If you’ve had anything to do with anglophone Departments of Philosophy over the last ten years or so, you’ve very likely seen on prominent display one of the posters produced by the American Philosophical Association’s ‘Committee on the Status of Women’ (CSW). The one in my school bears the caption ‘Philosophy: Where are the Women?’, and hangs, rather appropriately perhaps, beside the Ladies’ restroom. The poster consists of a collection of 170 portraits of women, from figures of the ancient world through current, and in some cases quite recently hired, academics. There is another version that differs from the former only in the caption—a more pointed, provocative query: ‘Philosophy: Got Women?’. The poster is intended, according to the CSW, to be a celebration of women in the discipline; and displaying it, or other CSW posters, is said to be a way to show support for women working in philosophy.¹ I have also heard it described as an aid to recruitment of young women towards a philosophical career. But there is both much more, and much less, to it than that.

It is hard not to see the poster also as a challenge: does your department have women? Does it have enough women? If not, why not? And to take it so would be very much in line with the mission of the CSW and associated organisations like the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP).² But let’s take it at face value: a celebration of women in philosophy. Now, to those among us who don’t habitually discriminate philosophers who interest us in terms of their sex, it can take more than a cursory examination of this poster to realise that there are some extraordinary omissions. Take, for instance, the philosopher we are honouring in this Festschrift. Susan Haack’s absence is striking: undoubtedly one of the greatest living philosophers, any display that aimed at celebrating women philosophers ought, one might have thought, to feature Haack in a position of especial esteem. She was included in a collection of the 100 Best Philosophers of all time in 2004: six women were named in total, Haack one of only two born in the 20th c. (King 2004). The other was G.E.M. Anscombe—and she doesn’t make the CSW poster either.

Further inspection shows that Anscombe and Haack are in very good company: also missing from the poster are such important and influential philosophers as Hannah Arendt, Sarah Broadie, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Mary Midgely, Iris Murdoch, Susan Stebbing (the first woman to hold a chair of philosophy in the UK), Mary Warnock, and Kathy Wilkes. And that’s just off the top of my head. Take a glance at Mary Warnock’s 1996 publication Women Philosophers (Warnock 1996). Warnock names seventeen women in that book, but of the
nine born in the 20th c., seven are not on the poster (that seven includes Haack and many of those just named). Quite remarkable; but we need not stop there. The British newspaper The Independent ran a piece on ten great female philosophers in 2005 (Paglia & Levenson 2005). This time, the poster did rather better; half of the Independent’s women can be found on it—Simone de Beauvoir, Ayn Rand, and historical figures Anne Conway (17th c.), Mary Wollstonecraft (18th c.), and Hypatia of Alexandria (5th c. AD). The half left out are Arendt, Anscombe, Warnock, Margaret Fuller, and, again, Haack. Say what you like about these sorts of surveys, but it is hard to imagine any attempt to celebrate women that have made, or are making, a mark in philosophy that could leave out such figures as Arendt or Anscombe, Stebbing or Foot, Warnock or Midgeley; or Susan Haack.

What’s going on? What could possibly explain such glaring omissions? This is a poster that finds space for the fictional Diotima of Plato’s Symposium, for Pericles’ paramour Aspasia, and for a whole gaggle of medieval mystics. Descartes’ correspondent Elizabeth of Bohemia appears twice. There’s room too for a few contemporary women whose claims to be active in philosophy seem dubious; a Professor of Communication, a Buddhist scholar and ‘Leader of Faith-Based Health Initiatives’, and at least one woman who, since the poster’s publication, appears to have moved on to a career outside academia. Now we might be forgiving of blunders in any well-intentioned product of that most cumbersome animal, a committee—never an academic committee. And certainly one might allow an oversight or two; to err is human. But this many? Is there something more going on here than the innocent celebration of, and support for, women in philosophy? Let’s put this question another way: leaving aside the approximately 40 historical (i.e., pre-20th c.) figures, who—or who else apart from the already named, and rather odd bedfellows, de Beauvoir and Rand—is on this poster?

What we find is that the vast majority are feminist philosophers. Now perhaps this might seem like a statement of the obvious—particularly, I imagine, to many of the men in philosophy who agreed to the display of this poster in their workplace. Surely, one might innocently think, if one is a woman, and one does philosophy, then, in all likelihood, one must thereby be a feminist philosopher? After all, women who have succeeded in philosophy, or in other so-called ‘non-traditional’ professions, might be presumed to believe in equality of opportunities for both sexes; and isn’t that pretty much what we mean by ‘feminism’? Moreover, doesn’t Susan Haack herself say she is a feminist? (Haack 1998, 3; 1998a, 123).

There is a difference, however, between being a philosopher who is also a feminist, and being a feminist philosopher; and this difference corresponds to very different conceptions of ‘feminism’. The former does her work in the area of philosophy in which she is interested, be it Metaphysics or Ethics or Epistemology, or in the History of Philosophy, and is someone who believes in the principle that women and men ought to have equal rights and opportunities. She may well believe that today, and for some time now, they do (at least in the West). The latter, on the other hand, might very well be active in Metaphysics or Ethics or Epistemology, or in the History of Philosophy, but she consciously pursues her interests through a feminist prism; she does Feminist Metaphysics, Feminist Ethics, Feminist Epistemology, Feminist History of Philosophy. No fewer than 110 of the women on the poster—over 85% of the contemporary women featured—self-identify as ‘feminist philosophers’ in this sense: they specialise, or cite research interests in, feminist philosophy, or ‘feminist theory’.

It seems to me that there is something in this. In fact, as we shall see, if we say a little bit more about feminist theory, its assumptions, and its commitments, then the absence from the CSW poster of Haack, Anscombe, and the others ceases to be so puzzling. One simple way to begin is by noting a striking peculiarity of feminist theory, namely that, in the preceding paragraph, when describing the ‘philosopher who is also a feminist’, I might have written ‘the former does her or his work…’; but the addition of the masculine pronoun would be impossible with respect to the ‘feminist philosopher’. Men can’t possibly be feminists of the latter sort—their role can only be that of either enabler, or amanuensis. As Haack writes, ‘feminist philosophy’ in the now more usual sense [is] an enterprise for which being of the appropriate sex, or, as the jargon goes, ‘gender’, seems usually to be quietly assumed a qualification’ (Haack 1998b, 175). This is because at the heart of feminist theory is the conviction that there is a fundamental difference between men’s
and women’s experiences, and, consequently, between their ways of conceptualising these experiences. The most a wannabe ‘male feminist’ can do, according to one prominent feminist theorist, is ‘teach and write about women’s thought, writings, and accomplishments… criticise their male colleagues… move material and resources to women and feminists’ (Harding 1991b, 109; quoted in Haack 1998b, 179). (I don’t know about you, reader, but to my mind, at least, this unedifying image recalls nothing so much as the self-gelding devotees of Cybele.)

