I thank Leslie Marsh for the gracious invitation to participate in this symposium, Daniel Klein for serving as editor and soliciting its contributions, and the contributors for their thoughtful and generous responses to *Commerce and Manners*. I am grateful for their praise and their well-taken criticisms, from which I learned much. More important, I am indebted to their scholarship, and to that of all other scholars on Burke and the early modern period. A distinguished British philosopher-statesman once remarked that society is a sacred partnership between past, present and future generations. The discovery and transmission of knowledge is much the same way. The following is my response to the contributors.

RICHARD WHATMORE

Richard Whatmore asks what my ultimate intentions were as the author. My first intention was expository: to draw out Burke's theoretical and historical conceptions of political economy. Its second was to examine whether his economic thought can be used as an intellectual resource today in debates about the link between markets and morals. My intended audience included Burke scholars, students of the early modern period, and a general public.

Whatmore characterizes this blend of descriptive commentary and normative application as a “tension.” In my best judgment, however, it remains faithful to Burke's own approach to the study of public affairs, in which history was used both as a source of interest in its own right and as a preceptor—and one that could be misapplied at that (WS 8: 189)—for the contemporary debates and controversies he confronted in his political life.

This approach, I believe, also remains loyal to the discipline of political theory (my principal discipline), which pursues the study of political thought not as an object of antiquarian curiosity but as a reservoir of wisdom that yields enduring insights into human nature and society. Accordingly, my guiding methodology for the book was inspired by Burke's own flair for connecting the mundane to the theoretical and by his broader epistemic conception of history and custom: begin at the common sentiments and practices of the people and the times by painting the necessary historical context—taking into account contemporary idioms, institutions, and ideological debates—and then from this foundation carefully distill the guiding principles of Burke's economic thought.

Whatmore asks about my own “tribal membership.” If he is hinting at whether my approach adheres to the Cambridge school of interpretation (as suggested by his ges-
ture toward Quentin Skinner) or to another school, one may detect in my work a trace of Skinnerite and Pocockian methodology, mixed with a dose of textualism and Aristotelian conceptions of the ascension from *doxa* to *episteme*. It also strives to meet the responsibilities of a study of political theory, which requires the author not only to explain a thinker’s insights but also to draw out their application for contemporary affairs. Beyond any specific school of interpretation, however, it is worth reiterating my belief that this historical and textualist synthesis attempted to match Burke’s own approach to the study of politics and society.

Whatmore asks for my major reinterpretive claim about Burke. This can be answered in a number of ways. First, although scholars have touched upon Burke’s political economy in various fashions, Burke scholarship has paid relatively light attention to this topic compared to its heavy focus on his commentary on the French Revolution, America’s War of Independence, aesthetics, British India, and political parties and representation. Such focus, while appropriate, understates his sustained engagement with public policy throughout his political life. Burke therefore was not simply a thinker in action, or a politician on public display, but a policy wonk who carefully connected seemingly mundane debates about trade, taxation, and revenue to broader questions of morality, religion, and empire. Similarly, he fused the quotidian nature of market activity with philosophical ruminations about the role of commerce and economic contracts in his diagnosis of empire and civilization. Burke hence communicated his thoughts on commercial and economical reform not only in public forums but in private study, where he conducted rigorous research on policy and strengthened his command of the nexus between commerce and politics in Great Britain and throughout the British Empire.

This is why *Commerce and Manners* strives to connect Burke’s appreciation for the wisdom of historical practice with his use of empirical information in his analysis of commercial and fiscal policy. Although not as moving as his campaign against the French Revolution or his speeches on the American colonies, I do hope readers, after finishing the book, gained a deeper comprehension of Burke’s penchant for employing data to augment his mode of reasoning. I thus made a conscious effort to include facts and figures on imports and exports, enclosure bills, and other related statistical information in the book. Burke himself consulted such data when assessing the merits of policy, which illustrated both his thirst for information and his underlying epistemic assumptions about the virtues (and limits) of verifiable experience in understanding public affairs. In short, while Burke harbors a well-earned reputation as a philosopher-statesman who glittered his speeches and writings with literary, biblical, and philosophical references, we should also be aware that he summoned an impressive level of empirical detail in his arguments relating to political economy that enhanced the quality of his political and economic thought.

