Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether a statement like “the reform ought to be favored” is practically the same as “the reform would yield positive net consequences.” The first statement, featuring “ought,” is one that many economists would deem “normative,” the second, “positive.” But if the two statements are practically the same, where does that leave the positive-normative distinction? We advance the idea that any statement that is apt to be deemed “normative” can be recast as a statement that is practically the same but apt to be deemed “positive.” We generated empirical evidence on the idea by creating a set of surveys, fielded to economics professors. We sent out 3000 and received 574 completed surveys (19.1 percent). The key aspect of the surveys was that most of them contained both a “normative” formulation and a “positive” formulation, enabling investigation and assessment of practical sameness between the two formulations. When we sum all of the intra-individual-respondent differences between his or her “positive” answer and his or her “normative” answer—over all forms of the “positive” formulations, “for humankind (worldwide, present and future)”—we arrive at a sum of differences remarkably close to zero, a result consistent with the contention that so-called normative questions are practically the same as suitably formulated so-called positive questions. An online webpage contains numerous appendixes, allowing full replicability and including a kappa analysis and other ways of viewing our results.

Keywords: positive, normative, ought

This inmate of the breast, this abstract man, the representative of mankind, and substitute of the Deity, whom nature has constituted the supreme judge of all their actions…

—Adam Smith (1976, 130 ed. note r, italics added)

David Colander and Huei-Chun Su (2015, p. 157) write: “About the only thing most practicing economists remember about methodology is that it is important to maintain a distinction between positive and normative economics.” We agree that the positive-normative distinction is a salient feature of academic economics, but, while Colander and Su attempt to salvage the distinction, our attitude is, rather, to...
overcome the distinction. When we see it in discourse, we glean something from it, of course. It is not meaningless to us.

But we find employing the positive-normative distinction to be always a dominated option. Our attitude on the matter is like that of numerous other economists and philosophers. So, though the positive-normative distinction is necessarily part of an economist’s passive vocabulary, we ask the reader to entertain the idea that she should not allow it to be part of her active vocabulary.

We conducted a survey with the aim of showing that, in a discussion among economists, two statements like the following are practically the same:

**Statement A**: Implementing such a reform would, as compared to the status quo policy, yield, on the whole, positive net consequences for humankind (worldwide, present and future).

**Statement B**: The reform ought to be favored over the status-quo policy.

Claims concerning whether a pair of statements, such as A and B, are "practically the same" raise issues of what practical sameness means and how practical sameness is assessed.

Notice that the two statements above, A and B, leave unspecified many particulars, including: the policy issue, the time and place of the context (that is, the status quo being reformed), the reform, the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the discourse situation. Such particulars can vary in innumerable ways, giving rise to a universe of A-and-B pairings, with each pairing inviting the question of the practical sameness between the more fully specified A and B. It may be that for a particular pairing the two statements are then found to be, in those particular manifestations, not practically the same: The particulars may give rise to particular factors that then make the A statement and the B statement function somewhat differently. But the contention we advance is that, above all such particulars, or, over the whole universe of pairings, A and B, as stated above, are practically the same—that is, that A and B, as stated above, are practically the same in general.

Most economists make the positive-normative distinction part of their active vocabulary. To such economists we give the following appellation:

**Pos-normer**: An economist who makes the positive-normative distinction part of his or her active vocabulary.

Surely all pos-normers would call Statement B “normative.”

But what about Statement A? If you are a pos-normer, what say you? Is it positive or normative? If you say it is normative, we would next ask: What is it about Statement A that makes it normative rather than positive? Next: The answer that you provide, does it work as a general criterion (necessary?, sufficient?, both?) for distinguishing positive and normative?

We undertook our survey expecting that, after we had completed the investigation and written up our paper about it, readers of our final paper would be willing to accept the idea that most pos-normers would identify Statement A as positive rather than normative. We do not have survey evidence to back up that assertion. Our paper proceeds on that supposition—one that we suspect is sound—that is, that most pos-normers would call Statement A positive rather than normative.

On that supposition: If we could demonstrate that A and B are practically the same, the demonstration would support the contention that the positive-normative distinction does not hold the importance it is given. If “normative” statements are easily recast as and found to be practically the same as suitably formulated “positive” statements, what is the status of the distinction? Is there better terminology for the distinction one wishes to make?

Like John B. Davis (2016), we feel that the positive-normative distinction is often used to sneer at and bully people, to shut them up or push them aside. And it is sometimes used to evade the responsibility to
make important judgments, or to evade responsibility for the judgments one does make. Such vices often depend on presuppositions and arguments that are obscure, even hidden.

Suppose that you are assembling a soccer team and need to recruit players. On the day of try-outs a slew of aspirants show up to win a spot on the team. One is a fellow named Norm Pozz. He’s not useless on the soccer-field. But as you explore his value as a potential member of the team, you find that in every position some other aspirant bests him. Furthermore, you learn that his conduct is sometimes troublesome. He is dominated at every turn, and not worth including on the team. Here, the soccer team you assemble is a metaphor for your active vocabulary.

Daniel Klein (2014) has suggested that, as a discourse choice, employing the positive-normative distinction is always a dominated option. That is, there is always a choice that outperforms employing the positive-normative distinction. Sometimes it is outperformed by some other distinction, such as one of those in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Distinctions that sometimes best the positive-normative distinction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. precise and accurate</th>
<th>loose, vague, and indeterminate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. reserved</td>
<td>outspoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. unassuming; tactful</td>
<td>declamatory; strident; overbearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. uncontroversial</td>
<td>controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. conventional</td>
<td>unconventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. centrist; establishment or status-quo oriented</td>
<td>socialist/progressive/libertarian/ etc. etc. (as the case may be)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we must forgo elaborating that very often it would be to the good to replace positive-normative by some other language, such as one of the alternatives in Figure 1, except to give one example from Adam Smith.

In March 1756, Smith published a lengthy letter about European literature. He amply praises and congratulates the *Encyclopédie* edited by Diderot and d’Alembert, of which five volumes had appeared by 1755. But Smith (1980, p. 247) comments critically:

>You will observe, that tho’ none of the authors of this collection appear to be mean or contemptible, yet they are not all equal. That the style of some of them is more declamatory, than is proper for a Dictionary; in which not only declamation, but any loose composition, is, more than any where, out of its place.

Smith finds some of the entries too “declamatory.” It is easy to imagine that commentators today would say that those entries were too “normative”—a word first emerging only in the 1890s. But is Smith’s meaning better expressed by saying “normative” rather than “declamatory”?