Haack, then, is a feminist, but her feminism, as she herself puts it, is an ‘old fashioned’ feminism, a ‘modest style which stressed the common humanity of women and men, focused on justice and opportunity’; the other sort is a ‘new-fangled’ feminism, ‘an ambitious, imperialist feminism which stresses the ‘woman’s point of view’ and claims revolutionary significance for all areas of philosophy’ (Haack 1998, x; 1998a, 123). These two kinds of feminism map well onto the distinction often made between ‘equity’ and ‘gender’ feminism. ‘Equity feminism’ is very much the ‘old-fashioned’ feminism to which Haack subscribes, rooted in the tradition of classical liberalism, and is concerned with the equal treatment of men and women before the law, and the removal of prohibitions to women’s participation in society. Haack’s own early article ‘On the Moral Relevance of Sex’ is an excellent example of an equity feminist rationally demolishing a contribution to the debate over women’s rights that attempted to defend such prohibitions in certain circumstances (Haack 1974). ‘Gender feminism’, on the other hand, has its roots in the ‘radical’ feminism of the 70s, has parallels with and indeed is inspired by Marxism, and developed further through interactions with postmodernist theory towards questions of gender identity and sexuality. It is this latter sort of feminism that is the dominant ideology of most contemporary academic feminists—that is, it is the feminism of ‘feminist theory’. Returning to the poster, then, we might say that the vast majority of the women featured are ‘gender feminists’. And this is something that should not surprise us, if we glance at the CSW’s mission statement.

For among its goals, the Committee ‘seeks to facilitate an understanding of issues of gender and of the range of positions represented in feminist theories’ (my emphasis). The CSW sponsored Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy makes gender the key term in its self-description: ‘The Newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender’ (Callahan 2001, 2). Before going further, let’s pause to consider an objection. Academic feminists themselves do not draw any such distinction between ‘equity’ and ‘gender’ feminism; it is a division made by others—by critics of feminist theory. It might seem unfair, then, to characterise them with a label they have neither adopted nor recognised; moreover, this classification of feminism might appear far too simplistic. Elizabeth Anderson, for instance, insists that it is misleading, irrelevant, and unworthy of attention, as it fails to cater adequately for the plurality and diversity of feminist research: it is not, she writes, ‘an intellectually serious way to represent the range of feminist thought’ (Anderson 2004). Anderson’s point is worth considering; for it is one regularly made by feminists when attempting to present or defend feminism. The CSW itself refers to feminist theories, in the plural; and the Newsletter states that it does not ‘advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy’. Aren’t there, then, many kinds of feminism? Isn’t ‘feminism’ a term with so many different meanings? Already in 1986, the editors of What is Feminism? were speaking of the ‘impossibility… of arriving at a shared feminist definition of feminism …it now makes more sense to speak of a plurality of feminisms than one… [for instance] radical feminists, socialist feminists, Marxist feminists, lesbian separatists, women of colour…’ (Mitchell & Oakley 1986, 8-9; cf. Cudd & Andreassen 2004, 7).

At times it can seem that there is such a bewildering variety of feminisms that one might get the impression that each individual feminist subscribes to her own kind of feminism; rather like St Thomas’ angels, each feminist a distinct species unto itself. But this bit of dogma is a sham, an attempt to turn criticizing feminism into a game of whack-a-mole: try to hit it, it disappears and turns up elsewhere. This ‘so many feminisms’ move reminds me of Dario Fernández-Morera’s remarks about a similar Marxist trope—that ‘materialist discourse is so heterogeneous and complex as to be beyond critical scrutiny—unlike the bourgeoisie, Capitalism, ‘society’, ‘the classes’, ‘the West’ … which are so monolithic and simple as to be routinely bandied about’ (Fernández-Morera 1996, 5). Likewise with feminism: how often do we hear feminists bandy about these terms, and others too, e.g., ‘masculinity’, etc—as if they were simple and mono-
lithic? For this reason the candour of Lorna Finlayson’s recent *Introduction to Feminism* is to be welcomed. While insisting as usual that there are ‘many and varied ‘feminisms”, Finlayson claims that the ‘constant amid the differences’ is the recognition of ‘the fact of patriarchy’. Finlayson explains it thus: ‘Patriarchy’ names a system in which men rule or have power over or oppress women, deriving benefit from doing so, at women’s expense. Feminists believe that this system exists… as central, woven into the fabric of social reality’ (Finlayson 2016, 6 n. 6, 9).

Ah, the patriarchy: that vast conspiracy of gentlemen, according to which every tool at their disposal is employed to keep women under the heel, such as rape, sexual harassment, and adjusting the air conditioning in offices (Dvorak 2015). Now we have reached the dark heart of feminist theory. Finlayson’s is a sweeping claim, but, as far as feminist theory goes, it would seem to be justified (and, interestingly, as we shall see later, it seems consistent with the public perception of feminism). Whatever internecine issues feminist theorists might have, the belief that holds them together as a group is indeed a belief in the patriarchal ‘oppression’ thesis. The editors of the 2005 anthology *Feminist Theory* make this very clear: ‘Feminist theory is the attempt to make intellectual sense of, and then critique, the subordination of women to men… [it is premised on the claim that] women are dominated not only politically and economically but also sexually, physically, and in nearly every field of artistic endeavour and philosophical thought’ (Cudd & Andreasen 2004, 1).

Feminist theory, then, involves an interrogation of every sphere of life, and just about every discipline in the academy, for evidence of patriarchal oppression of women—which, unsurprisingly, it invariably finds. Given that feminist theory is marked by its belief in the patriarchy, the dice are loaded from the start. And nothing, no intellectual pursuit or feature of social life, can be spared the feminist inquisition, no matter how far from questions of the equality of the sexes it might seem, at first, to be. Take, for instance, feminist metaphysics. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry for ‘Feminist Metaphysics’, by Sally Haslanger and Ásta Sveinsdóttir, explains that the field is primarily concerned with uncovering the extent to which the central claims and concepts of (traditional) metaphysics support sexism. The feminist metaphysician asks if our ‘frameworks for understanding the world are distorting in ways that privilege men or masculinity’ (Haslanger & Sveinsdóttir 2011)—and, again, she generally answers ‘yes, yes they are’. And these frameworks include the very distinction between the sexes—or the ‘genders’. In fact it is here, in the cradle as it were, that discrimination begins. For, following the patriarchy hypothesis, the next central commitment of feminist theory is to the hypothesis of the social construction of gender.12

According to this view, which has the status of an article of faith, gender differences are ‘not rooted in biology’, but are ‘artificial constructs that work to reinforce women’s oppression’ (Cudd & Andreasen 2004, 8). In other words, behavioural differences between men and women are not manifestations of innate biological differences, but are thoroughly social, or cultural, phenomena; and, as such, they are conventional, arbitrary, and therefore, ultimately, malleable. This promise of malleability fuels the vision of feminist theory of a genderless or androgynous utopia of social equality (Charvet 1982, 4-5, 128-9; Elshtain 1986, 5-6, 11). For, according to feminist theory, only by abandoning or deconstructing gender can there be an end to unfair discrimination. But, as things stand, in our patriarchal society, socially recognised or ‘traditional’ gender roles display an imbalance, favouring men over women politically, socially, legally and economically. Given the social construction thesis, the assignment of certain gender roles to men, and others to women, must therefore be a sexist exercise of power and domination. Indeed, any numerical inequality in certain occupations13 or academic disciplines that displays an ‘underrepresentation’, as the jargon goes, of women, is typically reckoned to be evidence sufficient to maintain a charge of systemic sexist discrimination or bias in that occupation or discipline. The assumption seems to be that outcomes between men and women in society would be equal, were it not for that pesky patriarchal gender division.

