Metaphysics, Religion, and Death

or

We’ll Always Have Paris

ROSAMARIA MAYORKA
Chair, Department of Arts and Philosophy
Miami Dade College

Verily, metaphysics is the Paris of the intellect
(Nation v.3.181)³

When good Americans die, they go to Paris
—Oscar Wilde⁴

Death and corruption are mere accidents or secondary phenomena. (CP 6.558)

Mostly dead is slightly alive. (The Princess Bride)

Two people have had a profound influence in my philosophical career—one, long dead before I came to know of him, and the other, very much alive, who not only introduced me to his thought, but has been throughout many years a source of encouragement and inspiration. The first is Charles Sandters Peirce and the second, Susan Haack.

I was a graduate student at the University of Miami in 1991 when I took my first course, PHI 591 Metaphysics, with the then-newly arrived British philosopher Susan Haack. It became immediately obvious that Dr. Haack was not just an accomplished scholar, but also a consummate educator, a rather uncommon combination in academia. It was during this semester that I first made Charles Peirce’s acquaintance—it was Dr. Haack’s pointing to Peirce’s remark that metaphysics is “the Paris of the intellect,” a place for exciting but perilous adventures—which piqued my interest immediately, and consequently decided my academic fate.⁵

Reading Peirce has had a similar contagious effect on many scholars (too numerous to mention),⁶ as is also the case with Haack,⁷ whose work in logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of law, etc., etc., throughout her career has been influenced by Peirce’s thought. In her work, Haack generally agrees with Peirce’s perspective, using it as inspiration in the development of her own views. We see this in Haack’s identifying various of her philosophical positions in Peircean terms: “Critical Common-sensism;” “Innocent Realism;” “Contrite Fallibilism;” “(Classical) Pragmatism;” and especially for the purposes of this paper, her realization in mid-career that she had been a “synechist” all along. I want to focus in particular on Haack’s discussion of metaphysics, specifically insofar as it bears on the relationship between science and religion, and as juxtaposed with Peirce’s religious views especially as found in his paper “Immortality in the Light of Synechism.”
Because of its highly speculative nature and disorienting tendencies towards “flights of fancy,” Peirce considered that the study of metaphysics must be undertaken with great care and caution. Currently “a puny, rickety, scrofulous science,” metaphysics’ “deplorably backward condition” in which “almost every proposition is… meaningless rubbish…or downright absurd” was due mostly to the fact, according to Peirce, that its study in the last few centuries had been mostly in the hands of theologians concerned with the promotion of certain interests instead of the search for truth. This has resulted in the “common opinion that Metaphysics is… intrinsically beyond the reach of human cognition.” This is a mistaken opinion, as Peirce will argue, for metaphysics “really rests on observations, whether consciously or not.” Only a genuine desire to find out how things truly are, the mark of a true scientist, coupled with the scientific method, that is, the use of experience and reasoning, will yield progress in metaphysics. Hence Peirce’s proposal to restore metaphysics, whose “business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects,” to its rightful path by transforming it into a “scientific metaphysics,” subject to genuine scientific inquiry. Unlike the kind of scientific inquiry in the natural sciences that relies on the use of specialized equipment to enhance our experience and aid our reasoning, the true metaphysician only needs to focus on the many features of our everyday experience; a difficult task, since we are so ingrained in its familiarity, we take many of its aspects for granted, making it difficult to observe and analyze this experience “at a distance.” And the reasoning involved will be all three modes as described by Peirce—inductive, deductive, and abductive.

As we know, Peirce made great progress in reforming metaphysics, and as he advanced in developing other areas of his philosophy, he linked them all to each other. His universal categories of firstness, secondness, thirdness; his scholastic realism; his phenomenology; logic of relatives; his normative theory; his evolutionary cosmology and the notions of agapism, tychism, and synechism, as well as his religious beliefs, are all intertwined and provide support to the vast architectonic system he dedicated his life to create.

Haack considers Peirce “a metaphysician of remarkable depth and breadth.” In attempting to make sense of the “present condition of philosophy…a snarl of often ill-defined ideas of the kind of thing and stuff there are,” she turns to Peirce and echoes his conviction that “[m]etaphysics does, and must, rest on observable phenomena.” If we fail to recognize this, it is because “the observations on which metaphysics depends are so familiar that we ordinarily pay no attention to them.”