Notice that, in addition to objecting to declamation, Smith also says that “any loose composition” is inappropriate for such a work. Looseness is not the same as declamation: Some statements are objectionable because they are too loose, others because they are too declamatory. By getting away from the word *normative*, one clarifies his meaning. If one says “normative” as an objection, then by replacing it with “declamatory” or “loose,” one thereby makes oneself more accountable for his objecting, by inviting the next question: But why is the statement too declamatory? Or, But why is the statement too loose? Propriety in declamation and propriety in looseness are two matters that often relate to one another, but still they are two different matters. By clarifying one’s objection, one objects more civilly and more fruitfully. Figure 1 provides options to use in lieu of “normative.” Usually, one or more of these six dominates “normative.”
Besides sometimes being beaten by an alternative distinction, such as one in Figure 1, sometimes the positive-normative distinction is beaten by simply being erased, along with some of the other words around it.

It is common for pos-normers to express their distinction in terms of a distinction between *is* and *ought*. But does distinguishing between *is* and *ought* make for an important, useful distinction? Are *ought* sentences, as a category, substantively different from all *is* sentences? Klein (2014) suggests that the answer is no. He argues the following:

1. It is easy to recast any *ought* sentence as what pos-normers would count as an *is* sentence, and vice versa.
2. Every *is* sentence can be understood as conveying tacit “oughts;”
3. Etymology helps us see that every *ought* can be understood as an *is*: Just as “would have strolled” or “has been schooled” or “owes” is an *is*, so may we see “ought”—which derives from *owe*—as an *is*.

The third argument is most important—that’s why Klein’s 2014 piece is titled, “Ought as an *Is*.”

A skeptic might raise the following challenge: “You contend that it is easy to recast any *ought* sentence into an *is* sentence: Okay then, prove it.” The present project was taken up in the spirit of taking up that challenge. We sought to test whether a recast sentence does in fact function like the original sentence. We hoped to generate some evidentiary support for the claim that statements that pos-normers would deem “normative” operate like a recast sentence that they would deem “positive.” We think our effort was successful.

In this paper, our putting quotation marks around the word *positive* or the word *normative* (thus, “positive,” “normative”) is our way of saying: “which some pos-normers would deem ‘positive’ (‘normative’).” Thus the aim of the survey can be stated as follows: To see whether “normative” statements function like suitably formulated “positive” statements.

*Survey execution and the response rate:* In Appendix C we provide a thorough account of how the survey was conducted, etc., but the basics are as follows: William Davis and his team at the University of Tennessee at Martin created a mailing list of 3000 economics professors in the United States and mailed out the surveys (of which there were multiple forms, explained below) on 23 September 2013. Over the next several months they received back 574 surveys, a response rate of 19.1 percent.

**I. The correspondence between the two goods**

Sitting above the argumentation in this paper is an organizing precept, one that Adam Smith renders quite explicit in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.² We call it the *correspondence between the two goods*.

Consider a person—let’s call her Robin—who faces a choice between A and B. Suppose that you affirm in your public discourse that Robin’s doing A is better for humankind (present and future) than Robin’s doing B. Is it sensible, then, that you affirm, also, that Robin ought to do B, rather than A?

Here we see two different concepts of good. There is what is *good for humankind*, and there is what is *good action* on Robin’s part. Cultural evolution has organized our thinking such that we naturally and properly strive to make “good for the whole” correspond to “good action.” We do so by jiggering what is on either side of the correspondence.

Words used in treating matters of good action include *ought*, *should*, *duty*, *virtue*, *justice*, *right*, and *propriety*. Words used in treating matters of what constitutes the good of the whole, and of what advances such goodness, include *desirable*, *best*, *beneficial*, *efficient*, *flourishing*, *thriving*, *healthy*, *happy*, *wellbeing* and so on. The point is that we human beings navigate our cultural word under the precept that *ought* and the good of the whole shall correspond.

One’s notion of the good of the whole is whatever it is. It is surely something very loose and vague, but looseness and vagueness do not unmake that loose, vague thing’s existence. Whatever your notion is, we might call it the X criterion. Now, consider the statement: *By the X criterion, Robin’s doing A rates higher*
than her doing $B$. We can make that look scientific: $R(A) >_X R(B)$. Whether pos-normers would call the statement $R(A) >_X R(B)$ “positive” or “normative,” and what they would say is their basis for saying what they’d say, are questions deserving of exploration. But our contention is that such persons, if they examine their own thinking, will realize that, if cornered, they too would affirm the correspondence between the two goods. If they can accept that contention, then they will be part way toward entertaining the chief contention of this paper—that “normative” statements are practically the same as suitably formulated “positive” statements—because the chief contention rests directly on the correspondence-between-the-two-goods precept.

Here, one might wonder whether “normative” signifies that the statement treats matters on the whole, or on net, for humankind, whereas “positive” signifies that the statement treats matters with respect to only a finite, delimited set of aspects. But consider the following uncontroversial statement: *The discovery of antibiotics advanced the well-being of humankind*. That speaks of human well-being on the whole; so is it “normative”? If it is not “normative,” why not? Because it is uncontroversial? If so, then does “normative” just mean “controversial”?

Also, it would be easy to give examples of statements that would seem to treat only a finite, delimited set of aspects that pos-normers would be inclined to call “normative,” such as “Workers deserve to be paid a living wage.”

Maybe the positive-normative distinction does not deserve a living wage. That is, we suggest that pos-normers learn to overcome their being a pos-normer. We suggest that distinctions like those displayed in Figure 1 are necessary to understand motives of pos-normers.

II. On practical sameness between two statements

We have an intuitive sense of two statements being practically the same. In each of the following pairs of statements, both statements are practically the same, more or less:

- Please give me a turkey sandwich.
  - I’ll take a turkey sandwich, thanks.
- *Casablanca* is excellent.
  - *Casablanca* is superb.
- Generally speaking, my life is a happy one.
  - Generally speaking, my life is a satisfying one.
- God exists.
  - There is a divine being.
- The reform would yield positive net benefits.
  - The reform ought to be favored.

In contending that “the reform would yield positive net benefits” is practically the same as “the reform ought to be favored,” how are we to show such practical sameness? If the reader is open to hearing our contention that any “normative” question is practically the same as a suitably formulated “positive” question, what sort of evidence should the reader ask for? What sort of evidence should the reader find persuasive?