This view is captured neatly—if startlingly—in one feminist theorist’s assertion that at birth humans are ‘bi-sexual infants’ that are then ‘transformed into male and female gender personalities, the one destined to command, the other to obey’ (Bartky 1990, 50). According to feminist theory, then, the gender schema is the deepest and most important socio-political division. And this is why the use of the term ‘gen-
der feminist’ to describe the feminism of feminist theory is justifiable. It is precisely its emphasis on gender that gives rise to feminist theory’s key difference from ‘equity feminism’, i.e., its insistence that the sort of equality prized and pursued by equity feminists isn’t enough for the genuine liberation of women from sexist oppression. Mere equity leaves the fundamental structures of oppression untouched (Charvet 1982, 4). The goal of feminist theory, then, is centred on gender equality, rather than the comparatively superficial level of political or economic equality. Gender feminists thus express impatience with equity feminists. Elizabeth Minnich denounces the ‘ordinary feminism’—liberal or equity feminism—which merely ‘promises women the same individual rights as men in an otherwise unchanged world’ (Minnich 1998, 169). It is not enough, then, for feminism to look to end explicit sex discrimination, and to have equality before the law; only a thorough revolution of culture and society can end sexist oppression.14 This, then, is the consequence of the rejection of biology and the flight to social constructionism; all differences, other than the reproductive, between men and women are due to conditioning; therefore the only path to equality is the dismantling of the instruments of this conditioning—the social and political structures that oppress women. The patriarchy must be smashed.

Comical though it may be to think of our feminist theorist colleagues manning the barricades like so many modern Mariannes, feminist theory is thus committed to promoting a blatantly revolutionary political agenda. As Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir write, ‘[t]he aim of feminism is, in the most general terms, to end the oppression of women. The goal of feminist theory is, therefore, to theorize how women are oppressed and how we can work towards ending it’ (my emphasis, Haslanger & Sveinsdóttir 2011). Again, this pops up in an introductory article on feminist metaphysics! The politically activist aspect is also emphasised by Finlayson: ‘a central purpose of feminism is that of opposing the system of patriarchy—which means emancipating and improving the lives of women’ (Finlayson 2016, 6, 8).

Now it might seem reasonable to ask whether there is, indeed, a patriarchy to be smashed. Finlayson writes ‘[Y]ou either see patriarchy or you don’t… If you do see it, then …the world convinces you every day, in the form of innumerable ‘personal’ events and interactions’ (Finlayson 2016, 13). That’s not very reassuring. What if you don’t? (Finlayson has something to say of those who don’t see it; we’ll have occasion to note her views later.) Likewise, it might seem reasonable to question the hypothesis that gender is entirely socially constructed, and its concomitant rejection of biology. What would gender feminists accept as potential refutation of this theory?21 But I am not going to investigate either of these questions here. Whether or not it is true that the patriarchy exists, and thus whether or not the goal of feminist theory is a noble one, is beside the point. For what is at issue is not whether the agenda that feminist theory promotes—a change in culture and society culminating in complete equality in a genderless utopia—is agreeable or disagreeable, from a political point of view,16 but rather the sheer fact that it is political in the first place. For it entails that the feminist theorist is not interested in disinterested research, but seeks to weaponize each discipline and all inquiry—whether it be scientific, philosophical, literary, historical—even geographical!17—to the political end of opposing the alleged past and present unfair treatment of women. And this means that feminist theorists are not interested in truth.

This is something that gender feminists are on occasion quite happy to state clearly. In an article entitled ‘What is Feminist theory?’, Elizabeth Grosz states unashamedly that feminist theory is a ‘strategy’ aimed at power, not at all an attempt to say something true. ‘[F]eminist theory… is not a true discourse… It could be appropriately seen, rather, as a strategy, a local, specific intervention with definite political, even if provisional, aims and goals. …it seeks effective forms of intervention into systems of power in order to subvert them and replace them with others more preferable’ (Grosz 1986, 177). For Grosz, beliefs in truth and objectivity are simply examples of ‘patriarchal beliefs’ (Grosz 1990, 165-6). Likewise Evelyn Fox Keller says ‘the conception of objectivity is a parochial one, influenced by a particular ideology about gender’ (Keller, quoted in Levin 1988, 102). Sandra Harding scoffs at the idea of ‘the truth—whatever that is!’ (Harding 1991a, ix). Instead of truth as a goal, instead of honest disinterested inquiry, Harding explicitly urges the politicisation of science: ‘The model for good science should be research programs that have been explicitly directed by liberatory political goals’—liberatory, that is, for gender, race and class (Harding, quoted in
Haack 2007, 334). Anderson, in a piece purporting to defend feminist epistemology from the charge that it is politically motivated, seems unaware that she admits precisely that: ‘doing science as a feminist’ she writes, ‘[means] the pursuit of empirical inquiry… with the aim of discovering knowledge that is useful to women in liberating them from sexism’ (my emphasis, Anderson 2004, 9). When James Franklin writes that the ‘unquestioned assumption of Grosz’s work is that everything be evaluated according to whether it is useful to feminism’ (Franklin 2003, 373), he may be referring specifically to Grosz, but he is making a point applicable generally to feminist theory.

An instance of this sort of thinking is the hostile attitude towards any research that might not be useful to feminism, for example, research into sex differences. The prominent feminist journalist and public figure Gloria Steinem famously denounced sex differences research as ‘anti-American, crazy thinking… It’s what’s keeping us down, not what’s helping us’ (Young 2013). Academic gender feminists don’t quite rise to this level of histrionics (or herstrionics?), but their antipathy is evident. Referring to the debate between ‘those proposing innate gender differences (essentialists) and those proposing learned or socially acquired differences (social constructivists)’, a committee member of the Irish branch of SWIP makes it clear that, as far as feminists are concerned, the opposed theories must be judged in terms of the political implications of the research: ‘Given feminist concerns regarding ascriptions of innate gender differences, many feminist philosophers approach such theories with caution’ (Humphreys 2014). ‘With caution’ is an understatement. Camille Paglia remembers a 1970 feminist conference where ‘any appeal to biology was denounced as heresy’ (Paglia 2017, 215). Alice Eagly recalls the audience at an American Psychological Association meeting in 1995 stamping their feet and ‘glowering’ at her during her presentation that questioned the ‘social construction’ thesis; other researchers have stories about their investigations in this area being discouraged or denied funding (see Hoff-Sommers 2000, 89-92; Rhoads 2004, 17-22). Again, why is the feminist theorist cautious about such research? For political reasons. What, one might ask, would the feminist say about the huge 2018 study by Greenberg et al that finds that women are on average more empathetic than men, and men on average more systems-oriented than women? (Greenberg et al 2018). The feminist’s first thought, when presented with such research, is: does this further the movement or not? Or, to put it in Harding’s words, is it ‘politically adequate research and scholarship’? (Harding 1991a, 98). If it is, it enters the lists of required readings. And if not, if it is research that goes against feminist values, it can be dismissed as sexist; it promotes ‘negative’ stereotypes of women. But who makes the judgement that a stereotype is negative? And is it not potentially more harmful to women to reject such research out of hand? Indeed, as its title indicates, the Greenberg study is intended to make a contribution to the study of autism; should this be rejected too, given that it involves research into sex differences? Is that ‘politically inadequate scholarship’?

