<td>Examples include state-administered eugenics programs, central planning of economic activity, and central bank monetary policy. Highest chance of expert failure</td>
<td>Quasi-rule of experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example include school vouchers, Tiebout competition, and representative democracy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert-dependent choice</th>
<th>Self-rule or autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examples include religion under a theocratic state and state-enforced religion.</td>
<td>Examples include periodicals such as <em>Consumer Reports,</em> the market for preferences, and venture capital. Lowest chance of expert failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, I might make a comment about “epistemic systems design,” which is a variant of Vernon Smith’s “economic systems design.” In the latter we go to the human-
subjects laboratory to test the economic properties of different arrangements. We can compare, for example, Dutch auctions, in which the price is lowered until a taker is found to English auctions in which the price is raised until no more takers are found. It turns out that English auctions are more “efficient.” They do a better job of getting the goods into the hands of those who value them most. Once you have a market design that works well in the laboratory, you can export it to the real world. Your design may well need some adjustment once it has made the move from the constructed social world of the laboratory to the natural social world, but the basic design features will probably work more or less as planned. This is the work that helped earn Smith a Nobel Prize. I have suggested that we go to the human-subjects laboratory to test the epistemic properties of different arrangements. My co-authors and I have shown, for example, that a properly designed system of redundancy in forensic science could reduce error rates (Koppl et al. 2008). I have said that it is not enough to cry out; we must act. Epistemic systems design is a technique that helps us to both test theory and translate tested theory into action. An old joke notes that everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it. The problem of experts is not like the weather. We can do something about it. And I believe I have found principles and techniques that may help us to mitigate the problem in at least some important contexts such as forensic science.

GARZARELLI AND INFANTINO

I am grateful to Garzarelli and Infantino for their stimulating precis of my book. They represent an Italian branch of the Austrian school, which deserves more attention. Magliulo says, “Nowadays, the Austrian School enjoys a high reputation in Italy” (2018, p. 66). Contributions to the Italo-Austrian school of social science include Garzarelli et al. (2019), Garzarelli and Keeton (2018), Infantino (2003), Cubeddu (1993), Antiseri (1990), and many others.

Garzarelli and Infantino adroitly describe my book as “a treatise in socioeconomic epistemics.” Social scientists do not ignore epistemics. If my framing is not badly mistaken, however, they tend to have inappropriate models of the production and distribution of knowledge in society. In the book, I tried to provide evidence that Hayek’s vision of dispersed knowledge is still not well appreciated, even though his knowledge papers (1937, 1945, 1946, 1974, 1978) are frequently cited.

We should probably change our whole epistemic perspective and adopt a more broadly Hayekian perspective. My discussion of “SELECT” knowledge was meant to clarify what Hayek’s very different epistemics are. It may be that I deviate in some way from Hayek’s epistemic vision, in part, perhaps, under the influence of Mandeville. Or it may be that I have done nothing more than repackage Hayek’s ideas for a new audience. It is, of course, a matter of indifference whether I have or have not somehow deviated from the master. In precisely the context of Hayek’s legacy, Peter Boettke (2018, p. 29) has said, “Scholars should be judged not only by the answers they provided to the problems they tackled during their careers, but the questions they motivate others to ask and the new avenues of inquiry their work opens up.” And it seems fair to say the Hayek’s knowledge papers opened up new epistemic avenues of social science research. My epistemics are “Hayekian” because they emerge from an exploration of the new avenues of inquiry Hayek opened up. Garzarelli and Infantino seem to hint that my “socioeconomic knowledge” is little different from Vernon Smith’s “ecological rationality.” Certainly, Smith (2009) helps me to work out the idea of SELECT knowledge. In any event, I think Garzarelli and Infantino are right to say, “SELECT’s synecological element is arguably the most fundamental epistemic pillar upon which Expert Failure rests.” And it is this element which seems underappreciated and underdeveloped in social science today, notwithstanding important exceptions such as Smith (2009), Hutchins (2009), and Boettke (2018).