I believe that the book’s attempt to survey Burke’s use of data on political economy is one of the imaginative features of the book. Allow me to identify some of other aspects of *Commerce and Manners* that I think are novel, which will further help to answer Whatmore’s question about reinterpretation: its mining of Burke’s thoughts on political economy prior to his entry into public life, as exemplified by his remarks on trade and property as a member of Trinity College’s debating club; its examination of Burke’s defense of middlemen trading activities in the grain economy; its analysis of Burke’s insights into the connection between revenue and the state; its elaboration of Burke’s reflections on political economy in *Account of the European Settlements in America* and *Observations on a Late State of the Nation*; and its investigation into previously unpublished manuscripts of Burke’s comments on the corn bounty and enclosure. *Commerce and Manners* also provides, as far as I know, what are the most extended discussions to date of Burke’s political economy of the French Revolution, British India, the Navigation Acts, and the grain trade, as well as his multiple fights in Parliament against prohibitions on forestalling, regrating, and engrossing. Furthermore, the book’s itemized chart of the litany of constitutional alterations of Burke’s economical reform plan, I hope, will be instructive to those readers particularly interested in the labyrinths of eighteenth-century debates over public administration and public finance (Collins 2020, pp. 179-81).

All of this is to affirm my prior point about reinterpretation: while political economy (or any other single subject) did not wholly consume Burke’s energies, it remained a powerful object of inquiry through-
out his entire political life—replete with both grand questions of commerce and prosperity and seemingly mundane concerns about revenue, the corn bounty, and enclosure—that conveyed his knack for integrating the demands of statesmanship and theoretical reflection on public affairs with empirical policy analysis. One cannot appreciate Burke's approach to statecraft and his political thought, subjects that have garnered much attention in Burke scholarship, without understanding his proclivity for weaving them together with his attention to more practical questions regarding trade, taxation, and revenue.

In addition, one may consider *Commerce and Manners* a deepened synthesis of various strands of Burke scholarship: Francis Canavan, through the lens of political thought, laid stress in *The Political Economy of Edmund Burke* on Burke’s embrace of landed property (Canavan 1995); Frank Petrella, Jr., through the lens of economics, focused his doctoral dissertation at Notre Dame on the mechanics of Burke’s economic thought in the context of classical economics (Petrella, Jr. 1961); and Winch, through the lens of intellectual history, located Burke’s political economy in *Riches and Poverty* in wider early modern debates about the science of the legislator in managing commercial affairs (Winch 1996). My book attempts to broaden these manifold dimensions of his thought in a way that sharpens the connections between his remarks on supply and demand, the competitive price system, and property rights, on the one hand, and his political philosophy, religious convictions, conception of statecraft, and social and imperial thought, on the other. We should also mention that many histories of economic thought tend to give short shrift to Burke. I hope my book helps to fill this gap.

Whatmore provides shrewd commentary on the intellectual differences between Burke and Adam Smith (and David Hume), all of which I agree with. Two primary examples include Burke’s allegiance to Christianity and theism and his subsequent attempt to ground his political economy in a religious foundation; and Burke’s praise of primogeniture as a necessary instrument for civil stability throughout generations. One may also add, in the context of political economy: Burke’s more vigorous attempt to retain the charter of Britain’s East India Company; his endorsement of the corn bounty; Burke’s greater suspicions of engaging in trade with France; his stronger defense of the older system of the Navigation Acts, and of the imperial project in general; and the subtle tensions between Burke and Smith on the pace of policy reform (Collins (2020, pp. 141-43). Finally, while both Burke and Smith were aware of the rationalist pretensions of their age, Smith, I suggest, displayed a slightly more rationalist touch than Burke.