Jean Curthoys explains the sort of ‘political thinking’—as opposed to honest, critical thinking—that one finds in contemporary academic feminism: ‘it is no longer the content of the ideas which is at issue… It is only necessary to identify this form of ideas as intellectually and politically pernicious and we have at hand an easy means for rejecting and denouncing ideas, one which requires no critical engagement at all’ (Curthoys 1997, 70; cf. Haack 2008a, 32-3). For this reason Curthoys as well as Haack have suggested that feminist theory bears a family resemblance to authoritarian attitudes to science such as were typical of the Nazi or Stalinist regimes. As Haack puts it, the fact that Nazi science, or Stalinist science, was concerned with promoting a political agenda means that it is ‘tainted epistemologically’. And so, mutatis mutandis, is feminist theory. ‘Aryan or proletarian or feminist ‘science’ is not inquiry but advocacy’ (Haack 2007, 340, 341).

It might appear hyperbolic to make such a comparison. Feminists, like most people, don’t like being called ‘Nazis’. But let’s be clear about the basis of the comparison. Drucilla Cornell complains that a charge that feminists are ‘totalitarians, hence ‘feminazis’ … [is] deeply disturbing ethically’, and is moved to refute it by pointing out that there ‘are no feminist death squads, let alone concentration camps’, before pulling the virtue-signalling trump card that those who make the comparison are trivialising ‘the human devastation Nazism left in its wake’ (Cornell 2004, 414). This absurd response utterly misses the point. No one is suggesting that feminists are likely to invade Poland or annex the Sudetenland. Nor is the comparison in-
tended as an endorsement of the use of the ‘feminazi’ soubriquet. The charge Haack and Curthoys are putting forward is based rather on noting the striking similarity between feminism and authoritarian regimes in their conceptualizing of the scientific project, and uses familiar historical examples of the latter to highlight the concerns with the former. As Curthoys writes, in justifying her own comparison between Stalinist science and feminism, the comparison ‘does not imply that all the features of the former are being said to be analogous to all the features of the latter’; rather it is meant to show that ‘a kind of argumentation which is found often in contemporary feminist thought [bears comparison to that] which was characteristic of “LySENKOISM”’ (Curthoys 1997, 59). As we have seen, feminists manifestly do want to make of scientific or philosophical inquiry a tool for promoting their own interests, or the interests of the so-called ‘marginalised’ or ‘oppressed’ groups, into which they rather ridiculously insert themselves.

By the same token, feminists seek to undermine science or philosophy as it is being done or as it has been done by identifying it as simply the promotion by an oppressing class of its own interests. ‘Male scientific investigations’, writes Harding, ‘were meant to pacify, control, exploit and manipulate women or to glorify males and their domination’ (Harding, unpublished paper, quoted in Levin 1998, 102).

Remarks like these betray feminist theory’s borrowings from Marxism. According to some influential strains of Marxist theory, the idea of pure or disinterested inquiry, whether scientific or metaphysical, is impossible—it is and always has been biased towards the interests of one class, the bourgeoisie, and to the detriment of some other, the proletariat. Feminist philosophers of science like Harding just mimic the Marxist approach: “feminist ‘theory’” Fernández-Morera writes, ‘merely replaces the notion of class with that of sex (or ‘gender’…) …where Marxism spoke of a ‘proletarian science’ with its own peculiar methods and priorities, feminism unoriginally speaks of a ‘feminist science’’. Both the Marxist and the feminist theorist, then, would dismiss the charge that they seek to politicize inquiry—for they insist that it is always already inherently political. Their aim is to align inquiry with ‘the correct politics’ (Fernández-Morera 1996, 43f.).

But the business of science and philosophy, as Haack writes, ‘is figuring things out, not promoting social justice’ (Haack 2018, 1). In general, if science or philosophy is appropriated for promoting the interests of any class or group, and denoting the interests of another, this is to open it up to the same epistemological objections that we can make towards Fascist or Communist—whether Soviet or Chinese—politicizations of scientific enquiry. It is dangerous as well as mistaken: it is a live threat to the principle basic to our academic freedom, to pursue the truth wherever it may lead. It is no longer science—or philosophy—but ‘only politics in disguise’ (Haack 2007, 341).

Let’s return to the poster purporting to celebrate women in philosophy. It is notable that approximately 40 of the women featured on the CSW poster have, or, at some point in their career, have had, associations with Women’s Studies, either as affiliates of their university’s Women’s Studies programmes, or holding joint Professorships in Philosophy and Women’s Studies. A significant number boast the rather unwieldy title of ‘Professor of Philosophy and Women’s, Genders, and Sexuality Studies’, indicating the direction that Women’s Studies has undertaken in academia. Such titles are frankly oxymoronic. The notion of a person who is a Professor of Philosophy and Women’s etc. Studies betokens a sort of schizophrenia, two horses pulling in different directions. For Women’s Studies is and has been from its beginning an activist discipline, fused with a political agenda (see Paglia 2017, 216; also Patai 2008, 253f., and Patai & Koertge 2003). This is not a controversial point; one need only peruse these department’s websites to see this is the case. Take, e.g., Fordham’s ‘Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies’ program: it is ‘an interdisciplinary approach to a profound social justice goal’, aiming to ‘reshape old axes of power and cultivate new ones’. The program looks at gender and sexuality as a ‘lens on and a vehicle of social change”; students will be encouraged to ‘use that information to create positive change… to become agents of social change who work for the public good’. Or UC Davis’ ‘Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies’ program, which, among its five learning outcomes, cites ‘Advocate for social justice related to gender and sexuality’; and one of the three specialisations majors can choose from is ‘Social Justice, Gender Politics and Activism’. The ‘Centre for Gender, Feminisms and Sexualities’ at my university, UCD, launched in 2017, states that ‘active engagement with ac-
 ativists, social movements and civil society organisations and activities to effect social change will be a central principle of the new Centre’.