But Haack does pay attention—she reflects on the world around her. And she practices what she preaches—her writings often include everyday examples from her own observations that illustrate a particularly subtle point—the shy cat that visits her backyard every morning who expects breakfast, but doesn’t really have the belief that it will be waiting; her friend’s two-year-old daughter’s amusing category mistake shows the gradual development of conceptualization and human mindedness; her three imaginary childhood friends “Dum,” “Dagwood,” and “Auntie Elsie” who never returned after her mother sent them off on holiday after packing a real suitcase, nicely contrasting the real with the illusory. In “Not Cynicism, But Synechism,” Haack shares the story of how she came to the realization that she was a synechist, and traces in the rest of the paper how Peirce’s “regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined… that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance” has influenced her metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind—

The idea, as I understand it, is rather that we should look for underlying continuities, and recognize that supposedly sharp distinctions may be better conceived as lines of demarcation drawn at some point on a continuum.

One synechistic theme Haack recognizes in her work is the fact that philosophy can be placed on a continuum to which the natural and social sciences also belong. This means that philosophy also addresses ever-evolving questions capable of true or false answers through genuine, good-faith inquiry that involves the method of experience and reasoning. But she does note—
Peirce says, not that objective idealism, agapism, tychism, logical realism, etc., are implied or required by synechism, but that synechism "carries [these ideas] along" with it; meaning that these hypotheses, being of the type that synechism qua regulative principle recommends, have the merit of being at least potentially explanatory. But their synechistic character does not guarantee their truth; and they are not the only hypotheses of the desirable, synechistic type.\(^{22}\)

Haack cautions that although she is "a kind of prope-synechist, i.e. a synechist in a broad sense" she does not "endorse all, or only, the synechist hypotheses that Peirce himself proposes."\(^{23}\) She finds that when Peirce discusses his synechism, e.g. in "The Logic of Continuity," the "stunning metaphysical panorama in which the idea of continuity is the organizing principle" linking other areas of his philosophy is

… Peirce the metaphysician at his most philosophically fertile, his most mathematically imaginative, his most scientifically sweeping, and his most cosmologically prescient; but also his most darkly Cimmerian.\(^{24}\)

I suspect that the "darkly Cimmerian" reference as well as her cautious endorsement of only some of Peirce's synechistic pronouncements involve Peirce's explicit claims in "Immortality in the Light of Synechism," which she mentions in passing, but does not discuss directly, namely Peirce's claims that synechism allows "the possibility of a continuity of carnal and spiritual consciousness," and that it "may play a part in the onement of religion and science."\(^{25}\) In another paper, "Fallibilism and Faith, Naturalism and the Supernatural, Science and Religion," she tackles the general issue of science and religion, the topic of the next section.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE ACCORDING TO HAACK

Although Haack does not discuss directly Peirce's views on religion and science,\(^{26}\) it is obvious that she does not support his synechistic endeavors regarding the "onement of religion and science." For one, she argues that religion (as well as theology) and science are fundamentally different enterprises—

The goal of scientific inquiry, as of any inquiry, is to find true answers to the questions within its scope... no scientific claim is in principle beyond the possibility of revision should new evidence demand it.\(^{27}\)

And religion—

Unlike science, religion is best conceived, not as a kind of inquiry, but as a body of belief, a creed... At the core of a religious creed is the belief that a purposeful spiritual being (or beings) brought the universe into existence, and gave human beings a very special place; and that this spiritual being is concerned about how we behave and what we believe, and can be influenced by our prayers and rituals. Moreover, religious belief is supposed to be, not tentative or hedged, but a profound commitment.\(^{28}\)

And theology—

… unlike religion, sets out to be a form of inquiry. But unlike scientific inquiry, theological inquiry welcomes, indeed seeks, supernatural explanations, in terms of God's making things so… [it] calls on evidential resources beyond reasoning and the senses: religious experience and revelation. So... there are significant discontinuities between scientific and such everyday [and scientific] inquiries.\(^{29}\)
Although Haack eschews supernatural entities and explanations for this, our real (natural) world, she is careful not to endorse any kind of scientism, characterized as "an excessively deferential attitude—a too uncritically uncritical stance—to the sciences" and which "in her mouth...is pejorative." As a self-declared Innocent Realist, she supports Peirce’s Extreme Scholastic Realism in the claim that all that is existent is real, but not all that is real is existent; that is, that laws, minds, concepts, as well as material objects, are real—in her words, “it’s all physical, all right, but it isn’t all physics—”