Garzarelli and Infantino attempt to lift the gloom of my epistemic pessimism, particularly regarding the entangled deep state, by calling for improved training of individual minds. Parents teach their children simple heuristics such as “honesty is the best policy.” We can, similarly, “invest in making individuals more risk savvy,” by teaching appropriate heuristics à la Gigerenzer (2015). “Somewhat paradoxically,” they say,” “a possible solution to the tyranny experts” might be “to render more individuals experts along more than one decision making margin.” This solution seems in the same spirit as Levy and Past’s call for “transparent non-transparency.” In both cases, the call is for improving the individual’s ability to competently question the expert’s opinion. In my lingo, such moves would make individual non-experts less “powerless” and more “empowered.” I of course favor a more empowered laity. I confess, however, that I remain gloomier about such things than Garzarelli and Infantino.
Though I may be more epistemically gloomy than Garzarelli and Infantino, I do not forget that we should all do what we can in our various individual situations. And many of us should be working along precisely the lines Garzarelli and Infantino identify. In particular, educators should educate, which entails empowering their students. It is a cliché that schoolteachers and college professors often prefer obedience and admiration to educating their students. We should reach higher. We should (among other things) help our students to acquire the knowledge and thinking skills they need to competently evaluate expert opinions. We should help them to learn when to heed the expert’s advice, when – and how – to seek out more knowledge or information, and when to discretely flout the expert’s advice. Teachers have a fundamental moral and professional duty to enable, encourage, cultivate, and preach such empowerment. This duty is on us in American higher education in spite of all its many flaws, sins, and perversities. College students, as Caplan (2018) explains clearly, are mostly there to get credentialed, not educated in anything like the sense I have just sketchily indicated. College professors, as Brennan and Magness (2019) explain clearly, have the same humdrum motives as bus drivers and accountants. College administrators, as Lukianoff and Haidt (2018, pp. 200-201) explain clearly, prefer conformity and quiescence to free speech and open inquiry. We cannot, therefore, expect American higher education to provide much education. But each of us on the lonely side of the podium is a privileged actor with a moral duty to any of their students who might have at least some interest in education, rather than just certification. We have a moral duty to enable the sort of learning that happens only with a small minority of students. We have a moral duty to preach the meaning and value of education to students who may never before have had the opportunity to hear such talk and think such thoughts.

BOETTKE

If my book has merit, much of the credit goes to Peter Boettke, and not only for his kind encouragement. For many years now, Pete has been helping all of us in what he calls “mainline economics” to craft our research agendas and to position them appropriately within the larger context of the social sciences. I have been the happy beneficiary of his intellectual leadership. Regarding Expert Failure, it was Pete who saw the value of positioning my theory of experts in the context of Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. Boettke notes the important link between institutions and epistemics. I appreciate his emphasis on knowledge generation. Hayek’s notion of “dispersed knowledge” is not just about different people knowing different things. It is also about knowledge discovery, knowledge generation, and knowledge emergence. It is about learning. Boettke’s recent book, F. A. Hayek Economics, Political Economy and Social Philosophy delves deeply into the Hayekian link between knowledge and institutions, which Boettke deftly dubs “Hayek’s epistemic institutionalism” (2018, p. xviii). The book plumbs “Hayek’s deepening exploration of the epistemic properties of alternative institutional arrangements.” I believe Boettke first used the term in a Liberty Matters forum on “Hayek’s Epistemic Liberalism” (https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1m-hayek). I included the following two paragraphs in my comments there, and they seem apposite here as well.

The issue in epistemic institutionalism is how different social arrangements (institutions) affect the way dispersed knowledge is used, what sorts of facts people are likely to discover, and so on. How do alternative institutions influence the epistemic performance of the social system? Boettke discussed the salient example of socialism. Without a stock market, the economy cannot allocate capital well and things will go badly. Socialism is perfectly possible, but rational economic calculation under socialism is quite impossible. So-called capitalism, on the other hand, has a stock market. It has, therefore, market prices for capital goods and capital combinations. Rational economic calculation is therefore possible under “capitalism.” Under “capitalism” people can learn which capital combinations have greater value and which have less value. Capital therefore tends to move toward higher valued uses and away from lower valued uses.

Hayek seems to have only slowly arrived at a full understanding of the importance of epistemic institutionalism. Late in his career he said, “Together with some later related papers reprinted with it in Individualism and Economic Order, [‘Economics and Knowledge’] seems to me in retrospect the most original contribution I have made to the theory of economics (Hayek 1994, p. 68).” But in his 1937 paper he says, curiously, “I do not mean to suggest that there opens here and now a wide field for empirical research. I very much doubt whether such investigation would teach us anything new.” I think, instead, that his insights into dispersed knowledge open many wide fields for empirical research. Any of the standard sub-disciplines within economics can be studied from the perspective of epistemic institutionalism. The Mises-Hayek argument on socialist
calculation should be at the center of comparative systems theory (Boettke 2001). Easterly (2013) has brought Hayekian epistemics to development economics. Kirznem (1973) showed the centrality of epistemic institutionalism to the core of microeconomic theory. And so on. Coyne (2008) studies war from just this perspective. Horwitz (2015) has brought this perspective to the study of the family. My co-authors and I have looked at criminal justice (Koppl and Sacks 2013), forensic science (Koppl 2005, 2010) and experts (Koppl 2012, 2015, 2018) as problems in epistemic institutionalism. We should be bold and creative in applying Austrian epistemics to diverse topics such as art history, the administrative state, child protective services, medicine, and espionage.