A joint professorship in ‘Philosophy and Women’s etc Studies’, then, is as ridiculous as a ‘Professor of Astronomy and Flat Earth Studies’, taken in the sense that the ‘studies’ actually entails not study, at all, but activism. It is a title whose constituent parts on each side of the conjunction have goals and methods that are utterly alien to each other: The first indicates a love of wisdom, a respect for the truth; the second revokes wisdom and truth, and substitutes in their stead an explicit devotion to a shallow, partial, biased ideology that is opposed to the ideals of philosophy. There is here no love of wisdom, but a love of power.

Look again at the philosophers I named earlier whose absence from the poster is so striking. Are we close, now, to understanding why they are absent? Why their faces don’t fit? Could it possibly be an utter coincidence that the absentee women are ‘philosophers who also happen to be women’ (Haack’s phrase, 1998b, 176), rather than gender feminists for whom being a woman is inseparable from the content of their work? Philosophers who take the goal of inquiry to be truth rather than a political agenda? Philosophers who do not take every philosophical question as yet another opportunity to uncover and oppose the patriarchy? Philosophers who, in short, are—philosophers?

Warnock, in the introduction to her Women Philosophers, makes this point bluntly: ‘in this’ ‘feminist’ literature written by women…there tends to be too much unexamined dogma… too much ill-concealed proselytizing, too little objective analysis, to allow them to qualify for inclusion among philosophical writing proper’. She insists that ‘the truths which philosophers seek must aim to be not merely generally, but objectively, even universally, true. Essentially they must be gender-indifferent’ (Warnock 1996, xxxii-xxxiv). In one of her sharpest quips, Haack has written that a rubric such as ‘feminist epistemology’, a mainstay of Women’s Studies and the foundation-stone of feminist science, is incongruous on its face, like ‘Republican epistemology’ (Haack 1998, 124). But perhaps we should go further, and say, with Warnock, that a rubric like feminist philosophy, in general, is incongruous—that is, feminist philosophy as practised in the academy today (feminist philosophy ‘in the now more usual sense’, as Haack was putting it as long ago as 1997; Haack 1998b, 175). To the extent that it is feminist, i.e., gender feminist, it is not philosophy.

Haack and Warnock’s scepticism towards their very raison d’être naturally doesn’t go down well with the ‘Professors of Philosophy and Women’s Studies’ (see, e.g., Tyson 2019). Could that explain their absence from the poster? ‘But’, one might object, ‘not all of the absentee women have been so explicitly critical of feminist theory.’ True—their very silence is sufficient for the opprobrium of the opponents of patriarchy. Consider Hannah Arendt. The case of Arendt is arresting; a towering intellectual of the 20th c., taken very seriously by philosophers and political scientists, yet even a decade after her death it was still true to say that Arendt’s thought was ‘almost totally ignored by feminists’ (Markus 1987, 76-87). Why? Arendt makes no direct attack on feminism, although there is evidence that she did not consider herself a feminist, and indeed that she bore an antipathy to the women’s movement, which in any case might have been inferred from her distaste for single-issue politics and the totalitarian consequences of utopian ideologies (Young-Bruehl 1982, 96; see also Young-Bruehl 1998, 123, and Elshtain 1986, 24-5). But beyond that, feminist neglect of Arendt is evidently because she offered nothing to the feminist cause. Her famous ‘private/public’ distinction ‘seemed to have no liberation potential whatsoever’; in fact it could be taken to be supportive of sexism and political conservatism (Young-Bruehl, 1998, 128). It certainly didn’t synch with the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’. A jibe that would be repeated again and again in feminist circles was Adrienne Rich’s dismissal of The Human Condition: ‘[it] embodies the tragedy of a female mind nourished on male ideology’ (quoted in Young-Bruehl 1998, 128). Since the 1980s, however, there have been attempts to appropriate Arendt for feminism—on which, see below—but perhaps these have not yet been sufficiently convincing to admit her into the feminist canon alongside contemporaries like, e.g., de Beauvoir or Weil. Nor, yet, evidently, onto the CSW’s poster.

Were the poster’s purpose to applaud accomplished women philosophers, Arendt’s absence would be even more inexplicable when one notices that her erstwhile student and teaching assistant, Elizabeth Minnich, an incomparably lesser figure, is there. But Minnich is, of course, as we have already noted, a feminist
theorist. Maria Markus makes a salient point, originally in relation to Arendt, but which has more a general applicability, about the importance to feminist philosophers of ‘loyalty to the cause’: ‘There is a disturbing tendency in contemporary feminist theory’, she writes, in that ‘[it] persistently ignores the existence of women thinkers unless they declare openly their interest in feminism’. Women are dismissed by feminists if ‘they have next to nothing to say on woman’, that is, little that is specifically relevant to the cause of feminism; or, if they do say something that is not grist to the feminist mill, they are traitors, accused of ‘sneaking into the men's club’ (Markus 1987, 76). Consider, in this light, Andrea Nye's comments about Anscombe, Foot, and Murdoch. Nye recalls having as a student to read these philosophers, but, rather than this evidence that women were not, in the late 60s and 70s, being excluded from philosophy syllabi offering Nye any satisfaction, she complains that ‘none of this work was feminist, nor did it diverge far from establishment parameters’ (Nye 1995, ix). Now this might seem a rather anodyne reflection—if you are unaware of Nye's view of the establishment. For Nye is known, if at all, for her ‘feminist’ criticism of logic as reflecting male modes of thought—and for her advocacy of ‘feminist’ thinking, or ‘reading’, which will be radically different from the male mainstream, or the establishment (Nye 1990, 184). To be accused of remaining within the establishment, then, is effectively to be accused of being in league with the patriarchy (see Curthoys 1997, 73, and 175, n. 22).

This is a familiar accusation in feminist circles— if you're not with us, you're against us. Of women who dare to criticise gender feminism, Minnich says that they are traitors, collaborators: 'they have chosen to walk in step with a patriarchy that knows how to reward those who... attack their more agitating sisters' (Minnich 1998, 175). At least she credits such women with choice; more typical is the view that equity feminists are too duped to be granted the moral agency to make the choice. Paglia, for instance, notes how, at a conference in 1973, the academic feminists in attendance ‘unanimously declared that I had been ‘brainwashed’ and hoodwinked by generations of sexist male scientists’—for saying that there is a hormonal element in sex differences (Paglia 2017, 215). Women like Paglia are said to ‘suffer from false consciousness’: again, Finlayson is quite candid about this. As we saw above, Finlayson defines feminism in terms of the patriarchy: feminists are ‘united by their opposition to the system of patriarchy’, adding emphatically ‘if it doesn’t oppose patriarchy, it’s not feminism’ (Finlayson 2016, 9). Before you can ask, ‘what about equity feminists?’, Finlayson admits that this strict definition of feminism is a ‘political claim’ on her part. ‘There are, of course, people who label themselves ‘feminists’ but do not believe the patriarchy exists (any longer)’, she writes. ‘They can call themselves what they like, but we do not have to follow suit’ (Finlayson 2016, 6, n. 7). How inclusive. It gets worse.