Just because two statements elicit similar reactions in one particular context, we would not necessarily conclude that they are practically the same. Just because *everyone* strongly agrees that it is good to breathe each day and that it is good to drink fluids each day, we wouldn’t conclude that “to breathe” is practically the
same as “to drink fluids.” A statement belongs to a vast cultural world of many contexts and many intersecting, sometimes colliding, interpretations.

For persuading the reader that two statements are practically the same, it is probably impossible to use survey data to mount an empirical argument that will ever be sufficient, by itself. No matter how strong the quantitative evidence, the reader will reserve for herself a veto option, an option that she, as a living member of the vast cultural world under investigation, considers after asking herself, But are the two statements really the same? Reserving such an option, it seems to us, is perfectly reasonable. Quantitative evidence will never be sufficient.

But we can explore whether the quantitative evidence satisfies necessary conditions for practical same- ness. If two statements are practically the same, then the data should show consilience with practical same- ness. What does it mean for the data to show consilience with practical sameness? A useful comparison would be the findings of test-retest results—that is, data from surveys in which a respondent answers the exact same question. Such findings would provide a sort of benchmark for practical sameness; in our online appendixes we discuss test-retest and we adopt such a benchmark for assessing our results (appendices E, G, and H).

We offer this investigation, then, not with a pretention of offering knockdown, sufficient evidence of practical sameness between “normative” statements and suitably formulated “positive” statements. Rather, we ask the reader to consider that contention, and we help the reader ponder the matter by going through evidence that, we feel, shows consilience with such practical sameness.

III. The survey wording and questions

At the top of the first page of the survey (in all forms) appeared: Survey of Economics Professors on Im- migration, Drug, and Pharmaceutical Policies. The survey asked questions about three areas of public policy: immigration policy, illicit drug policy, and pharmaceutical or FDA-approval policy. In all forms of the survey, the wording of questions across the three policy topics was neatly parallel. The primary goal of the survey had to do with the “positive”/“normative” wording, not policy attitudes. In this manner, a respondent would provide us with three trials of our “positive”/“normative” test—a trial for each of the three policy topics. Therefore we have more “positive”/“normative” data than we have respondents.

Also, the survey asked year of birth, gender, and a final invitation to share thoughts about the survey. The survey was very short, just 12 questions (or fewer, in some forms). It did not ask political-party affiliation or ideological disposition.

The reform proposal, in each of the three policy areas

For each of the three areas of federal government policy, the survey posited a reform proposal. A respondent who answered the questions in the order they were presented would proceed through the short survey as follows:

1st: answering questions about the posited immigration reform
2nd: answering questions about the posited marijuana policy reform
3rd: answering questions about the posited pharmaceutical approval reform
4th: answering the final questions (age, gender, and comments).
The survey posited the following reform concerning immigration:

The federal government maintains various controls on (legal) immigration into the United States.

Please consider the following reform proposal: That the federal government increases the in-flow rate of new legal immigrants by about 30 percent above its status quo yearly level (across the board, with respect to immigrant/visa categories). (Under the reform, every year, the new policy would permit 130 people to enter where now only 100 are permitted to enter.)

The survey posited the following reform concerning marijuana:

The federal government maintains various controls on certain intoxicating drugs, including marijuana.

Please consider the following reform proposal: That the federal government treat marijuana in the same manner as alcohol or tobacco are now treated—that is, liberalization of the current controls, but with licensing and monitoring of suppliers and age restrictions on purchase and use.

The survey posited the following reform concerning FDA approval:

In the United States, a new drug must be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to be produced and marketed in the United States.

Please consider the following reform proposal: That the United States adopt a policy wherein the FDA selects five of the drug-approval agencies of other leading OECD countries (for example, the Health Canada agency in Canada), and then, thereafter, as soon as a new drug is approved by any of those five agencies, that drug automatically gains approval in the United States.

The basic idea of our investigation is to test whether, with the reform proposal specified in each policy area, the respondent would answer a “normative” question about the reform in the same way that he would answer a sufficiently broad “positive” question. The “normative” question (in the case of immigration policy) was as follows:

The reform ought to be favored over the status quo immigration policy:

- [ ] agree strongly
- [ ] agree, not strongly
- [ ] neutral
- [ ] disagree, not strongly
- [ ] disagree strongly
- [ ] have no opinion

As for the “positive” questions (which preceded the “normative” question), we used four different phrasings, explained below.
A. The compounded ruse of the survey

It is our sense that people are more likely to respond to a survey if they feel they have a sense of the motivations of the investigators, and support such motivations.

Our true motivation in conducting the investigation had to do with the positive-normative distinction. None of the text in the survey or the cover-letter indicated that motivation. We imagine that when the respondent first laid eyes on the text of the survey he would guess that our motivation simply had to do with the three policy topics. Reading the survey more carefully, he would probably form a suspicion as to what the underlying motivation was—a suspicion, however, that was not right!

In designing the survey, we faced a problem. Take the immigration reform. Our goal was to get the respondent to answer both a “normative” question about it and a broad “positive” question about it. One of the phrasings we used for “positive” questions was “positive net economic consequences.” Had we, after positing the immigration reform, asked whether it would result in positive net economic consequences (“positive”), and then whether it ought to be favored over the status quo (“normative”), the respondent might well have thought the survey very strange. If we had asked just those two questions, the respondent might have thought the investigators goofy and not worth cooperating with. Or, we thought, perhaps the respondent would see that we are actually investigating whether economists answer “positive” questions the same way that they answer “normative” questions, and therefore responded in a way somehow affected by such speculation on his part.

We came up with a different unstated but perceptible motivation, namely, a matter of present-day Americans versus present-and-future humankind worldwide. For the phrasing of “positive net economic consequences,” for example, we asked first about “for the set of people who are American citizens at present,” and then about “for humankind (worldwide, present and future),” and then the “normative” question, whether the reform “ought to be favored over the status quo.” We think that when respondents read all three questions, they probably thought that our motivation had to do with the following two issues: (1) For such reforms, do economists systematically see a difference in net consequence for present-day Americans and for present-and-future humankind?, and (2) Which one—consequences for Americans or for humankind—better fits economists’ judgments about whether the reform out to be favored? In particular, do economists ever favor what they perceive to be the interests of Americans over the interests of humankind?