Such differences, of course, should not cloud the many similarities the two thinkers held as well, as discussed in *Commerce and Manners*. So was in fact Smith a Burkean or Burke a Smithian? I will not lose sleep if one wishes to defend one or both of these arguments, but my imperfect answer is neither: while they both shared affinities for the diffusion of power, market liberty, and the importance of morals in civil society, they harbored their own approaches to the study of human affairs that, in the halls of the academy, warrant drawing out important distinctions.

I am surprised Whatmore writes that I “overplay” the linkage between commerce and peace. If anything, I sought to show in my book that *doux commerce* theory stretched the patience of Burke as an explanation for the development of civilization and for irenic relations between nations. On this matter, which I shall return to later, I find J.G.A. Pocock’s thesis about Burke’s challenge to the conventional causal historiography of Enlightenment civility—commercial society was the product of, rather than a departure from, the social traditions rooted in Europe’s pre-commercial past—largely convincing.

Pocock’s argument focuses on the general progression of civilization. Yet I also attempt to demonstrate in *Commerce and Manners* that Burke hesitated to fully embrace the *doux commerce* theory in the foreign arena as well. Burke did not systematically outline his thoughts on this matter, so I endeavored to tease out his reasoning by piecing together his assorted thoughts and public stances on the subject. My verdict was that trade, in his view, was more likely to defuse tensions between the British government and British colonies, including Ireland, the American colonies, and the West Indian dependencies, because these possessions already shared overriding values, principles, and security interests interwoven under Britain’s imperial umbrella.
According to Burke, however, the link between commerce and peace was highly suspect when applied to avowed enemies in the international arena. The most conspicuous case in this context was the rivalry between Britain and France, the commercial implications of which Burke was quite aware: he believed that the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, if England had assented to its free trade provisions with France, would have been “ruinous” to Britain because of the underdeveloped condition of its trade at the time of the proposed pact (WS 4: 237n1).

Burke’s unease over France’s economic intentions was further exhibited by his opposition to the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786, which would have spurred the flow of commercial intercourse between the nations. Burke believed that France—which was neither united under the same sovereign as England, nor shared a common tongue, religion, or security interests—was orchestrating the treaty to extend its imperial influence across the globe to the long-term detriment of Britain, reflecting traditional Whig suspicions of trade with the Catholic kingdom. As Burke indicated in his speech on the treaty, the encouragement of commercial relations to promote peace would be ineffectual if the two parties did not hold overlapping cultural and social preconditions and national security objectives.

This reasoning bears a telling resemblance to his belief in the Reflections that the spread of exchange relations relied on pre-commercial foundations that were not established by barter. As Burke wrote in First Letter on a Regicide Peace, “Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life” (WS 9: 247). Trade could certainly be included in this formulation, but it was not a necessary condition. Trust, sympathy, and cultural affinity were. Similar reasoning can be found in Burke’s speech supporting the Traitorous Correspondence Bill of 1793, which was designed to limit economic transactions between England and France. He argued in his speech that England’s commercial interests should remain subordinate to wider moral and security considerations.

With specific regard to Donald Winch and István Hont, Whatmore writes that they “emphasised the crisis-ridden nature of Burke’s world and the difficulty of finding solutions.” Commerce and Manners does not repudiate this approach—in fact, I would hope that my book’s attention to the great complexities of statecraft in the eighteenth century more or less affirms it—but what drove my narrative was an attempt to unearth Burke’s argument about the connection between markets and morals, of which the surrounding time period served as a useful, though not conclusive, guide. After gathering sufficient knowledge about the intellectual substance and contemporary political circumstances of Burke’s writings and speeches on political economy, the political theorist ultimately has to make a judgment about such information. I hope my book rendered this judgment about Burke’s treatment of the role of exchange relations and public finance in the wider social order in a judicious and intelligible manner.