BUTOS

The problem of experts would not exist if we all knew about the same things. But in an advanced division of labor, there is also an elaborate division of knowledge. Butos focuses on this central point. I am not surprised to see such a focus from Butos. He and his co-authors have returned again and again to Hayek’s knowledge papers and his seminal work in theoretical psychology, The Sensory Order. (See, for example, Butos 2012, Butos and Koppl 2007, and McQuade and Butos 2005.) Early in my career I enjoyed disproportionate benefits from this focus of Butos’ scholarship. My collaboration with Butos, which included the first published paper on Big Players, helped me to develop and refine my ideas on the production and distribution of knowledge in society.

Butos is right, I think, to emphasize “system-level knowledge.” If my interpretation of dispersed knowledge is about right, then systems of interacting persons generate a kind of system-level knowledge not readily addressed by epistemologies that begin with a definition of “knowledge” as “justified true belief.” Some bits of the knowledge co-evolving with the division of labor are bookish, explicit, and housed within human crania. In the main, however, it is Synecological, EvoLutionary, Exosomatic, Constitutive, and Tacit (SELECT). Butos explores such knowledge with the concept of “adaptive classifying systems,” which he and Thomas McQuade have developed in earlier work (McQuade and Butos 2005). Doing so seems entirely apposite to me. We could almost view “society” as a “knowing system” except that it is “non-teleological” as Butos is careful to point out. It probably doesn’t matter whether we call such classifications “knowledge” as long as we recognize what is and is not “non-reflexive, unconscious, and non-teleological.” S-LECT knowledge is knowledge because it shapes and informs the “teleological” choices of individuals and organizations. Butos emphasizes the parallelism between Hayek’s theory of mind and the adaptive classifying systems that produce system-level knowledge. In both cases we have an emergent order that does epistemic work without which the emergent system would collapse into its separate components, no longer functioning as a synecological whole.

DEVEREAUX

As Butos notes, centralized decision making may easily impair the epistemic properties of the system being centralized, with this risk generally being higher the more complete the centralization. For this reason, I have called for the piecemeal dismantling of the administrative state. Devereaux suggests that this call may be unnecessary. She foresees “piecemeal circumnavigation of the administrative state.” She illustrates this possibility with the sharing economy, crypto currency, and smart contracts.

Devereaux’s argument bears some similarity to Ed Kane’s “regulatory dialectic” (Kane 1977, 1981, 1988). Kane’s argument builds from an insight that has recently been developed in detail by Richard Wagner and his co-authors under the felicitous label “entanglement” (Wagner 2010, Smith et al. 2011). Kane says, “Far from being a politically self-contained disturbance to financial markets, ‘deregulation’ is an endogenous response by regulators to changes in the economic constraints that financial markets impose upon them” (1988, p. 328). Kane goes on explain the “regulatory dialectic” of “regulation,” “avoidance,” and “reregulation.” In this game private actors are generally lighter on their feet than hidebound regulators. In the long-run, however, the dialectic tends to culminate in efficient regulations. “Precisely because inefficient patterns of regulation impose excessively burdensome costs either on regulatees, their customers, or the general taxpayer, the burdened parties must be expected sooner or later to develop avoidance strategies by which to throw these burdens aside” (1988, p. 333). This argument for regulatory efficiency has some similarity to arguments for the efficiency of the common law made by Adam Smith (1776), Paul Rubin (1977) and others. I hope Devereaux is right. Her argument is, at a minimum, plausible. And we have at least some precedent. Newspapers in California in the 1860s would sometimes list persons who had defaulted on their gold-denominated debts by forcing depreciated legal tender on their creditors (Cross 1945, p. 273). Greenfield and Rockoff (1996, p. 905, n. 2), who draw
our attention to Cross’s article, tell us such forcing was called “greenbacking.” Outing greenbackers was a work-around that greatly reduced the importance of fiat money inflation in California. The digital workarounds Devereaux points to are happening right now. The process may well culminate in the withering away of the importance of the state, though it will likely not cause the withering away of the state itself.