… there is more than just physical stuff, things, events, phenomena, properties, kinds, and laws. There are, besides, all our mental states and processes—our beliefs, fears, hopes, wishes, dreams, ideas, thoughts, associations, inferences, etc.; all the social institutions we humans have brought into being—from languages and other sign-systems to kin structures…

In Defending Science and “Brave New World,” Haack elaborates her naturalistic, yet “non-scientific” (non-reductionist) alternative to religious or theological answers to significant metaphysical questions by denying “inherently inexplicable and mysterious...mental stuff” but which poses and explains human “mindedness”—

I don’t think there’s mental stuff—no Cartesian minds, no souls, no spooks, no spiritual realm—only physical stuff; and yet, I think we humans really are (to borrow a word from George Herbert Mead) “minded” in a way no other creatures are, and that this in turn has enabled us to change the world by creating the vast array of social institutions and artifacts.

Beliefs, ideas, inferences, etc. come into being, Haack argues, because the “human imagination, intellect, design, plans, choices, actions, etc.,” bring them into being, and hence are real. Mindedness consists in “a distinctive combination of characteristics that we humans have in significantly greater degree” and in a fuller sense than other animals, namely, self-awareness, tool use, capacity for communication. A combination of evolutionary and social-historical theories do the work of explaining how social interactions are the means by which we gradually acquire language and are also what make us capable of “forming the complex, interwoven, and explicitly expressible beliefs, hopes, fears, wishes, etc., that are a distinctive feature of human mentality” in the brain. This process is visible in a singular fashion by observing the gradual process of language acquisition in infants and children.

So when comparing religious versus scientific answers to metaphysical questions, although religion “is no less quintessentially human an enterprise than science,” but because its fundamental appeal is to the human aspect that “craves certainty, likes to be elevated by mysteries, dislikes disagreeable truths, and clings to the idea that we are...the chosen creatures,” science, Haack believes, “really is, on all those dimensions, far and away the more admirable enterprise.”

How do Peirce’s views on religion and science compare to Haack’s?

RELIGION AND SCIENCE ACCORDING TO PEIRCE

Peirce was certainly aware, both theoretically and personally, of tensions between religion and science. He came from a family with a strong religious background and lived during the severe religious crisis caused by the 1859 publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, which questioned the view that humans were created intentionally as special beings by God and chosen to have dominion over all other creatures.

As a man of science, Peirce could not ignore the force of Darwin’s theory of evolution which linked humans in a continuous chain with other species and the rest of nature. Indeed, both Peirce’s notion of tychism, of objective chance in the world, as well as synechism, the notion of continuity, have strong connections to Darwin’s principle of fortuitous variation. At the same time, as a man of science, his conviction that metaphysics needed to adopt the scientific attitude of a genuine desire to search for truth never wavered. Indeed, he blames theologians (at least recent ones) for the sorry state of present-day metaphysics—
In my opinion the chief cause of its backward condition is that its leading professors have been theologians... since theology pretends to be a science, they must also be judged as scientific men. And in that regard I must say that another so deplorably corrupt an influence as theirs upon the morals of science I do not believe has ever been operative (CP 6.3)

But Peirce was also a man deeply concerned with religious matters, as his writings on religious topics attest. As one would expect, he struggled in trying to reconcile his religious with his scientific tendencies, and was uneasy about superficial attempts to achieve this. When, for example, in the 1890s the Open Court, a journal devoted to philosophy and religion announced its intention to make an “effort to conciliate religion with science,” Peirce wrote to Paul Carus, the editor, and asked “Is this wise? Is it not an endeavor to reach a foredetermined conclusion? And is not that an anti-scientific and anti-philosophical aim? Does such a struggle imply a defect of intellectual integrity?”

Peirce subsequently wrote several articles for the Monist and the Open Court; his synechism offered a possible rapprochement between religion and science by arguing for a continuum in which there is real connectedness between the physical and the mental/spiritual (and not unrelated parts) which shade into each other. In 1908 he published "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” the culmination of his religious thought.