If a woman doesn’t agree with the patriarchy hypothesis, Finlayson continues, not merely can she not call herself a feminist, but she evidently suffers from ‘fairly crude distortions of reality, or simple obliviousness to certain phenomena’. In fact, that there are women that deny the patriarchy is itself proof of the patriarchy—it shows how pervasive and insidious it is. For this is what systems of oppression, like the patriarchy, do—they 'have a way of making themselves invisible... engendering certain 'blind spots' or self-undermining patterns of thought—that is to say, false consciousness—in those who suffer from the oppression' (Finlayson 2016, 22). Invisible to ordinary women, perhaps, but not brave souls like Finlayson—she and her gender feminist friends are the anointed ones who have seen through the Matrix. The woman who believes in and opposes the patriarchy knows herself, and her social situation, better than other women. Those hapless women, like Haack, who oppose feminist theory, do so because they have been effectively hoodwinked.

Just think for a moment about what gender feminists are actually suggesting here. What it entails, ultimately, is that it is not just Haack and other (unfortunately few) equity feminists in academia that have been brainwashed by the patriarchy; it is at bottom a claim that the vast majority of women, in general, have been brainwashed. This view goes back to gender feminist icon Simone de Beauvoir who, in conversation with another icon, Betty Friedan, urged that women not be 'authorized to stay at home and raise [their] children. Society should be totally different. Women should not have that choice, precisely because if there is such a choice, too many women will make that one’ (de Beauvoir 1975, 18). Alison Jaggar, one of the founders of SWIP, wrote in a similar vein that women who choose marriage and 'traditional’ gender roles do not realise
that they are thereby internalising patriarchal values and thus contributing to the oppression of women (Jaggar 1986, 115).

Consider also the well-known ‘feminist paradox’—the fact that while most women support equal rights and opportunities, only a minority identify themselves as ‘feminists’. In a 2016 survey in the UK, for instance, only 7% said they considered themselves ‘feminist’. Yet more than two thirds were supportive of equality between the sexes (Sanghani 2016). This is a result frequently repeated (see, for instance McCabe 2005, 480–505; Abowitz 2008, 43–63; Scharff 2012). For the gender feminist, the solution to the paradox is obvious; these women are sleepwalking with the patriarchy. They don’t know how oppressed they really are. Indeed, one academic seriously suggests that feminist ‘consciousness raising’ is necessary on campuses to make young women realise that, and how, they are oppressed (Airaksinen 2017). But there really is no paradox; or at least there wouldn’t be if we retained the term ‘equity feminism’, for this is, after all, what the majority of women are subscribing to in these surveys. The survey result shows two things; the first, that Finlayson is right, in a way, when she defines ‘feminism’ as opposition to the patriarchy—and the radical views of gender that this entails. For it seems that this is in fact how most women, how most people, see feminism too: people associate the term ‘feminism’ with ‘gender feminism’. The second is that most women want nothing to do with gender feminism.

The ‘brainwashing’ jibe is a last resort that gender feminists rush to first. Any person’s values can be so dismissed as due to being brainwashed; as such the charge is ‘operationally meaningless’, as Murray Rothbard writes. To appeal to such a charge is itself evidence that gender feminists ‘refuse to accept any evidence, logical or empirical, of whatever kind, that might prove their contentions to be wrong. Show them a woman who loves domesticity, and they dismiss this as ‘brainwashing’; show them a militant, and they claim that this proves that women are yearning for ‘liberation’’ (Rothbard 1974, 162). Who strikes you as the one that has been brainwashed, indoctrinated: the woman who believes sincerely in a vast conspiracy that distorts everything in life, and, by its very nature, cannot be disproven? Or the woman who doesn’t?

Back to the Poster. There would no doubt be deep irony if a Committee formed ostensibly to assess the state of women in the profession of philosophy and to promote women’s work, and is premised on the claim that women have been and continue to be historically silenced and marginalised, should itself marginalise women for political reasons. But perhaps this might still seem too far a step to take, that is, to think the omission of Haack and others from the CSW poster is a deliberate, indeed, politically motivated decision. It is, after all, only a poster! Is it really credible that the CSW deliberately populated the poster only with those philosophers whose feminist credentials checked out? Am I not, with this lengthy and possibly unhealthy obsession over portraits of women (oh dear!), setting off on a conspiracy theory of my own? Besides, look here! Isn’t Ayn Rand—hardly a feminist of any sort!—on the poster? And isn’t it possible that future versions might include those now excluded? Furthermore—and surely this is a killer, to be delivered with supercilious cross-armed smugness—what of the simple fact that, on the release of this poster in 2012, then CSW Chair Peggy Des Autels invited anyone who was missing to simply send a head shot for inclusion in future posters—for which the only qualification was a Phd in philosophy—oh, and being a woman, presumably25

Whoops. Ok, let’s start with Rand. Admittedly, she does seem an outlier. And as for emendations to the poster, certainly this is possible; moreover, these won’t necessarily be unexpected. For it seems even clear antipathy towards the aims of gender feminism doesn’t mean that gender feminists won’t seek to appropriate and colonise—and distort—other women for the cause, whether Rand or anyone else—when these women are no longer in any position to object to such use. This seems already to have happened to Rand.26 It is the very process by which historical women philosophers and writers have been co-opted by feminist theorists for use in contemporary socio-political agendas. Such feminist history of philosophy does not have the laudable aim of adding to our store of knowledge of the thought of the past; its function is to keep the sex—or the ‘gender’—dominant in the mind of the reader.

Consider Arendt again. She would seem a particularly resistant subject of feminist appropriation, as noted above. As her biographer puts it, ‘Feminists have said clearly ‘she was not one of us’” (Young-Bruehl
But—against her will, one might say—we also noted that there have been feminist reassessments of Arendt's work (see, e.g., Honig 1995). Let's be clear what that means; it means attempts by feminists to excavate Arendt's work for anything that will further feminist purposes. For Arendt was a woman, so her work will be infused with women's ways of knowing: this is a basic principle of feminist theory. Thus Minnich attacked Arendt's biographer Elisabeth Young-Bruehl for Young-Bruehl's lack of feminist analysis of Arendt as a woman-philosopher ‘informed by an understanding of the all-pervasiveness of the patriarchy’ (Minnich 1985, 301-2). That Arendt herself said that all thinking is genderless in her Life of the Mind is simply ignored, indeed, contradicted. Her thought can and should be understood precisely as gendered, as framed by her experience as a woman. Markus stresses this point: ‘if being a woman is an experience of the importance ascribed to it (and I think justly so) by feminism, then it has to have an impact upon theoretical investigations produced by women, even if they are not related directly to feminist issues’. Failing to realise this will ‘impoverish… the ‘ways of seeing’ of feminist theory’ (Markus 1987, 76). In other words, forcing the gendered, patriarchal heuristic onto readings of women like Arendt is not for the purpose of understanding their thought, or how their thought is important to the discipline of philosophy, but for the ideological purpose of promoting gender feminism.