Devereaux’s argument seems to suggest that democratic politics will grow even crazier in the coming years. She notes an implication of her circumvention thesis: “Choosing good political representatives will matter less, and the opportunity cost of voting based on impulse and emotion rather than based on reasoned reflection will go down.” Indeed, the opportunity cost of whimsical, impulsive, and performative political action will fall for all participants in the political process, including both voters and the elected representatives of the people. If the opportunity cost of something goes down, we generally get more of it. And technological advance seems to be reducing the opportunity cost of political melodrama. Politics is spectacle, and the spectacle does seem to be growing increasingly showy and shallow in at least some of the world’s rich democracies. In the US today Team Blue and Team Red vilify one another in increasingly virulent terms. My opponent is no longer “worthy,” but evil, stupid, and an immediate threat to all that is good and decent or even to life itself (Kalmore and Mason 2019).

I am reminded of the fanatic loyalty to blue and green teams in Byzantine Rome, which produced the infamous Nika riot of 532 in Constantinople. The political dimension to such fanaticism is debated, as is the uniqueness of the Nika riot. But we should view the madness of it all as a warning.

Competing teams in Roman chariot races were distinguished by their colors. Over time blue and green came to be the dominant two colors. Adherents to each color often came into violent conflict in the wake of the victory of one and defeat of the other in the arena. The Nika riots were a particularly infamous case of violence between the Greens and the Blues. Gibbon’s (1776) description is vivid.

[T]he women, from the roofs and windows, showered stones on the heads of the soldiers, who darted firebrands against the houses; and the various flames, which had been kindled by the hands of citizens and strangers spread without control over the face of the city. The conflagration involved the cathedral of St. Sophia, the baths of Zeuxippus, a part of the palace, from the first entrance to the altar of Mars, and the long portico from the palace to the forum of Constantine; a large hospital, with the sick patients, was consumed; many churches and stately edifices were destroyed, and an immense treasure of gold and silver was either melted or lost. From such scenes of horror and distress, the wise and wealthy citizens escaped over the Bosphorus to the Asiatic side; and during five days Constantinople was abandoned to the factions (p. 25).

In the United States today we do not have the Blues and the Greens; we have Team Blue and Team Red. As the state grows increasingly irrelevant, one’s adherence to Team Blue or Team Red will have less and less to do with considered policy preferences and more and more to do with personal identity. The more easily we circumvent the administrative state, the more purely symbolic will be one’s political loyalty. Can we laugh off the show as silly spectacle? Or should we be afraid that mad politics will reverse the very technological advances that had been making the administrative state increasingly irrelevant? I think on long views of, say, 200 years and more we can be relaxed and happy. If Koppl et al. (2018) are right, technological progress will continue to enrich us. And rich people are better at defending their rights than poor people. But in the short run of 50 to 150 years, things can go very badly indeed as the Soviet Union illustrates. On the one hand it lasted “only” about 70 years. On the other hand, how much human suffering accumulated in those decades!

LANGLOIS

Richard Langlois has been a deep intellectual influence on me. To cite just one important example, he taught me the importance of the “system constraint” in generating predictable outcomes, which is an insight central to my theory of Big Players. His fealty to the truth has also been a valuable object lesson for me. This fealty to truth has led him to delicately criticize my discussion of corporate power. It is possible, of course, that Langlois’s erudition and penetration, which well exceed my own modest skills, have led him to the better view. But I think he misses a distinction that may be relevant to our disagreement. I must take the blame, however, for flagging the distinction in question only by an oblique reference to “reasons not entirely unlike those Hayek articulated.” I should have been clearer. I cited...
favorably Hayek’s (1960) essay “The Corporation in a Democratic Society: In Whose Interest Ought It To and Will It Be Run?” Langlois correctly characterizes the “pyramiding” Hayek there decries. “Hayek . . . warns of the dangers of allowing corporations to hold stock in other corporations, which permits a pyramiding of holding companies: an apex company can hold controlling stock in daughter companies, which can in turn hold stock in other companies, and so on down the line, providing the owner of the apex company with control of vast resources that are mostly owned by minority shareholders.” Although I cited Hayek, pyramiding was not my concern. As far as I can tell, Langlois has the right fix for pyramiding: “Let expert would-be managers compete in the market for corporate control.” This solution requires, as Langlois notes, “removing anti-takeover defenses (and other pro-management legal arrangements) in order to allow true competition to discipline (expert) managers.”