The survey, then, has three levels:

- **Level 1**: Gathering data on economists’ judgments on immigration, marijuana, and FDA reform.
- **Level 2**: Gathering data on their thinking on Americans-versus-humankind.
- **Level 3**: Gathering data on whether they answer suitably formulated “positive” questions differently than “normative” questions.

For recipients of the survey, the first level was obvious, and the second was perhaps what they inferred to be our real motivations. Our real motivation, the third, probably was *not* inferred by them. Level 3 is what concerns us in the present article.

B. The NPR contextualization of the questions

Sometimes, when you ask an economist for his judgment on a policy issue, he says, “As an economist, I would say…” If an economist John speaks that way, presumably it is because he means to imply that what he says “as an economist” doesn’t necessarily match with what he might say as whatever else he might be. Since some economists talk that way, we provided some contextualization for the policy questions, in hopes of specifying what the respondent, in answering the questions, is speaking “as.” The contextualization was as follows (for the questions on immigration):
Now, suppose the reform proposal is being discussed on National Public Radio (NPR), and the interviewer has invited you to speak as a professional economist on the matter. In the course of the interview, the interviewer shall report your answers to the following questions (that is, questions 1, 2, and 3): Please mark your disposition toward each of the following statements as you would for the purpose of such an NPR engagement.

The NPR contextualization was a constant: As the survey proceeded to the marijuana and FDA reforms, we repeated the contextualization. Thus, for all questions on all three reforms, the respondent is contextualized to be speaking “as a professional economist” in a discussion on NPR.

C. The four phrasings of the “positive” question

We used four different “positive” variations—with only one used in any given survey. All begin with: “Implementing such a reform would, on the whole, …”

The four phrasings of the “positive” questions:

• “yield positive net economic consequences for …”
• “yield positive net consequences for …”
• “increase social welfare for …”
• “be good for …”

We realize that, even though “would be” is a form of is, some people would say that a statement to the effect that a reform “would be good for” some set of people is a “normative” statement, not a “positive” statement. The variation may show how one comes to see “positive” as “normative,” or vice versa. Also, we varied the “positive” phrasing to explore whether such variation matters. We used the “ought to be favored” question in all (core) surveys.

If a survey used “positive net economic consequences” for the immigration part of the survey, then it repeated that same phrasing for the marijuana and FDA questions; and similarly for the other three “positive” phrasings. Thus, each “positive” phrasing was paired with the “normative” question (“ought to be favored”), but never was a “positive” phrasing paired with a different “positive” phrasing.

We had expected that, on average, “positive net economic consequences” answers would differ most from “ought to be favored” answers. The four “positive” versions bulleted above are listed in the order that we expected would be largest to smallest in absolute gaps from “normative” answers. We expected that the final version, “be good for,” would be closest to “ought to be favored.” As we shall see, that pattern did not obtain; but not finding the expected pattern does not, we feel, bear on our main prediction, which is simply that respondents’ “positive” answers would not systematically differ much from their “normative” answers.

D. Four core survey forms, plus two auxiliary forms

We have four core surveys, each corresponding to one of the four “positive” phrasings, with the following three questions for each of the three policy areas:

• “positive” phrasing for present-day American citizens
• “positive” phrasing for humankind (present and future)
• “normative” phrasing (that is, “ought to be favored”)
Of the 3000 surveys mailed out, 20 percent were “positive net economic consequences,” 20 percent were “positive net consequences,” 20 percent were “increase social welfare,” and 20 percent were “be good.”

The remaining 20 percent were split between two auxiliary forms of the survey. We speculated that perhaps the presence of a “normative” question would affect the respondent’s answer to a “positive” question, and vice versa. To check on such a concern, we made 10 percent of the surveys just like the “positive net economic consequences” survey but without the “normative” questions, and 10 percent with only the “normative” question, that is, without any “positive” questions at all.

Table 1 summarizes some of the foregoing information, and also shows the response rate for each of the six forms of the survey.

Table 1: The six forms of the survey and return rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>“positive” phrasing</th>
<th>“normative” question</th>
<th>Sent out</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Return rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>“positive net economic consequences”</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>“positive net consequences”</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>“increase social welfare”</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>“be good”</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>“positive net economic consequences”</td>
<td>Not included!</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>NONE!</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were numbered in the order that their completed surveys arrived back to William Davis. Consider the first F1 survey. The respondent was male and 72 years old. Since his survey was the third to be received, let’s call him Mr. 3. Mr. 3 responded to all of the questions. At the final question, he wrote: “Good luck on this research.”

On the immigration reform, in response to the statement that implementing the reform “would, on the whole, yield positive net economic consequences for the set of people who are American citizens at present,” Mr. 3 checked “agree, not strongly.” In response to the same statement except now “for humankind (worldwide, present and future),” he checked “agree strongly.” In response to the statement, “The reform ought to be favored over the status-quo immigration policy,” he checked “agree, not strongly.”

Our attitude about the positive-normative distinction entails the feeling that “normative” questions can be recast as “positive” questions, particularly by specifying consideration of consequences “on the whole” or on “net,” or something to the effect of “overall social welfare,” or what is—is—“good” for the whole. Mr. 3’s “agree, not strongly” answer to the “ought to be favored” question matches his answer to the “positive net economic consequences” question for Americans, but it is one notch off from the same for humankind (his answer there being “agree strongly”).

Turning now to Mr. 3’s responses on the marijuana and FDA questions, we find matches between his “positive” and “normative” response: For both reforms, he responded “agree strongly” to all questions.
For each (core-form) respondent, there are six pairings of “positive” response with a “normative” response:

- Immigration:
  1. Americans
  2. humankind
- Marijuana:
  1. Americans
  2. humankind
- FDA:
  1. Americans
  2. humankind

For Mr. 3, the responses in five of the six pairings match, and in one they differ only by a single notch. We suggest that, on the whole, Mr. 3’s responses show consilience with our general contention.

**IV. A negative difference means lesser “normative” agreement**

We number the five response options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The number 1 corresponds to “agree strongly,” and 5 to “disagree strongly.” The number rises with disagreement.

To illustrate how we calculate and interpret a difference, let us return to Mr. 3’s “positive” answer on immigration for humankind and his “normative” answer. To the positive question Mr. 3 answered, “agree strongly,” 1 in our calculation. To the “normative” question, he answered, “agree, not strongly,” 2 in our calculation. We calculate the difference by starting with the “positive” answer and then subtracting from it the “normative” answer. Thus, a difference is calculated for respondent i as follows:

\[ i's \text{ difference} = i's \text{ “positive” answer} - i's \text{ “normative” answer} \]

For the just-specified answers from Mr. 3 we have 1 − 2 = −1. This difference (−1) has—obviously—a negative value. The negativity is aptly interpreted as follows: Mr. 3’s agreement is lesser for the “normative” statement than for the “positive” statement. He strongly agreed that the immigration liberalization would yield positive net economic consequences. But his “ought to favor” answer is “agree, not strongly.”