We have seen above that Haack seems to find the synechistic attempts by Peirce towards “onement” between religion and science, at least as stated in “Immortality in Light of Synechism” to be unpersuasive. One reason stated is that “religion is best conceived, not as a kind of inquiry, but as a body of belief, a creed.” But that is not exactly how Peirce conceived of religion, at least not how he conceived of it in theory. To be sure, he criticized, as seen above, how religion was currently practiced by the clergy, as well as how current theologians understood theological theory. But there is sufficient evidence that Peirce thought that his ideal of a genuine truth-seeking community did not exclude religious believers.

Indeed, it is not surprising that Peirce’s developments in one area, i.e. science, would inform his perspective in another (religion), and vice versa.

In “A Religion of Science,” for example, he explains the difference between the two from a social/historical developmental point of view. Whereas science developed in such a way as to “not rest satisfied with existing opinions, but to press on to the real truth of nature,” those who “have the interests of religion at heart are apt to press backward...refus[ing] to go through her successive transformations with sufficient celerity to keep always in accord with the convictions of scientific philosophy.” However, “[w]hile adhering to the essence of religion,” a devoutly religious person can “cast aside that religious timidity… and cowardice... that is forever prompting the church to recoil from the paths into which the Governor of history is leading the minds of men... and will gladly go forward, sure that truth is not split into two warring doctrines.”

This is the ideal religion; not one with a “dead memory” or staid creed, but a “religion of science.” By this he does not mean a religion that worships science as the only source of truth (akin to a type of scientism—“a too uncritically uncritical a stance”—as Haack describes), but rather a religion in the “proper sense” of the word—“arising from nothing but the religious sensibility”—that becomes animated by the scientific spirit, confident that all the conquests of science will be triumphs of its own, and accepting all the results of science... as steps toward the truth, which may appear for a time to be in conflict with other truths, but which in such cases merely await adjustments which time is sure to effect.

One can also see Peirce’s emphasis on the importance of community in the notion of truth as that which a community of scientific inquirers will discover in the long run reflected in the importance of a community of believers—
... religion, though it begins in a seminal individual inspiration, only comes to full flower in a great church coextensive with a civilization. This is true of every religion, but supereminently so of the religion of love. Its ideal is that the whole world shall be united in the bond of a common love of God accomplished by each man's loving his neighbour. Without a church, the religion of love can have but a rudimentary existence; and a narrow, little exclusive church is almost worse than none. A great catholic church is wanted.49

Interestingly, Peirce’s religious views do not conflict with those of certain mainstream Christian theologians regarding the role of human reason and the possibility of attaining some knowledge of God. Indeed, although divine revelation as well as religious (mystical) experience are offered by some as proofs of God’s existence, they are not the only way to know of God. Thomas Aquinas, for example, famously tried to demonstrate with his Five Ways, a set of logical arguments based on different aspects of the natural world, that knowledge of the existence of God could be had separately from divine revelation.50 In his “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” Peirce attempted to make a case for God’s reality, not his existence, the latter being a nominalistic mistake.51 But one can also see in Peirce’s Neglected Argument a strategy for “the marriage of science and religion” by showing that the process of acquiring belief in God is of the same kind as the process for acquiring belief about the natural world—

It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion between self and self. If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours.52

Here, Peirce is intent in showing that the formation of the hypothesis that God is real is parallel to the formation of hypothesis in science, that is, the process that goes from observable phenomena and perception/perceptual judgement to conjecture, gets tested by experience and is either confirmed or not. The three interconnected stages of inquiry of abduction, deduction, and induction illustrate this process, which is the same in science and in religion, Peirce will want to claim.53

DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

In his 1871 review of Alexander Campbell Fraser’s edition of The Works of George Berkeley, Charles Peirce comments on the general lack of interest prevalent among “the most advanced minds” of his generation in “the only problems that metaphysics ever pretended to solve… the abstract acknowledgement of God, Freedom, and Immortality… now seen to have no practical consequence whatever”.54 For Peirce, though, as I’ve tried to show, these matters, as well as metaphysics in general, were far from dead. In “Science and Immortality,” written in 1887, Peirce writes:

…the theory of another life is very likely to be strengthened, along with spiritualistic views generally, when the palpable falsity of the mechanical philosophy of the universe which dominates the modern world shall be recognized. It is sufficient to go out into the air and open one’s eyes to see that the world is not governed altogether by mechanism, as…greater minds, would have us believe. The endless variety in the world has not been created by law. It is not the nature of uniformity to originate variation, nor of law to beget circumstance. When we gaze upon the multifariousness of nature, we are looking straight into the face of a living spontaneity. A day’s ramble in the country ought to bring that home to us (W 6:63).55
He concludes that since “mechanical philosophy of the universe” (again, “it’s not all physics”) is doomed, it must now give place to the possibility of more spiritualistic views, and he thinks it natural to anticipate that a further study of nature may possibly establish “the reality of a future life.” By a future life, Peirce meant that after death we shall retain or recover our individual consciousness, feeling, volition, memory; in short, a recovery of our mental powers unimpaired. And in “Immortality in the Light of Synechism” written some years later in 1893, Peirce considers again the possibility of a future life.

Here again his doctrine of synechism which, contra dualism, the philosophy which splits everything into two—materialism and idealism—maintains rather that continuity governs the whole domain of experience. The synechist, Peirce tells us, will not admit that physical and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct, but will insist that all phenomena are of one character—some more mental or spontaneous, and others more material and regular, but all alike exhibiting a mixture of “freedom and restraint.” Consciousness, on the mental/spontaneous side of the continuum, can be considered in three different ways (carnal, spiritual, and social), and it is in the context of these three that Peirce proposes that synechism can make sense of a claim to immortality.

Carnal individual consciousness is where feeling, volition, memory, and all mental powers are found, and is “but a small part of the man.” From a synechistic point of view, just as there are varying degrees of wakefulness and sleep, there are varying degrees between material life and death—“Synechism refuses to believe that when death comes, even the carnal consciousness ceases quickly.” Here, Peirce admits he may have been influenced by a work of fiction, Dreams of the Dead, reviewed by him in the Nation the year before, which poses the possibility of a dreamlike awareness remaining past bodily death which gradually fades and can eventually transform itself to a different state, that of a spiritual consciousness—

A man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole. This as an archetypal idea can never fail; and in the world to come is destined to a special spiritual embodiment.

To illustrate this transition in the present life, Peirce provides the example of a friend, who lost his sense of hearing, but developed a mode of consciousness that allowed him to “feel” and enjoy the music by standing close to the instrument. In the same manner, he says,

…when the carnal consciousness passes away in death, we shall at once perceive that we have had all along a lively spiritual consciousness which we have been confusing with something different.

And then there is a social consciousness—

… by which one’s spirit is embodied in others, and continues to live and breathe and have its being very much longer than superficial observers think… your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure… than you would believe.

Most scholars focus on Peirce’s comments about a future life as referring to the influence that a person’s life and ideas have on others and that remain after the person has passed, what he calls here a “social consciousness.” For Peirce, of course, this influence is real since ideas have the power to shape the conduct of others, so in this sense, the deceased person continues to have a “living” force. In this sense, it can certainly be said that Peirce continues to be a living presence amongst us. But I find his comments about the possibility of carnal consciousness shading into a continuum of a different kind of spiritual consciousness, as opposed to ending abruptly with death, more intriguing. Elsewhere, Peirce questions the notion of death as an absolute end—
Death and corruption are mere accidents or secondary phenomena. Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. Races, at any rate, do not die out except under unfavorable circumstances. From these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer, by the most unexceptionable logic, that there is probably in nature some agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased; and that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way with interference.63

In the 1987 fantasy-comedy film “The Princess Bride,” the character “Miracle Max,” an old folk healer, expresses a similar sentiment regarding death as he examines the lifeless body of young Wesley, the dashing protagonist, who has been tortured to death by the decree of the six-fingered villain. Pronouncing him as only “mostly dead,” Miracle Max explains that “mostly dead means slightly alive,” and proceeds to revive Wesley successfully with a chocolate-covered pill who then, of course, fights to win Princess Buttercup in the end, as befits the fairy tale.64 But the notion that the difference between life and death is more a matter of degree than of kind, is not confined to fairy tales (or horror stories).65

A recent feature in The New York Times reports on the work of a group of Yale neurobiologists studying the mammalian brain.66 It has been known since the early 1980’s that the brain cells of mammals remain fairly intact for several hours after loss of blood flow. Some time later, it was found that certain neurons remain electrically active hours after the pronouncement of death as well. But the Yale scientists achieved something unprecedented—with the help of a pump-like machine which circulated liquids through the vascular system of the disembodied brain of a recently- killed pig, they were able to restore metabolic activity to the dead brain cells. In other words, they restored life to already-dead tissue.67 Although the pig was dead, it was, Miracle Max would say, slightly (or partly) alive.