My concern was not pyramiding, but something we might call “levitating.” A group of firms is levitating if it collectively owns controlling shares in itself. I gave a simple (and merely illustrative) numerical example in my book. In that example 1) a majority of firm A’s shares are owned by firms B and C, 2) a majority of firm B’s shares are owned by firms A and C, and 3) a majority of firm C’s shares are owned by firms A and B. As long as these three firms continue to levitate together, no group of human stockholders can influence the management of any of the three firms in the levitation set. The market for corporate control is suspended for levitating firms. It is levitating, not pyramiding, that produces the result Hayek feared: “the tendency of corporations to develop into self-willed and possibly irresponsible empires, aggregates of enormous and largely uncontrollable power” (Hayek 1960, p. 311). While my numerical example was illustrative, Vitali et al. (2011) have shown that levitating is a real phenomenon. They find a significant degree of levitating among large transnational corporations (TNCs). A “large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions.” And “nearly 4/10 of the control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held, via a complicated web of ownership relations, by a group of 147 TNCs in the core, which has almost full control over itself.” Moreover, “3/4 of the core are financial intermediaries.”

What will levitating firms do? We can start to answer that question by considering what they will not do. They will not act to maximize profits for any human shareholders. (Of course, when we speak of “profit maximization” we really mean – or should mean – maximizing the wealth of shareholders.) It may well be appropriate for a levitating firm to issue dividends or buy back shares of common equity. Doing so could make stock ownership attractive to entities outside the levitation set. And the consequent ability to raise capital from stock issues will help a levitating firm, no less than a grounded firm, to minimize its cost of capital. But in this scenario stocks might almost be compared to callable bonds with variable coupon payments and no maturity date. A levitating firm has no incentive, however, to return any more value to its shareholders than is required to minimize its cost of capital. Any remaining surplus can be plowed back into the enterprise or other firms in the levitation set. It is generally in the interest of management in a levitating firm to prioritize growth over profits. Presumably, growth is not the only goal of a levitating firm. Stability seems an obvious candidate. Management wants a predictable environment from which to extract its rents. And it wants it to protect those rents from competition. Thus, a large levitating firm is likely to be a strong voice in opposition to “greed” and “unbridled capitalism.” It is more likely to be a cronyist creature than co-equal competitor.

It seems reasonable to fear the potential political power of levitating firms.

Before turning to Scott Scheall’s contribution, I would like to express disagreement with Langlois on the role of discretion in government bureaus. Citing Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, Langlois says, “The flunky who came to the door to take the kids away had no discretion; she was just following the rules.” The bureau that snatches the child away hires an expert to make a judgment of the parents’ supposed fitness. The judgment given is subjective; there is no parental-fitness algorithm. If there were, the bureau would have no need of a credentialed expert. The expert’s opinion is then plugged into the machine as a kind of replaceable module. Indeed, citing Reid (2012), I provided an example in which the relevant bureau in the UK sought out an expert opinion three times over before getting one that suited its apparent bureaucratic interests. Something similar can happen in forensic science, where the forensic examiner’s subjective opinion about potentially ambiguous data is plugged into the larger criminal-justice system. This modular role of expert opinion creates a great scope for discretion in the administrative state. This role of discretionary expert opinion in the administrative state abrogates the rule of law, which, Dicey tell us, “excludes . . . wide discretionary authority on the part of the government” (1982, p. 120). The administrative state is not a bulwark of the rule of law.
law. It is an interesting exercise to consider whether a purely algorithmic administrative state might be unpredictable and thus in violation of the rule of law. As far as I can tell, however, that would be an arid and purely speculative exercise. The substantive “real world” point seems to be the role of subjective judgement in ambiguous circumstances.

SCHEALL

Scott Scheall tells us that politicians are like drunks: they look for their keys under the lamppost. This point seems valid and worth pursuing. I wonder, however, whether Scheall and I have fully compatible views of the role of “epistemic burden” in human choices. Scheall says, “If I am correct that ignorance serves to determine incentives, then, other things equal, we should expect to find fewer experts with regard to relatively epistemically burdensome topics and more experts regarding topics with respect to which adequate knowledge is more easily acquired.” As far as I can tell, Scheall’s expectation is mistaken. We seem to have an abundance of experts in areas he would, I think, consider to be “epistemically burdensome.” As I say in my book, “Under competitive conditions in the market for ideas, the demand for magical thinking meets a willing supply.” In financial markets, “technical analysis” is demanded and supplied. Psychics and wizards persist notwithstanding the advance of science. In the Christian Bible Jesus says, “But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, but My Father only” (Matthew 24:36). And yet many persons who believe the Bible to be divinely inspired demand and thus in violation of the rule of law. As far as I can tell, however, that would be an arid and purely speculative exercise. The substantive “real world” point seems to be the role of subjective judgement in ambiguous circumstances.