Another example of this feminist repurposing is the British Academy project that treats Murdoch, Anscombe, Midgely and Foot as a ‘Female Philosophical School’. A stated aim of this ‘case study’ is, indeed, ‘to examine the barriers women face in philosophy’ (MacCumhail & Wiseman 2019). It’s not hard to imagine the disdain with which these four philosophers would greet this project. Anscombe’s lack of patience with this kind of feminism hardly needs stating: feminists ‘received no aid or comfort’ from Anscombe; she ‘never thought of herself as a woman philosopher’ (McInerny 2001). Midgely states in her memoir that, while the demand for equal opportunities was perfectly understandable, she was ‘puzzled’ by the feminist sisterhood’s excited expressions of ‘male chauvinism and female frustration’, and ‘mystified’ by their ‘frenzy of exasperation towards men’ (Midgely 2007, 37). Murdoch, more than the others, has been getting increased attention from gender feminists (see, e.g., Wylie 2011), but it is doubtful she would be any more appreciative. She is on record lamenting ‘cults’ such as ‘Women’s Studies’ that lead young women to waste their time reading ‘all the latest books on feminism… mediocre or peripheral books by women rather than the great books… of humanity in general’, and dismisses the ‘dead end’ of feminist attempts to separate women ‘from the mainstream thinking of the human race’ by claiming space for ‘female ethics, female criticism, female knowledge’ (quote from Hoff-Sommers 1994, 78). Or, indeed, for ‘female philosophy’ (cf. Sayers 1938, with Haack 2001, 12-14).

The very obvious problem with this sort of approach is precisely the insistence that women who happen to be philosophers—or, rather, philosophers who happen to be women—are always, in the first instance, to be identified as women; and any judgement of their philosophy must keep this in mind. They are philosophising—but as women. As a response, I cannot improve upon Young-Bruehl’s own exemplary response to Minnich’s criticism: '[Minnich’s demand] is narrow, almost sectarian, because to me it seems to prescribe that biographers [or researchers in general] should fit their subject’s lives to a feminist agenda rather than respecting the way a woman lived her life and understood herself’ (Young-Bruehl 1998, 259, n. 8).

Nevertheless, this sort of approach is endemic in current academic philosophy, and we won’t be rid of it any time soon. Another species of this approach, in so far as it insists on the sex of the author as a relevant factor in the work of philosophy, is evident in the demand of the obnoxious gender feminist BPA/SWIP Good Practice Guide, adopted by Schools of Philosophy throughout the UK, to ensure that a specified minimum number of publications by women appear on all course reading lists. At the University of Oxford, for instance, 40% of recommended works must be by women; moreover, it must be made clear to students which publications are by women, by spelling out first names rather than using initials (Fish 2018). As Oxford Professor of Philosophy Edward Harcourt explained, ‘one of the greatest philosophers of the post-war period, Elizabeth Anscombe, published as ‘G.E.M. Anscombe’. If that’s what goes on the reading list, understandably students won’t know she was female.’ Perhaps she could be listed as ‘Miss Anscombe’, the way
she was professionally addressed throughout her career—even by her husband! (McInerny 2001)—but today, of course, that would be deemed sexist. Not at all sexist, however, to insist on her sex in the syllabus.

It is hard to chart a sure way out of this morass. It appears pointless, for instance, to point out that Anscombe would not want attention drawn to her status as a ‘woman philosopher’; or, for instance, to point out that someone like Susan Stebbing wished to be referred to ‘by the bare surname without academic title or sex denomination’ (my emphasis, Barth 1992, 1). For this move is not at all to do with Anscombe or Stebbing or anyone else as a philosopher; it has no respect for the individuality and independence of women like Anscombe; it is, like the British Academy project, putting her purely at the service of a political feminist agenda for which she herself would have had no time. It enacts the ultimate insult—inclusion on a reading list because she was a woman. And this from Oxford, where she taught for the greater part of her career. And when you think of all this, the only response one can muster won't be far from that of Susan Haack’s: 'Oh, good grief! Oxford, yet! What’s wrong with them?'.

To the last objection: anyone can send in a head shot to the CSW to be included on the next version of the poster! The CSW, thus, is not excluding anyone! Well, firstly, this invitation is of no use to absentee women who have passed away, such as Stebbing or Anscombe; it remains the case that they were either excluded, or—somehow—forgotten. Secondly, what sort of philosopher would want to be on this poster? From what we’ve just said, Stebbing or Anscombe would surely decline; I’d wager Arendt, Murdoch and Warnock refusing too. And Susan Haack? Would Susan Haack want to be featured on it? Considering Haack’s attitude to all-women conferences (invitations to which she refuses, on the grounds that they are (a) a terrible idea, and (b) sexist), and her dim view of the agenda of the CSW and SWIP to get more women into philosophy, I’m quite confident she would say ‘no’ (see especially her answer to the fifth question in Haack (2012); on the general issue of preferential hiring of women, see Haack 1998b, 168-179). Evidently the people who would seek inclusion on the poster are precisely the sort who are already most represented on the poster—gender feminists; in other words, the CSW’s target demographic. Moreover, there is undoubtedly, as Margarita Levin has noted, a marked ‘pchantment of many feminists to praise themselves most fulsomely’ (Levin 1998, 106). Minnich, for example, makes the extraordinary claim that the work of gender feminists like herself is ‘as fundamental, as dangerous, as exciting’ as the Copernican or Darwinian revolutions; Nye, in a review of Women’s Studies books, gushingly compares their world shaking insights to those of Socrates and Descartes (Minnich 1979, 7, quoted in Hoff-Sommers 1994, 280, n. 3; Nye 1998, 107-115). And all of this without a hint of embarrassment. The poster is a simply another element of this—they are, frankly, celebrating their own damn selves.

In general, it is not necessary to invoke conspiracies of exclusion to make sense of the CSW’s choices for the poster. The fact is, even if the exclusions were (somehow!) unintentional, and even if these exclusions were later to be rectified, as it stands they do, for the most part, match up well with the stated agenda of the CSW, as is evident from its Newsletter and the other materials on its website. The thing is, it is not so much that an association such as the CSW ought to be clearer about what it is really about (for it is really quite clear), but that the philosophy community and academics in general ought to be better informed as to what the CSW is about. During the heated debates after the poster appeared, overnight, without any consultation, in my school, I remember well the incredulity with which some of my male colleagues met the simple objection to the display of the poster, namely, that it was a thoroughly partisan, ideological and political statement, and as such inappropriate in the workplace.