Although I have cited Winch and Hont on numerous occasions, and am certainly indebted to them, I will heed Whatmore’s counsel and continue to engage them in my future scholarship. Perhaps this slight difference in methodology between Commerce and Manners and Winch and Hont (and Whatmore) stems from our different disciplinary backgrounds: mine is political theory and political philosophy, not intellectual history. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages when drafting a manuscript. But, once again, I do hope that my extended discussions of the historical context of Burke’s political economy (more so than many works of political theory), as detailed at the beginning of most chapters, and my mining of unpublished archival material, does justice to the age in which Burke lived and establishes credibility in the community of intellectual historians. To answer Whatmore’s question: yes, I hope that the book can be “read in the tradition of recent work by intellectual historians, scholars of political thought and political economy who have reinterpreted what was happening in the final decades of the eighteenth century.” Yet I also hope it can be read in the tradition of political theorists and philosophers studying the normative connections between markets and morals.

I am puzzled by Whatmore’s comments that my picture of the eighteenth century was “less bleak” than Burke’s and that Burke “always had an answer.” To Whatmore’s point, the string of wars throughout the eighteenth century, at a time of unprecedented commercial expansion, does cast into doubt the unassailability of the doux commerce thesis in the early modern period, an implication to which Burke was quite
sensitive. In addition, I criticize Burke for communicating a harmonious image in *Thoughts and Details* between the farmer and laborer that understated the tensions in England’s agricultural economy in the latter half of the eighteenth century (Collins 2020, pp. 122-23). I also question in my conclusion whether Burke’s project of integrating modern commerce with the pre-commercial pillars of the nobility and religion was sustainable in light of the unavoidably disruptive effects of commercial society on settled social order. I would even hesitate to frame the matter as Burke having an “answer” or one trying to “find solutions”—Iain Hampsher-Monk uses the word “solutions” as well—since the connotations of such language defy the chief premise of Burke’s approach to policy and of his broader political philosophy: social ills are not mathematical problem sets that requires solutions, but rather natural constituents of the human condition that call for reform and improvement. Better or worse, not true or false, were Burke’s touchstones in the formation of commercial policy, and of all policy.

IAIN HAMPSHER-MONK

Both Whatmore and Hampsher-Monk draw attention to my reference to Hayek in understanding Burke’s conception of political economy. Allow me, then, to briefly sum up my interpretation of the Burke-Hayek relationship, which I discuss in *Commerce and Manners* but outline in greater detail in a forthcoming article (Collins forthcoming). Burke and Hayek can be located in the antirationalist tradition for defending the complexity and variety of civic life from the rationalist certitudes of planners and projectors. They also endorsed market liberty and the competitive price system. Yet the thinkers held important differences, including Burke’s deeper religious convictions and his commitment to fixed moral truths. More important for our purposes, Burke displayed less confidence than Hayek in the belief that the competitive price system, voluntary contracts, and conventions that could shift based on the protean preferences of individuals could sustain social order and social prosperity in the long term.

Hampsher-Monk writes that the result of integrating Hayek into my analysis is to “present the independence of markets from government as the central ‘doctrine’ of debate within political economy.” If this is the effect that impresses upon the reader, then I take full responsibility. Yet I tried to lay consistent emphasis throughout the book on the notion that Burke confronted an array of complex matters intersecting with commerce—spanning the nobility, religion, custom, law, imperial politics, cultural variety, and international relations—of which the market was a consideration, but not the only consideration, in the practice of statecraft.

It follows that late modernity’s propensity to read a “government-versus-the-market” binary (and even the “free trade-versus-mercantilism” binary) into the early modern period oversimplifies such interdependent concerns in Burke’s age. In fact, I increasingly resisted this impulse as I deepened my engagement in researching and writing the book. For I could not have written it better myself than Hampsher-Monk: “But for Burke and his generation, Political Economy was a much wider complex of issues centered on the capacity of Britain’s moderate, trading monarchy to survive in the struggle to prevent any European State from establishing ‘universal empire’. In this contest political and economic questions were hardly yet disentangled.”