TURNER

Stephen Turner is the author of a classic article in the theory of experts, “What is the Problem with Experts?” When I first tried to learn the literature on experts I wrote to Turner for help, which he generously offered even though he did not know me. His generosity on that occasion reflects the highest standards of academic citizenship. Turner’s contribution to this symposium notes the problem of massive error among experts. And it is a difficult problem. He says, “Koppl doesn’t have a solution to the problem of massive error, and neither do I.” He’s right. I do not have a scheme to detect or root out massive expert error. An old joke has a science skeptic insisting that the earth rests on the back of a turtle. And what does the turtle rest on, asks the scientist triumphantly? It’s turtles all the way down, replies the skeptic. Turner notes that science and, indeed, all knowledge has a turtles problem. “[I]t is markets for opinions, including opinions about opinions, all the way down.” Turner is right once again.

Turner’s turtle problem crops up even in logic and pure math, as is illustrated in Lewis Carroll’s (1895) charming essay, “What the Tortoise said to Achilles.” Tortoise asks Achilles whether he accepts a simple deduction in Euclid’s elements. The two premises are A: “Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other” and B: “The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.” Tortoise then draws the conclusion Z: “The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.” The unsuspecting Achilles agrees that it is a fine piece of reasoning. Tortoise points out a hidden premise, however. C: “If A and B are true, Z must be true.” And now we are, as it were, off to the races. For there is yet another hidden premise, D, to the effect that if C, A and B are all true, then so is Z. The game cannot be brought to a close and poor desperate Achilles must endure the reading out of an infinite list of hidden premises. It’s tortoises – I mean turtles – all the way down.

The turtle’s problem and the problem of massive expert error are related. Massive expert failure is possible because it is opinion all the way down. I have noted in my book techniques that can mitigate – though never remove – the turtles problem and its unhappy progeny, massive expert failure.

One thing we can do is practice epistemic systems design, which I described above. Another thing we can do is eliminate professional licensing, which tends to augment the monopoly power of experts. Licensing restrictions strengthen
professional associations. Azocar and Ferree (2016) make the crucial point in a useful review article.

The sociology of occupations and professions emerged with primary concern to explain what was distinctive about professions, which scholars defined as their capacity to monopolize esoteric knowledge (Parsons, 1939; Hughes, 1994; Wilensky, 1964; Millerson, 1964; Becker, 1970; Friedson, 1970). As a result, expertise became the core feature of professions. Expertise was understood not only having both practical and theoretical dimensions (what knowledge was and how it was used) but also intrinsically evolving into ever more rational forms (Parsons, 1939; Friedson, 1970; Abbott, 1988).

Such measures can be helpful, I think, but they cannot eliminate massive expert failure. Nor can the get around the turtles problem.

WAGNER

It is probably fair to describe my book as combining Virginia political economy with Austrian epistemics, as Garzarelli and Infantino note in this symposium. And Richard Wagner has long represented the intersection of the Virgin-ia and Austrian schools. Today, thanks in large measure to Peter Boettke, we think of that intersection as obvious and natural. And, indeed, the earliest founders of public choice theory were deeply influenced by Mises and Hayek. (See Koppl 2006.) But there was a time when Richard had little or no company in that space. His patient work there has been an important service to both traditions.

The context for my work is very broad indeed. The literature on experts stretches back to antiquity and ranges widely from mathematical complexity theory to the history of Anglo-American law to phenomenological sociology and beyond. Wagner draws attention to three important figures in this firmament: F. A. Hayek, Frank Knight, and Vilfredo Pareto. Of these three, Hayek has been the most important direct influence on me. If it can be shown that my book deviates from Hayek in some important way, then so much the worse for Hayek. And my reading of Mandeville may have drawn me to a more radically egalitarian epistemics than Hayek gave us. My inner subjective feeling, however, is that it’s all in Hayek and I have, at best, reframed a few important Hayekian truths.