This particular difference for Mr. 3 can be read as moderating the level of agreement as we pass from his “positive” to his “normative” response. For responses that are in the disagreement range, however, negativity would mean stronger “normative” disagreement. The general formulation, regardless of agreement or disagreement, is that negativity indicates lesser “normative” agreement—which in the case of agreement means moderation, and in the case of disagreement intensification of disagreement.

As it happens, the same sort of lesser agreement exhibited by Mr. 3 on immigration/humankind is found in the sample results for all four versions of the “positive” question. That is, on immigration, respondents, on average, agreed with ameliorative “positive” outcomes (for humankind), but reduced their “ought to favor” agreement. For each of the four “positive” versions, the average of such differences was below zero.

Now consider marijuana. Here we find the opposite pattern. On marijuana liberalization, respondents again leaned on average toward agreement about ameliorative “positive” outcomes. But their “ought to favor” responses were now (on average) a bit more bullish on agreement. The differences are greater than zero: Their “normative” agreement is greater than their “positive” agreement (in fact, greater not only for all four humankind differences, but also all four Americans differences).
V. Aggregate respondent-level differences: Humankind-“positive” and “normative”

Below is Table 2, the focal point of this article. It provides results for the 12 differences between “positive”/humankind and “normative.”

Table 2: Differences between “positive”/humankind and “normative”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“positive” q. asked</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Marijuana</th>
<th>FDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“positive net economic consequences for”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min.: −3</td>
<td>Min.: −2</td>
<td>Min.: −2</td>
<td>Mean of 3 means to left: 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean: −0.14</td>
<td>Mean: 0.22</td>
<td>Mean: −0.03</td>
<td>(1.75 − 1.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(= 1.75 − 1.90)</td>
<td>(= 2.18 − 1.96)</td>
<td>(= 2.52 − 2.55)</td>
<td>Max.: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 1</td>
<td>%: 0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=105</td>
<td>n=105</td>
<td>n=97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“positive net consequences for”</td>
<td>Min.: −2</td>
<td>Min.: −2</td>
<td>Mean of 3 means to left: 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean: −0.16</td>
<td>Mean: 0.23</td>
<td>Mean: 0.04</td>
<td>(= 1.48 − 1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(= 1.48 − 1.65)</td>
<td>(= 2.03 − 1.79)</td>
<td>(= 2.39 − 2.35)</td>
<td>Max.: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%: 1</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=110</td>
<td>n=112</td>
<td>n=103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“increase social welfare for”</td>
<td>Min.: −3</td>
<td>Min.: −2</td>
<td>Mean of 3 means to left: −0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean: −0.38</td>
<td>Mean: 0.32</td>
<td>Mean: −0.05</td>
<td>(= 1.53 − 1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(= 1.53 − 1.91)</td>
<td>(= 2.19 − 1.87)</td>
<td>(= 2.52 − 2.57)</td>
<td>Max.: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=102</td>
<td>n=105</td>
<td>n=95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“be good for”</td>
<td>Min.: −4</td>
<td>Min.: −4</td>
<td>Mean of 3 means to left: 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean: −0.07</td>
<td>Mean: 0.26</td>
<td>Mean: −0.07</td>
<td>(= 1.77 − 1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(= 1.77 − 1.84)</td>
<td>(= 2.09 − 1.83)</td>
<td>(= 2.66 − 2.73)</td>
<td>Max.: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 2</td>
<td>%: 0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=113</td>
<td>n=112</td>
<td>n=102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of 4 means above: −0.19</td>
<td>Mean of 4 means above: 0.26</td>
<td>Mean of 4 means above: −0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of 4 means above: 0.26</td>
<td>Mean of 4 means above: −0.03</td>
<td>Mean of all 12 means: 0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data presented here includes only respondents who gave an answer to both “positive” and “normative” questions, i.e., respondents who declined to answer either question are excluded.

Look at the upper-left cell. There we find information on the 105 respondents who answered (on survey form F1) both the “positive net economic consequences” for humankind immigration question and the “normative” immigration question. We see that the mean of the differences is −0.14. For the “positive net economic consequences” the mean response was 1.75. For the “normative” question the mean response was 1.90. In relation to either of those values, −0.14 is small. The cell also tells the minimum of the 105 differences, which was −3, and the maximum of the 105 differences, which was 2. Finally, the cell tells what percent of the 105 respondents answered each of the two questions with the exact same response (a difference of 0). In the case of this particular cell, 68 percent respondent to the two questions with the exact same response.

Now look at the lower right-hand cell, showing the remarkably small mean differences of the mean differences by “positive” question: 0.01. We focus on that result as the most pertinent finding for assessing, or at least illustrating, our contention. The reasoning for regarding it as the best test of our contention now proceeds in three basic propositions: (1) the justness of focusing on humankind (present and future), rather
than current Americans; (2) the justness of using differences, rather than gaps; (3) the justness of doing a roll-up over the three differences, rather than keeping the three issues strictly separate.

VI. The justness of focusing on “humankind (worldwide, present and future)"

It is natural to see “ought” statements as implicitly relating to some notion of the whole. But which whole? The sentence, Ralph ought to exercise more, might relate to the whole of Ralph’s life. But Ralph’s life is a part of larger wholes—his family, his circle of friends, his neighborhood, his country, humankind, all living things. It may well be that we come to the same conclusion whether we think of the whole of Ralph’s life or the whole of humankind, but we can also imagine how the conclusions might differ.

The situation of a discourse will tend to make certain wholes more focal than others. Our survey posited a discourse situation—the NPR interview setting—which is American in nature. Also, there was the setting of the survey itself: It was written in American English, sent by USPS mail, from fellow US-based economics professors, to US-based economics professors, about American reforms, etc. We cannot deny that the survey gives great prominence to the American whole.

Despite all, we feel that the more natural whole behind “ought” is humankind, and so we focus on the humankind results (contained in Table 2). (In Appendix F, we provide a table with present-day Americans results.) Now we expatiated on why we think humankind is the more natural whole.