Hampsher-Monk questions whether *Thoughts and Details* can be interpreted as the “epitome” of Burke’s economic thought on the market, given that it was an *ad hoc* letter delivered to government officials at a time of crisis in England’s agricultural economy. That it was a quickly written tract is quite true. It is plausible, if not probable, that Burke would have revised the final composition of the letter, which his executors produced by combining his memorandum to Henry Dundas and William Pitt and fragments of a letter Burke had drafted for Arthur Young. And, as I write in the introduction of *Commerce and Manners*, “no greater mistake can be made than to assume” that *Thoughts and Details* “captures the range and depth” of his political economy (Collins 2020, p. 4). The letter is inadequate, if read in isolation from his other writings and speeches, to grasping his conception of markets in their broadest dimensions.
Yet Thoughts and Details is the best summation of Burke’s perspective on the agricultural economy when taking into account his many direct experiences with, pronouncements on, and legislative activities relating to the subject throughout his political life, such as: his decades-long farming activities and exchange of agricultural knowledge with contemporaries (Collins 2020, pp. 23-25, 31); his efforts on a House committee soon after he entered Parliament criticizing laws banning forestalling, regrating, and engrossing (Collins 2020, p. 75); his successful attempt to repeal the statutes proscribing these activities in 1772 (Collins 2020, pp. 70-72); his resistance to reviving them in 1787 (Collins 2020, pp. 72-76); his opposition to the Butcher’s Meat Bill in 1776, which imposed additional regulations on the livestock market (Collins 2020, p. 138); his scattered comments in Parliament on corn policy and enclosure throughout his political life (Collins 2020, pp. 78-92); and his views on agricultural markets following his drafting of Thoughts and Details, both in his Letters on a Regicide Peace and in his communication with Arthur Young (Collins 2020, pp. 70-71, 115, 513-15).

We must also bear in mind that, although that England in the early-to-mid-1790s experienced a rash of socially unsettling phenomena, such as poor harvests, population growth, and war, the “very specific political problem” Hampsher-Monk identifies during this time actually emerged in various forms throughout Burke’s life, spanning back to his first years in Parliament. In other words, the complexities of the grain trade he reckoned with in Thoughts and Details—scarcity, prices, contracts, forestalling, wages, and so on—had stirred his mind for decades prior to his writing of the letter, as illustrated by the examples above.

It was therefore my judgment that Thoughts and Details, even with its imperfections and improvised glow, provided the clearest explication of Burke’s most cherished convictions on supply and demand laws and the competitive price system with specific regard to the internal grain trade. Ninth Report of Select Committee also reached similar conclusions about the virtues of market liberty (regarding local Indian markets in this case)—and this was not an extempore letter but an official report written primarily by Burke, intended for public consumption, that reflected diligent research and an element of detachment from the heated tribunal of everyday politics (Collins 2020, pp. 358-59).

Hampsher-Monk attempts to historicize Burke’s comments on the “market” in Thoughts and Details. I agree with much of Hampsher-Monk’s rich commentary on the agricultural economy that Burke addresses in the letter. He writes, “If we did not live (as Burke did not) in a world where every day public reference is made to ‘the market’ as a universal abstraction, it might be more natural to read Burke’s remarks as comments on the observable facts of the matter in the case of actual empirical agricultural markets.” Hampsher-Monk then writes in a footnote that he is “at a loss to understand why our author sets up Hayek as a standard and insists that Burke subscribes to a universal doctrine.”

First, I do not write that Burke held a “universal doctrine” in favor of free markets. In fact, I push back against the temptation to read Thoughts and Details through a rigid laissez faire framework. It is worth underlining my belief, which I have also conveyed in multiple public seminars on Commerce and Manners as well as in the text, that attempts to read libertarianism into advocates of market economies in the early modern period simplifies these thinkers’ capacious outlook on the many considerations of civic life that defy modern “state-versus-the individual” frameworks. Of course, if there were a text in Burke’s corpus that could plausibly be interpreted through a state-versus-the-individual framework—a framework that, like Hampsher-Monk, I find anachronistic—it would in fact be Thoughts and Details, in which the central object of inquiry concerned whether public officials should further intervene in local agricultural markets.