Wagner is right to chide me, if only implicitly, for neglecting Pareto’s distinction between logical and non-logical actions. (The terms “logical” and “non-logical” are probably unfortunate, here, as they do not carry their ordinary meanings.) Citing Backhaus (1978) he notes that “political competition in non-logical environments can often lead voters to choose options they would not have chosen if those options had been proffered within an environment of logical action.” I am reminded of the 1969 film “Putney Swope,” which satirized white power and a corrupt corporate culture. The title character is the one black figure on the otherwise all-white board of an advertising firm. When the chairman of the board dies, they must elect a new chairman. But no one may vote for themself. Each of the (male) white board members decides to maximize his chance of winning by voting for the one person they all know cannot win, Putney Swope. In this way Swope is elected, much to the horror of his racist colleagues. In the fictional film, it is a good and delightful thing that the childish folly and corruption of others swept Swope swiftly into power. Unfortunately, an equally childish folly and corruption among legislators can destroy democracy, as illustrated by the rise of the fascist Dollfuss regime in inter-war Austria. In 1932 Dollfuss came to power in Austria as a result of a ballot mix-up and a childish dispute between two deputies. (See Greaves 2011 p. 31 and references cited therein.) The political circus of modern rich democracies may continue to be nothing but tragi-comic entertainment. Devereaux’s circumvention thesis may give us reason to hope so. But the final collapse of democracy in Austria should give us pause and, perhaps, induce us to think how we might avoid a similar fate.

Wagner’s discussion of the Knightian tradition is subtle. It is an important and honorable tradition. I appreciate, for example, a Knightian point flagged by Wagner: Our political preferences are not independent of political action, including political discussion. And I appreciate the Knightian insistence on equality between the theorist and the theorized, which I invoked when noting “the anthill problem.” As social scientists, I said, “We see society as an anthill and people as ants. We gaze down upon the anthill as if we were higher beings,” whereas each of us is, in reality, but another ant in the anthill. Alluding to Simon’s comment on Courn-ot (1976, p. 140), I said, “The permanent and ineradicable crisis of social science is the theorist’s dual role as godlike observer and equal participant” (p. 20). The anthill problem closely related to the “analytical egalitarianism” rightly touted by Peart and Levy (2005, p. 3). And yet I wonder if I
—or Wagner—fall fully within the Knightian “discussion” tradition.

If Levy and Peart (2017) are right, the “requirements” for Knightian “discussion,” include “real listening and moral restraint.” But, following Mandeville, I have to doubt how much “real listening” humans are capable of. Every discussion with another person, and every internal dialogue is an opportunity for both deception and self-deception. We are taught the “Habit of Hypocrisy, by the Help of which, we have learned from our Cradle to hide even from our selves the vast Extent of Self-Love, and all its different Branches” (Mandeville 1729, vol. I, p. 140). Modern evolutionary psychology seems to support the view that humans have a universally shared “capacity for self-deception” (Nesse and Lloyd 1992). Wagner seems to recognize the problem of self-deception. He cites favorably Cowen’s (2005) analysis of self-deception in politics, which has pessimistic conclusions for democracy. “Democracy does not give us wealth-maximizing outcomes,” Cowen concludes, “but perhaps it does the best job possible, relative to alternative institutions” (p. 448). Knight had distinguished discussion from debate. Wagner notes, however, “Whether discourse is among people who deceive themselves or is eristic in the presence of an audience is probably a moot question because the two are observationally equivalent.” If Mandeville and, indeed, hosts of thinkers ancient and modern, are right about human self-deception, then Knightian discussion may be harder to achieve than its advocates seem to believe. As Cowen says, “[I]t is very difficult to improve the workings of politics” (2005, p. 448).

These thoughts on discussion, debate, and self-deception raise the problem of populism and technocracy, which is present in many countries today including most of the rich democracies. Citing Mudde (2004) and Bickerton and Accetti (2015) my book notes that in the US and elsewhere we are increasingly clustered about the two poles of populism and technocracy, which are alike in rejecting pluralistic democracy. I fear that voices at each pole may be growing more explicitly anti-democratic. To cite a minor, but quite recent, example, on 23 April 2019 Will Wilkinson of the Niskanen Center tweeted, “I’m Madisonian enough to think Trump’s power is straight-up illegitimate, independent of questions about it [sic] election results” (https://twitter.com/willwilkinson/status/1120715489574105089). Mr. Wilkinson seems to have forgotten that a democratic electorate might freely choose candidates and policies he dislikes.

Wilkinson aside, many “progressive” thinkers seem to have adopted an attitude of superiority to the very populations they claim to be working for. They are like the communist Gillian in the Wyndham Lewis novel The Revenge for Love, who mused, “The proletariat were the weak-spot in the communist scheme of things, ultimately” (1937, p. 203). She despised the very proletariat she would save. “Those who were not of the class for whom all this was being done had to be a sort of saint, as far as she could see, to stomach all they had to stomach—in the way of ingratitude, recrimination, and general brutality.” Gillian was “full of class-hatred of the class it was her hard lot to save” (1937, p. 219).