Our suggestion is that “normative” statements are practically the same as suitably formulated “positive” statements. Our understanding of “suitably formulated” entails the idea of regard for the extensive human whole.

Most Americans are of the Western monotheistic heritages, which teach that all people are the children of God. Many argue (e.g., Siedentop 2014)—and we agree—that the ethical outlook of Western humanism or liberalism is patterned after such universality. The Declaration of Independence declares as a self-evident truth that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” Such universality rejects any profound variation in ethical standing by political jurisdiction. Say what one will about differences across ethnic, national, or racial populations, we are one species: We bond and raise up families that mix such petty distinctions: We may quarrel about how to describe human nature, but we all agree when it comes to distinguishing human and non-human.

Should we imagine that, in responding to “ought,” the survey respondent who happened to reside in Texas focused on Texas as the whole? Or on county or town? All of humankind—our highly distinct species—is the natural stopping point of ethical consideration. Do we doubt that the survey respondents see Canadians, too, as mattering equally to “ought”? And their Spanish-speaking neighbors in Mexico? Is not America itself a nation of immigrants and descendants thereof?

We think it natural to suppose that, when doing “ought,” our respondents, who are economics professors, principally respond with respect to the larger whole of humankind, present and future, as opposed to just present-day Americans. One question, preceding the “ought” question, asks explicitly about “humankind (worldwide, present and future).” The respondent was explicitly reminded of the largest human whole.

Such a universalistic ethic would not, of course, preclude special sentiment, sympathy, and concern for our more local wholes, for a love of home and a healthy patriotism. One of Smith’s central ideas is that universal benevolence is generally best served by our focusing on the local, because the effectiveness of our service to the whole of humankind declines as we try to act beyond the local. But nonetheless, for Adam Smith, universal benevolence (that is, the beauty of the great scene of humankind as it is perceived by a super-knowledgeable beholder who is benevolent) still sits as the proper, though loose and vague, conception behind “ought.” We think that civilization in America is, in that regard, Smithian enough to justify our focus on the humankind results.

The case for using humankind in formulating “positive” net-consequence questions to match “normative” questions is general. But as regards the results of our survey in particular, it turns out that even if we use the US version of the “positive” questions, the differences are—as shown in Appendix F—still small.
enough to illustrate our contention that "normative" statements are practically the same as suitably formulated "positive" statements. (In Table 2 above, using humankind, the mean of all 12 means is the vanishingly small 0.01. When using current American citizens instead, it is merely 0.09.)

VII. The justness of using differences (rather than gaps)

Consider again a pair of statements that we feel intuitively are practically the same:

• God exists.
• There is a divine being.

If we had data on people answering both questions in that pair, we would naturally feel that sameness ought to take into consideration differences, rather than mere gaps (absolute values). Suppose 100 people answered both questions. Now consider two different results outcomes:

Outcome 1: 50 people answered the two questions identically, and 50 answered with agreement to "God exists" one notch above how she answered “There is a divine being.”

Outcome 2: 50 people answered the two questions identically, 25 answered with agreement to "God exists" one notch above how she answered “There is a divine being,” and 25 people answered with agreement to the first one notch below how she answered the second.

In measuring mere gaps, both Outcomes yield a mean gap of 0.5. (Each has 50 people with a gap of 1 and 50 with zero, so 50/100 = 0.5.)

But don’t we feel intuitively that Outcome 2 better evinces practical sameness? In Outcome 2, the separations balance out; Outcome 2 has a mean difference of zero. But Outcome 1 has a mean difference of 0.5. It is reasonable to think that the variations shown in Outcome 2 are the results of vagaries, such as respondents reacting to a non-redundancy effect (Strack, Schwartz, and Wänke 1991), prompting them to give not-exactly-the-same answers to two similar questions.11 Half of the variations in Outcome 2 go in one direction, half in the other, as though people decided to vary by flipping a coin. But in Outcome 1 we see a systematic direction to the variation, which more strongly suggests that people on the whole do see the two statements as really somewhat different. To see such indications of real differentness we need to use signed differences, not merely gaps.12

VIII. The justness of doing a roll-up over the three issues

We hope that the preceding reasoning justifies our focusing on Table 2. Now we justify our focusing on its 'roll-up,' the lower right-hand cell showing the mean of all 12 means, which is 0.01. To justify the roll-up we start by imaginatively entering into the respondents’ thinking.

As previously noted, on the immigration liberalization, respondents agreed on average with ameliorative “positive” outcomes for humankind, but tended somewhat to reduce their “ought to favor” agreement. In Table 2’s column for Immigration, observe in boldface: −0.14, −0.16, −0.38, and −0.07. Not big, but the consistently below-zero figures make a pattern. On the marijuana liberalization, respondents agreed on average with ameliorative “positive” outcomes, and on average responded with stronger “ought to favor” agreement. In Table 2’s column for Marijuana, observe in boldface: 0.22, 0.23, 0.32, and 0.26. Again, not big, but the consistently above-zero figures make a pattern.

Here we may ponder two questions: (1) Why are immigration differences (for humankind) below zero? (2) Why are marijuana differences above zero? In the following two sidebars, we speculate on possible answers to those questions. These speculations are intended to persuade the reader, not that we accurately ex-
plain the particular factors in play in each pairing, but simply that any particular pairing will give rise to particular factors that do create slight systematic differences in how people answer the “positive” question and how they answer the “normative” question.

Sidebar 1: Why are immigration differences (for humankind) less than zero?

Enter into the situation of the respondent as she answered the immigration questions. She finds a “positive” question concerning outcomes for present-day Americans, the same “positive” question concerning humankind present and future, and the “ought” question. She imagines her role in the NPR interview. She knows that immigration is a gnarly and heart-wrenching issue involving considerations of liberty, compassion, identity, and complex political and cultural dynamics. Many of the factors relevant to her “ought” judgment are things that, as an economist, she is unlikely to be able to speak to in a way that impresses as expertise.