Nenad Sestan and his two Yale colleagues published the astounding results in Nature in April 2019. For six hours they maintained perfusion in the porcine brain, and they were able to restore complete metabolic function to the greater part of the brain; that is, the cells of the “dead” brain metabolized oxygen and glucose into substances such as carbon dioxide, an indication of life. “These findings, the scientists write, show that, with the appropriate interventions, the large mammalian brain retains an underappreciated capacity for…. restoration of…certain molecular and cellular functions multiple hours after circulatory arrest.”68

CONCLUSION

Although Haack admits to being “a kind of prope-synechist,” she does not share Peirce’s conviction that the doctrine can be utilized to marry religion and science, nor does she support his “darkly Cimmerian” views such as carnal or spiritual immortality. She provides a scientific (but not scientistic) account that proposes to explain human mindedness as resulting from socialization and language, a theory that makes further religious explanations unnecessary. I believe that Peirce would disagree only with the latter part of the theory, alleging that a view that separates religion and science is not quite synechistic (or fallibilistic) enough.69 As to Metaphysics, though, that “Paris of the intellect,” I want to say they both might concur with the sentiment (as would I) that “Paris is always a good idea.”70
NOTES

1. A portion of this paper was presented at the 2019 APA Central Division meeting in Denver, Colorado last February, and a translation in Spanish was presented at the VIII Jornadas ”Peirce en Argentina” in Buenos Aires in August of that year. I want to thank Mark Migotti for the many helpful suggestions offered for improving this paper.
2. This is Rick Blaine’s (Humphrey Bogart) farewell line to Ilsa Lund (Ingrid Bergman) in the movie Casablanca.
3. I use the customary abbreviations of CP for The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, followed by volume number and paragraph; EP for The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical, followed by volume and page number; W for The Writings of Charles S. Peirce, followed by volume and page number; N for Nation followed by volume and page number.
4. ”And where do bad Americans go to when they die?... They go to America,” from the dialogue between the duchess and Lord Henry in The Picture of Dorian Gray.
5. When I discovered soon after that he thought the medieval philosopher, John Duns Scotus, made the right call regarding the reality of universals, I was hooked, and settled on the topic of my dissertation, which Haack subsequently directed. Peirce’s stance on realism and its influence on other aspects of his philosophy has been an enduring interest for me throughout the years hence. See my From Realism to Realicism: The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce.
6. Writing in the midst of what will be remembered as the 2020 Covid-19 Pandemic, it is hard to resist using this metaphor, but of course, I mean no disrespect.
7. Although I have now known Susan Haack for almost thirty (!) years, it is still difficult for me to stop addressing her as ”Dr. Haack”. I attribute this to an inherent formality in Spanish, my native tongue, as a way of showing respect; Peirce and Haack would agree that language has an enormous effect on how one thinks—see e.g. Haack’s ”Brave New World: on Nature, Culture and the Limits of Reductionism” in Explaining the Mind discussed further below. However, for the rest of this paper, I will refer to our honoree by last name only, as is customary in academic writing.
8. CP 6.6, 6.2, 5.423
9. CP 6.2
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. CP 6.6. Of course, for Peirce, anyone with a true desire in searching for truth and a willingness to discard beliefs in the face of contrary evidence could be considered as following the scientific method.
13. ”Not Cynicism, But Synechism,” Putting Philosophy to Work, 84.
15. ”Not Cynicism,” 85.
16. Ibid.
17. ”Brave New World,” 53, 57.
18. ”The Real, the Fictional and the Fake.” Spazio Filosofico 2013, 211.
19. CP 6.173, 6.169
20. ”Not Cynicism, But Synechism,” 81.
21. Ibid., 86-89.
22. Ibid., 86.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 82.
25. Peirce, Essential Peirce 2.3 cited by Haack in ”Not Cynicism but Synechism,” 182.
26. Haack discusses science and religion more extensively in her previous Defending Science; the views expressed there are consistent with those of her later paper, but as in that, she does not include Peirce’s views on these topics. I am not aware of any other such discussions on Peirce’s religious views or his views on immortality.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 40.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 49.