If technocrats often despise the democratic electorate that they pretend to serve and protect, we must not lurch to the populist political pole in attempted solidarity with ordinary persons. Surely, our sympathies should be with ordinary persons and most with the least among us. But populist leaders, like their progressive duals, seek to deny the democratic legitimacy of their political opponents. This alarming state of affairs is illustrated by Donald Trump’s suggestion in 2016 that he might not accept defeat in the 2016 Presidential election and by recent hints that he might not accept defeat in the 2020 race (unattributed 2016, Bort 2019). The populist leader and the technocratic expert alike pretend to have possession of the truth. And they would forcibly impose that supposed truth on the people in the name of democracy. It is a relative detail that the technocrat invokes book learning and infallible science, while the populist invokes common sense and the wisdom of the people. In both cases the supposed knowledge being invoked is embodied in a person with power (the monopoly expert or populist leader) and is said to be unassailable. Someone imaging themself to have unassailable knowledge may easily think that dialogue is unnecessary. They may think that dialogue creates the danger of making the better argument seem the worse and the worse argument seem the better. This danger is equally present with technocrats and populists. It is an open question how to avoid these undemocratic political poles and cut a secure path to pluralistic democracy.

WIBLE

James Wible takes a rather more optimistic view of experts than I. He seems confident in the value of credentialing, for example, notwithstanding my attack thereon. “Advanced educational credentials and certifications may also help to fill in the picture of how competent an expert or professional scientist may be in his/her domain of specialized inquiry...”
and application.” Wible does not seem to recognize a difficulty with such credentialing, which I tried to emphasize in my book. “Professions such as medicine, law, and pharmacy,” I wrote, "may often serve to keep outsiders out and insiders in” (p. 205). In that case, credentialing makes the problem of experts worse and not better. Professions tend to give experts monopoly power.

Wible sees clearly that experts are paid. But it is not clear to me whether he recognizes such payments as essential to very meaning of “expert” in my system. It almost seems as if Wible equates experts to their expertise. “Experts know a lot more about certain things and processes than other people.” Often they do! But such expertise, I have insisted, is neither necessary nor sufficient to make one an expert in my sense. In my definition, recall, an expert is anyone paid for their opinion. It is a contractual role and not something about who knows what.

Wible’s principal line of attack on expert failure is to admonish experts to be humble. He “argues for the cultivation of an attitude of humility.” Wible quotes Pierce’s admonition “Do not block the way of inquiry.” He (Wible) then says, “This is clearly an antidote for expert failure. Be alert to the limits of what one knows and the need to produce new expertise, new science, and new practice when those limits have been encountered.” In this symposium, Wible takes a position more agreeable to my own view: “If any remedy exists, it resides not in cajoling experts to replace some of their arrogance with humility. To the contrary, it requires changing the environment within which experts are selected and subsequently operate toward one whose principles of operation are consistent with [Paretian] logical action.” Should we cajole experts to be more humble as Wible recommends? Or should we change the environment within which they work? The policy of cajoling is the policy of high hopes and good wishes. Only a policy of structural change can be consistent with economic logic.

Wible says, my “real contribution” is showing that “a reflexive attitude needs to be kept in mind in the background of the thought and practice all of the time.” The passive voice is significant here. Precisely who should keep a reflexive attitude? The expert or the non-expert? If the former, Wible is taking up the position of Colander and Kupers (2014, pp. 173-174): Admonishing experts to be humble. If the later, he is taking up the position of Peart & Levy: Admonishing non-experts to be skeptical. I certainly agree that experts should be humble and non-experts should be skeptical. That normative stance, however, is not a theory of experts. Nor does it help me to learn when expert failure is more likely and when less. Nor does it present design features of institutional reform that might help people to reduce the incidence of expert failure. It is wisdom, not social science. I hope not to spurn wisdom. But I hope also to have produced a volume on the science of experts. Indeed, I am vain enough to imagine that my work, which builds on Berger, Luckmann, Peart, Levy, Turner, Hayek, and others, may be viewed as a founding text in what we might call “expert studies.”

REFERENCES

Carroll, Lewis. 1895. What the tortoise said to Achilles. 14 MIND 278, 278–80 (1895).


Dicey, A. V. 1982. Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics. (This volume is a reprint of the 8th edition of 1915.)


Greaves, R., Garzarelli, G., and Company. (At the time of this writing, available at http://lf-.