“Ought” judgments should give attention to all things that matter; that is common knowledge, more or less. But it is unclear whether one can say the same about our “positive” statements, which say the reform “would, on the whole,”: (1) “yield positive net economic consequences,” (2) “yield positive net consequences,” (3) “increase social welfare,” and (4) “be good for.” One of us might be prepared to mount a case that all four formulations, too, entail due attention to all things that matter. But we would be much less inclined to argue that it is common knowledge that they entail that. The discourse situation of a survey does not afford an opportunity to elaborate how one understands such phrases, and, instead, the discoursers must mind how other people understand them. The point is that such “positive” phrases (particularly 1, 2 and 3) are more susceptible to narrowing by the economist. So narrowed, the economist might then feel greater readiness to assert agreement about the thusly narrowed outcomes being ameliorative. But when it comes to the “ought,” the economist cannot dodge or hide from all things that matter. We find that “ought to favor” elicits less slightly less agreement. Perhaps respondents did not wish to come across as definite on what is a large, complex, controversial issue, and, because of such factor, therefore shaded their “ought to favor” response, making it closer to “neutral.”

Yet another possible factor is worth pondering. On the immigration reform’s yielding positive net economic consequences for humankind, Mr. 3 responded “agree strongly,” but for “American citizens at present” only “agree, not strongly.” His response on “ought to favor” was also “agree, not strongly.” Perhaps Mr. 3 and others with similar patterns would not wish to display to an NPR audience a response pattern that might be construed as globalist as opposed to America-first. Such shading might be more rhetorical tact than genuine partiality toward Americans.
Sidebar 2: Why are marijuana differences greater than zero?

Why does the shading on the marijuana issue go the other way? What factors might have played a role there?

The center of gravity is again toward agreement with the specified liberalization, but now agreement on “ought to favor” is a bit stronger than agreement on ameliorative “positive” outcomes for humankind. Perhaps one factor was that in responding to the “positive” statements our economists shrank a bit from seeming to propound stoner consumer surplus. There is a simple side to argumentation for liberalizing a product, but that simple argumentation isn’t so simple for products widely disapproved of. Perhaps our economists, again, hedged a bit from a concern about being construed as indifferent toward pot smoking and hence being dismissed. And yet their “ought to favor” agreement is slightly more robust, perhaps, first, because an NPR audience would probably lean that way, and, second, because such audience likely finds the issue not to be momentous. The reform was simply to regulate marijuana as alcohol is regulated. The economist who really does favor such reform faces no great difficulty in plainly saying so. In defending the “ought” judgment the NPR guest could speak directly of issues of law enforcement abuse, racial disparities, mass incarceration, disorder in foreign countries—matters that defy the semblance of precision connoted by the “positive” statements. Indeed, the results from the control surveys (survey forms 5 and 6) make for comparisons that support the reasoning of this paragraph; we elaborate those comparisons in Appendix B “Control Table.”

Or, instead of shying away from any semblance of precision, the respondent is perhaps simply less sure of how the “positive” statements will be understood by others, as well as of how the statements should be understood. The uncertainty leads them to moderate their “positive”-statement agreement. But “ought to favor” perhaps requires less in the way of presupposed common understandings: It asks more directly about how they feel it all stacks up, what they feel is the bottom line. As such, one feels less accountable to how exactly the accounting is done. The greater certainty about speaking to merely the bottom line, as opposed to speaking to what exactly the system of accounting is, results in this case (a widely held position on a fairly minor issue) in expression of stronger agreement.

Thus, in the Sidebars, we suggest explanations of how particular factors combined to push the agreement a bit one way or the other. Now, our reader might say to us: “OK, but don’t your Sidebar explanations just show that, assuming that the pushing in each case is something real, something calling for explanation, that in fact the ‘positive’ statements therefore are not practically the same as the ‘normative’ statement?”

To that we respond: Yes, indeed, in each case (that is, the case of the immigration reform and the case of the marijuana reform), for that particular position on that particular issue in that particular discourse situation, there are particular factors that make for small differences between the two sorts of questions. But the contention is larger: That particular factors tend to balance out across the wide span of issues and discourse situations. The contention is that “normative” and suitably formulated “positive” statements are practically the same in general.

Think of a universe of myriad pairings between “normative” and suitably formulated “positive” statements. We can, using a questionnaire such as ours, draw out pairings, to test the practical sameness of the two statements in a pairing. Such a universe could never be well-defined, and the number of pairings to test is innumerable. In this paper we have sampled only a very few of the pairings as could be drawn from such a universe. The pairings we test are but instances of more general ideas of a “positive” statement being practically the same as a “normative” statement. Our investigation, then, achieves two things: It instantiates par-
ticular pairings of the wider universe of such pairings, and it provides results that might illustrate the practical sameness of “normative” and suitably formulated “positive” statements.

Both amount to statements about the beauty or goodness or healthiness of the whole.\textsuperscript{13} We see that factors particular to the issue/situation push one way on immigration and the other way on marijuana, which illustrates our contention that such particularistic differences presumably tend to wash out when we think about the practical sameness, generally speaking, of “normative” statements and suitably formulated “positive” statements.

Thus, we maintain that focusing on the ‘roll up,’ combining the means over the policy issues, is just. Human beings develop a sense of the overall, as well as of the by-and-large. We navigate semantic action using associations wide and worldly. In terms of assessing our results, that authorizes our combining results spanning the differences sampled. In Table 2, the mean of the 12 means in the table comes to 0.01.\textsuperscript{14} That the below-zero immigration differences and the above-zero marijuana differences would tend to cancel each other out was entirely unpremeditated on our part. Had we “drawn” different issues from the “universe,” we may not have hit so close to zero.

It was without guile that we formulated the wording of the four “positive” phrasings or the three policy reforms. We never even thought about how results would differ over the three policy reforms.

IX. Concluding remarks

It has been said the one never steps into the same river twice—indeed, even that one never steps into the same river once. Two things cannot be the same because the very premise that they are two presupposes some differentness. The apple on the left cannot be the same as the apple on the right, because it is on the left, not the right.

But we humans naturally reject extreme skepticism, instead embracing Humean natural beliefs about the existence and continuity of things, and of causal relations between them. We embrace Humean natural beliefs from practicality. Any instance of sameness can be regarded as being a matter of practical sameness.

Just as we say that a question that is repeated verbatim in a survey is the same question, we are suggesting that an “ought to favor” statement that many pos-normers would be apt to deem “normative” and a suitably formulated statement that they would be apt to deem “positive,” are, though not the same verbatim, practically the same. Maintaining that humankind provides the most suitable “whole” to assess such sameness, we have provided survey evidence suggesting that answers to “ought to favor” and answers to four different “positive” formulations are very similar, and remarkably so when the results over the three different issues are brought together. We defend such ‘roll up’ because our contention is that “ought to favor” statements are practically the same as (for example) “positive net economic consequences for humankind on the whole” statements, not for every particular position, issue, and discourse situation, but over all positions, issues, and discourse situations, or \textit{in general}. Any notion of two things being the same must entail some such extension of generality: Saying that these two apples are the same must draw on a sensibility regarding what it means \textit{in a more general sense} for apples to be the same.