Second, when drafting the manuscript, I greatly wrestled with the very question of whether to use the phrase “free trade” or “a free trade” in the book. (Such is the tormented life of scholars.) The first was not commonly used in Burke’s time and connotes a heightened level of abstraction—unlike the second phrase, it is not modified by the indefinite article “a”—that Hampsher-Monk appropriately believes fails to capture the empirical texture of Burke’s, and early modern contemporaries’, thoughts on markets in the eighteenth century.

Third, perhaps Hampsher-Monk’s comments on reading Burke’s economic thought through an abstract lens are also referring to the conclusion of Commerce and Manners, in which I sum up the guiding
principles of his political economy. That was one of intentions of the book. Throughout my research on the subject, I became progressively conscious of these underlying themes of his economic thought that he applied in circumstances ranging from the American colonies to the British West Indian colonies to British India to England’s agricultural economy. I am certainly aware that some Burke scholars hesitate to affix such principles to his thought. The degree of consistency in Burke’s reflections on political economy led me to arrive at a different conclusion.

In general, on the matter of invoking “principle” when describing Burke’s thought, I made a good-faith judgment when writing Commerce and Manners that this word aligned with Burke’s own understanding of his thought. He famously wrote that “[c]ircumstances…give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect” (WS 8: 58). But we are also reminded of his less famous remarks on principle, which he wrote in 1792 in his draft remarks on the Unitarians’ petition for relief. First asserting that he never governed by “abstractions and universals,” he continued:

I do not put abstract Ideas wholly out of any question, because I well know, that under that name, I should dismiss Principles—and that without the guide and light of sound well understood principles, all reasonings in politicks, as in every thing else, would be only a confused jumble of particular facts, and details, without the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion (WS 4: 489).

Burke then explains how the “Statesman” has a “Number of Circumstances to combine with those general Ideas” (WS 4: 489). Such remarks embody what I attempted to do in Commerce and Manners, consistent with my comprehension of his conception of principle: paint the facts and details necessary for grasping the political context behind Burke’s thoughts on commerce, taxation, and revenue, and then draw out the underlying economic principles in his writings and speeches that informed his political theory and statesmanship.

Fourth, and on a similar note, Burke in Thoughts and Details, as was characteristic of his political theory in general, blended empirical observation with deeper philosophical insight into human affairs. This is why he alluded in the letter to his own experiences in the agricultural market and offered more general observations on markets, including his most abstract comment in the letter—that “the laws of commerce” were the “laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God…” (WS 9: 137). Much as a faithful rendering of Thoughts and Details should not allow these comments to overshadow Burke’s attention to empirical observation, one should not historicize the market without recognizing these remarks—brief, yet telling—that include but transcend recourse to experience. Burke himself did not separate such concepts. For even Hampsher-Monk concedes Burke would invoke the market and trade as concepts removed from the heart-beat of particular marketplaces. We should acknowledge both of these articulations of political economy from Burke—their empirical and conceptual dimensions—if for no other reason than because Burke himself did.

Fifth, on the matter of introducing Hayek, I did not incorporate him in the text to set him up as a “standard” for Burke but to probe their intriguing intellectual relationship. It would be quite a curious decision not to include Hayek in a study of Burke’s economic thought, since Hayek was heavily influenced by him. Beyond their shared distrust of rationalism in coordinating the diffusion of goods and services, Hayek famously labeled himself an “Old Whig” in the tradition of Burke (Hayek 2011, p. 531); he called Burke “the great seer” (Hayek 1983, p. 22), as Lauren Hall notes; Hayek frequently cited Burke, including his remarks in Thoughts and Details; and many scholars have discerned the compatibility of their respective thought. That Hayek was one of the most prominent economists in the twentieth century, and that he located himself in the same tradition as Burke, cries out for elaboration in a book on Burke’s political economy. We should also mention that Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics, the primary intellectual tradition of Hayek, was influenced by Burke as well (Menger 2009, pp. 173-77, 180-81). Burke, I contend,
was closer to the Austrian school than the classical school of economics because of the former’s sharper misgivings about rationalism and the quantification of human behavior.