37. Ibid., 53
38. Defending Science—Within Reason, 293.
40. CP 6.3.
41. We are told in David Pfeifer’s “Charles Peirce’s Contribution to Religious Thought” that in the Collected Papers alone there are at least 40 papers on topics of religious concerns, and at least 85 manuscripts.
42. Bernstein, 16.
43. Again, although she mentions Peirce’s claims about immortality in this paper, she does not analyze them directly, nor am I aware of other attempts to do so.
45. Although Haack describes her position in “The Real Question: Can Philosophy Be Saved?” as “naturalism-as-opposed-to-supernaturalism,” she makes it clear that she does not therefore believe that “we must conclude that there is nothing but ‘matter and energy and their interactions’ and that this means that philosophy must look to sciences for answers.” But again, she leaves no room for religion—“Granted, theological ‘explanations’ don’t really explain anything: but it doesn’t follow, and it isn’t true, that science can explain everything.” Free Inquiry, 42.
46. CP 6.428- 6.432. He notes, though—“It would be ridiculous to ask whose fault this situation is chargeable. You cannot lay blame on developmental forces.”
47. Ibid.
48. CP 4.33.
49. CP 6.443. Raposa, 11-12.
50. Anselm, of course, thought that all we needed was to use our reason to prove God’s existence, as he claimed to have done with his Ontological Argument. The soundness of all these arguments, though, has been debated for many years hence; Peirce himself comments on Anselm in CP 3.138.
51. Of course, as an extreme scholastic realist, Peirce associates reality with his category of thirdness, and not with secondness, or brute existence. For more on his realism, see note 28 above.
52. CP 6.459.
53. See Raposa and Anderson for interesting discussions on how Peirce’s Argument was part of the project of better aligning these two.
54. W2.439.
55. W 6:63. This is of course reminiscent of “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.”
56. EP2:3.
57. Ibid.
58. A contemporary example that is strikingly similar to that of Peirce’s friend is the Scottish percussionist Dame Evelyn Glennie. Although she is “profoundly deaf,” she claims that since sound is “simply vibrating air which the ear picks up,” and since hearing is “basically a specialized form of touch,” by refining her body’s ability to detect vibrations in the air, she can “hear through touch.” http://www.evelyn.co.uk/Evelyn_old/live/hearing_essay.htm. I am indebted to Mark Migotti for introducing me to this artist.
59. EP2:3.
60. Ibid.
61. See for example Raposa, 111-115.
62. Peirce himself was not at all convinced about this idea, when he admits “Those of us who have never met with spirits, or any fact at all analogous to immortality among the things that we know, must be excused if we smile at the doctrine” (CP 6.552), but he felt compelled to entertain the possibility.
63. CP 6.558.
64. Directed and co-produced by Rob Reiner, the film is an adaptation of the 1973 William Goldman novel of the same name.
65. Of course, it is now fairly commonplace that people with cardiac arrest, for example, are “brought back to life” in many cases with immediate intervention; for that to occur, though, there’s a very small window of opportunity.
67. The question, of course, of the relationship between metabolic cellular activity and consciousness is a related, and much more complex issue. Aware of the ethical implications of (inadvertently, but possibly) restoring consciousness to a disembodied brain, measures (such as the use of channel blockers) were taken by the researchers to prevent a possible re-emergence of consciousness, we are told. Ibid., 43.
68. Ibid.
69. “Thus scientific infallibilism draws down a veil before the eyes which prevents the evidences of continuity from being discerned” CP 1.172. If I were asked, as in the “By the Book” New York Times weekly celebrity interview, “which three writers, dead or alive, do you invite” to a literary dinner party, Peirce and Haack would be my first two choices for an unforgettable evening of philosophical discussion!
70. Well, not always; certainly travel to Paris, France during a pandemic would not be a good idea; nor would a tour of the Paris of the intellect be advisable without a good philosophical sense of direction. The quotation is attributed to the character Sabrina Fairchild (played by Audrey Hepburn) in the 1954 movie “Sabrina.”

REFERENCES