Survey evidence of the sort offered here can show only that certain necessary conditions for practical sameness are met, and we have argued that the evidence does meet such necessary conditions. \textit{Sufficient} conditions for practical sameness are harder to define, and harder to meet. But we hope to entice readers to ponder practical sameness between “normative” statements and suitably formulated “positive” statements.

If we are right about such practical sameness, then pos-normers should perhaps rethink the habit. When we hear economists employ the positive-normative distinction, we do not regard it as meaningless. But imputing meaning to their words does not imply that we find it worthwhile to use such words. We invite readers to consider the possibility that in virtually every discourse situation the positive-normative distinction is a dominated strategy.

Sometimes a word remains outside a person’s active vocabulary because she lacks the competence to include it, and sometimes because she has the competence to exclude it.\textsuperscript{15}
NOTES

1 Economists whose attitude seems to be like ours include Davis 2016; Hands 2012; Walsh 1996; Heyne 2008, p. 14; McCloskey 1985, pp. 42–46; 1995, p. 553; Coase 1994[1975]; Feser 2009, pp. 175–80; and philosophers would include Quine 1953; Putnam 2002; Pakaluk 2013; and see “Two-Score or More of Witnesses against the Fact-Value Split” in Booth 1974, pp. 207–211.

2 At the head of this paper appears a passage from Adam Smith that nicely joins “the supreme judge” of action (think ought) and “representative of mankind” (think what advances the wellbeing of humankind) (Incidentally, that passage appeared in editions 1 through 5 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but not the final edition.) Smith writes of the rules of all virtues (think ought) as the laws of the Deity (pp. 165–6), and says: “That to obey the will of the Deity, is the first rule of duty, all men are agreed” (p. 176), and: “[B]y acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity” (p. 166). Since ought/duty/virtue please a being whose pleasure corresponds to the good of the whole (or serving “benevolence” to humankind, p. 305, or “universal benevolence,” pp. 235-7), Smith is affirming the correspondence between the two goods. Smith speaks of the Deity, but we think that his work fully allows that the being may be only allegorical, as opposed to divine (see Klein et al. 2018 forthcoming).

3 Since nothing in the survey or cover-letter indicated that the survey was sent only to American economics professors, a respondent might wonder whether the survey was exploring differences between American and non-American economists.

4 We provide an overview of results at this level in Briggeman et al. (2017) and the FDA questions have been used in a simple way in a short popular article by Klein and Davis (2015).

5 Here let us describe what did influence our decision about what policy reforms to ask about. One factor was that the respondent would see potentially see that the posited reform would work out differently, in terms of net benefit for Americans as opposed to for humankind (thus, we would not ask about, say, rent-control or minimum wages, because such reforms would be so inconsequential for people outside of the United States). Another factor was that we wanted to asked questions that we are simply interested in (that is, at Level 1 of the survey). Yet another factor was that we wanted to present a set of reforms that would allay concerns among the survey recipients that the project had an ulterior motive of devising an ideological criticism of the economics profession, and thus, with the possible exception of the FDA reform, we avoided reforms that divide classical liberals and left-liberals.

6 Data found at http://www.briggeman.org/papers/KBDD/KBDD_Appendixes.pdf.

7 The “ought to be favored” question was in all surveys except for Form 5, one of the two auxiliary versions, as explained below.


9 The only respondent to generate such a −3.0 difference (namely, respondent 75) responded “agree, not strongly” to the “positive” question and “disagree strongly” to the “normative” question, thus a difference of −3.

10 The only respondent to generate such a +2 difference (namely, respondent 34) responded “disagree, not strongly” to the “positive” question and “agree, not strongly” to the “normative” question, thus a difference of +2.

11 As OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being (2013, 100) puts it, in summarizing findings of Strack et al 1991: “respondents may assume that two similar questions asked on the same survey must require different responses because asking the same question twice would be redundant.”

12 We recognize that differences can mask differentness: Consider two outcomes, one with 100 people returning identical responses to paired questions, and one in which 50 people returned response pairs yielding +4 differences and 50 returned response pairs yielding −4 differences. Overall, each outcome would show a mean difference of zero, but clearly the first outcome evinces practical sameness much more than does the second. So, we think gaps are worth taking into consideration, as we do in Appendix G, but in a capacity that is secondary to looking at the differences, which should be primary.
13 In fact, the words *health*, *whole*, and *holy* are etymologically linked (Klein 2016), as are *good* and *god*, *owe* and *ought*, and *schooled* and *should* (Klein 2014).

14 There are three ways to roll up all twelve of the mean differences into a single statistic. The most direct way of doing so is, forgetting Table 2 altogether, simply to calculate the mean of all the differences, that is, of all the instances in which a single respondent answered both a “positive” question and the “normative” question (for any of the three reforms). There were 1261 instances. Averaging of the 1261 differences yields the remarkably small difference of 0.017. A second way to do the roll-up would be to take a mean of the four means-of-the-three-means shown in right column of Table 2, yielding 0.015 (= (0.02+0.04+(-0.04)+0.04)/4). The third way to do the roll-up would be to take a mean of the three means-of-the-four-means shown in the bottom row of Table 2, that yielding 0.013 (= (-0.19+0.26-0.03)/3). Whichever way we do the roll-up—over the four variations in “positive” questioning, over the three policy issues used in the survey—the differences between “positive” and “normative” come out to be remarkably small.

15 Acknowledgments: For funding of the survey, we thank the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee at Martin. For helpful comments we thank Adam Gurri, Eric Hammer, and Erik Matson, Andrew Humphries, and anonymous referees.

APPENDICES

The appendixes listed below are available at http://www.briggeman.org/papers/KBDD/KBDD_Appendixes.pdf.

Appendix A: The six survey forms (4 core, 2 auxiliary)
Appendix B: The data
Appendix C: Description of mailing-list creation and the fielding of the survey
Appendix D: The control table, which makes use of the auxiliary survey forms F5 and F6.
Appendix E: Test-retest variability: A discussion
Appendix F: Differences between “positive”/US and “normative”
Appendix G: Gaps (absolute values) between “positive” and “normative”
Appendix H: Kappa analysis

REFERENCES (FOR BOTH THE PAPER AND THE APPENDIXES)