One CSW poster asks, ‘Where are the Women?’, the other asks ‘Got Women?’. But ‘Got feminists?’ is the question it is really asking; and what’s more, feminists of a particular stripe. The fact is that the CSW, and SWIP too, are neither about philosophy, nor about women. They are interested in feminist philosophers, whose claim to be philosophers is, as we have seen, dubious. So while these organisations declare their deep concern about the ‘under-representation’ of women in philosophy, they don’t actually represent women in philosophy. Recalling the feminist paradox, we might say indeed that there are low numbers of women in philosophy, but that feminist philosophers are in fact greatly over-represented in philosophy; and the sort of lobbying pressure these organisations place on departments of philosophy is indeed more likely...
to lead to the appointment of more feminist philosophers (see Haack 1998b, 176). So let’s return to the poster the very same question it asks. Where are the women? Too busy doing philosophy, I’d imagine.10

NOTES

3. The fictional status of Diotima of Mantinea (not ‘Diotima Mantinea’, as the rather error strewn poster puts it) ought not to be controversial, but there has been a concerted recent effort to make it so, starting with the tendentious arguments in Waihe 1987, 83 (but note that even Waihe waives judgement on Diotima’s historicity, xiv-xv). Cf. the entry on Diotima in Nails 2002, 137. Note that d’Angour 2019 revives the case that Diotima is to be identified with Aspasia, on whom see following note.
4. Henry’s study of Aspasia concedes that we know very little about her (Henry 1995, 3, 127, 128). While sexism is regularly invoked as the reason why she has been denied major cultural and intellectual influence (Henry 127; Stadter 1991, 123), sober reflection on the evidence indicates that the claims in, for instance, Plato’s Menexenus that Aspasia taught rhetoric to Pericles—and Socrates—are not to be taken seriously: as M. Schofield notes drily ‘what she was expert in, no doubt, was the giving of pleasure’, Schofield 2010, 119 n. 8; cf. also xix-xx. See review of Henry by R. Wallace 1996. Cf. also the entry on Aspasia in Nails 2002, 58f. Even someone as sympathetic to the subject of rehabilitating historical women philosophers as Peter Adamson remarks that one could include Diotima and Aspasia among women philosophers ‘only if you are willing to treat Plato’s dialogues as records of historical fact (which you shouldn’t be)’ (Adamson 2016).
5. Or is this unfair (and sexist)? ‘The category ‘mystic’ allows us to throw someone in that container, shut the lid, and assume that that person isn’t a thoroughgoing philosopher,’ Christa Mercer remarks, adding: ‘It so happens that a lot of women have been put in that category’ (Goldhill 2017). One man’s mysticism is another man’s, or woman’s, philosophy, perhaps.
6. Elizabeth’s different titles confused the poster’s compilers; she appears as Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia at no. 66, and as Elizabeth Princess Palatine at no. 154 (different portraits are used). Descartes’ other famous female correspondent, Queen Christina of Sweden, is notably absent.
7. Another blunder is the garbling of the name of the last woman on the poster, Hipparchia; she is listed as ‘Hipparchia of Maroneia Villa Farnesina’—the corruption of Maroneia into Marcoloneia we might pass over in silence, but the addition of ‘Villa Farnesina’ is presumably because the editor(s) simply cut and pasted the file name of the image of Hipparchia in her Wikipedia entry, the image being a detail of a wall painting from the garden of the Villa Farnesina, Museo delle Terme, Rome—an inauspicious conclusion to the poster.
8. Assuming, that is, that they were given the opportunity to express an opinion on it—which is not a particularly safe assumption.
9. The ‘equity’ versus ‘gender’ feminism distinction was first introduced by Hoff Sommers, 1994, 22f. See also Pinker’s presentation of this distinction, 2002, 341f., to which much of the summary of gender feminism in what follows is indebted.
11. Academic feminists’ disingenuous adoption of a high-functioning autism approach to figures of speech perhaps behooves me to say that I am not advocating whacking a feminist—no more than I want to actually hit a mole; cf. Gross & Levitt 1998, 116, 121, on feminist ‘metaphor mongering’.
12. Butler 1990 goes even further, asserting that sex too is constructed; for a shorter and mercifully clearer exposition of her views, see her 2019.
13. Certainly not every occupation, but the well paid, comfortable, office-environment occupations.
14. Thus the frequent calls to change the culture: see e.g., Haslanger, 2008. For comment, see Elshtain 1986, 7-14.

15. There is a great and growing number of studies documenting the origin of behavioural sex differences in human biology. See, e.g., Beltz et al, 2011, 313-7, Cohen-Bendahan et al, 2005, 353–384; Hines 2010, 448–456. This is not, of course, to rush to the other extreme and claim the differences between men and women are totally a matter of biology.

16. Although de Beauvoir’s vision of such is, to put it mildly, very concerning: ‘A world where men and women would be equal is easy to visualize,’ de Beauvoir writes in The Second Sex, ‘for that precisely is what the Soviet Revolution promised’; de Beauvoir 1952, 806.

17. Yes, feminist geography is a thing, with its own dedicated journals. See, for instance, Richardson 2017.

18. See, e.g., the ‘Recommended Reading’ at the Leverhulme Trust funded Implicit Bias and Philosophy Research Project site, upon which SWIP relies for the claim that implicit sexism is rife in Philosophy and the cause of women’s ‘under-representation’. The ‘Psychological’ literature omits all of the many articles sceptical of the effects of implicit bias. Talk about bias, eh? https://www.biasproject.org/2018/11/27/psychology-literature/

19. The meaning of ‘feminazi’ is in any case somewhat ambiguous, having been originally used by Rush Limbaugh with specific reference to extreme feminists that enthusiastically promote abortion, but now often extended to feminists in general. See OED, s.v. ‘feminazi’; Rudman 2012.

20. Haack 1998a, 126 remarks on the incongruity of these ‘affluent, well-educated Western women’ identifying with the marginalized and oppressed.


   https://gsws.ucdavis.edu/program-information

23. https://cgfs.ie/

24. Joan Weiner describes Nye’s ‘readings’ as ‘products, not of scholarship, but of fantasy’, Weiner 1994, 681. Even worse, Haack finds in Nye’s thesis a ‘disquieting’ revival of sexist stereotypes of women as illogical, Haack 1998a, 125; Nye is indeed reviving very much the same sort of stereotype of women for which Haack took John Lucas to task, that is, as ‘so woolly-minded and emotional’ that they are not able to understand abstract subjects like mathematics or logic; see Haack 1974, 91.

25. https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/got-women-poster-now-available/

26. ‘Rand’s radical individualism has much to offer to modern feminism… it is ‘radically empowering’ for many women’, Michalson 2001, 161.

27. Honig 1995, 2-3, on one reading, might seem to dispute this point; but, be that as it may, she still ends up identifying as the key question in feminist approaches to Arendt, ‘How does reading Arendt change the way we think about feminist theory?’.

28. Haack’s reaction, in an e-mail of 13:06 [EST], 19th March 2018; on file with author.

29. In the email cited in note 28, Haack refers to an invitation to such a conference: ‘they seemed amazed when I said sorry, no, (1) this is a terrible idea, and (2) I don’t accept sexist invitations’.

30. Many thanks to Mark Migotti for his patience, his valuable comments on the penultimate version of this paper, and, of course, for inviting me to contribute to this Festschrift.
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