But Hampsher-Monk hints at a crucial question: should Burke and Hayek in fact be located in the same intellectual tradition? He highlights a possible tension in the foundations of Burke’s and Hayek’s economic epistemology and ontology that suggests no. According to Hampsher-Monk, while Burke’s thought does acknowledge the existence of economic knowledge—he just holds that it would be impractical for public officials to comprehend and apply it—Hayek denies the existence of economic knowledge absent the market price mechanism. It would therefore be “logically impossible,” in Hampsher-Monk’s words, for government to acquire the type of knowledge Hayek believed was necessary to facilitate efficient economic transactions. Knowledge for Hayek was only generated “from freely contracting individuals.”

Not only do I agree with much of Hampsher-Monk’s thought-provoking analysis here, but he brings to mind one of Burke’s chief arguments in the Reflections relating to political economy: knowledge, insofar as it was part of Burke’s understanding of the disclosure of wisdom throughout the growth of civilization, was not something that could merely be reduced to utility, calculation, and measurement. I move toward Hampsher-Monk’s conclusions in my comments on the Burke-Hayek relationship in Chapter 12 of Commerce and Manners, and I more fully elaborate on the matter in my recent article on the thinkers. To return back to my interpretation of Burke and Hayek, I argue that Burke held that civil society required sturdier sources of authority and morality that did not depend on the price mechanism, market arrangements, voluntary contracts, personal preference, and even the rule of law. Similarly, Burke’s defense of monasteries, his belief that some property should be protected from market competition, and his implicit rebuke of John Locke’s labor theory of property and the terra nullius doctrine (Marshall 2019, pp. 90-91), among various examples, all imply a recognition of economic value, if we may use the term, that was not simply the product of barter. Framed differently, value for Burke not only derived from a voluntary contract between consenting individuals but from intrinsic goodness itself. Combined with his firm theism and embrace of the fixed moral law, Burke, even given his antirationalist inclinations, harbored a more robust conception of knowledge than Hayek’s heavy epistemological skepticism.

Yet we should be fair to Hayek and note his acknowledgment in the Constitution of Liberty of the pivotal responsibility of the wealthy classes to provide financial succor for ends that competitive markets struggle to attain, such as cultural and artistic initiatives. He writes, “It is more in the support of aims which the mechanism of the market cannot adequately take care of than in preserving that market that the man of independent means has his indispensable role to play in any civilized society” (Hayek 2011, p. 190). This question of value, admittedly, is a source of tension in Hayek’s own writings. With regard to his final comments about the inefficacy of the modern economics discipline, however, Hampsher-Monk would struggle to find two thinkers in the history of economic thought who would embrace his suspicion of modern “economics,” methodologically segregated from social and moral concerns, with as much enthusiasm as Burke and Hayek.

EMILY JONES

On the matter of the influence of Thoughts and Details and Burke’s economic thought, Emily Jones expertly traces the writing’s afterlife. We may add a number of addenda to her rigorous survey. In his 1920 book Christian Socialism, Charles E. Raven characterized Burke’s “benign and wise disposer” comment in Thoughts and Details, in which Burke signals his conception of an Invisible-Hand type force connecting enlightened self-interest to the general welfare, as a “sinister sentence” (Raven 2006, p. 34). Beyond Thoughts and Details, Burke’s economic analysis of Britain’s East India Company, as communicated most powerfully in his parliamentary speeches and Ninth Report of Select Committee, informed later commentaries on British India (Collins 2020, p. 398n143). Romesh Chunder Dutt went so far as to write, regarding Burke’s elucidation of the wealth drain thesis in Speech on Fox’s India Bill, that “it is doubtful if even that great ora-
tor ever spoke anything more forcible, more eloquent, and more true, within the whole course of his brilliant parliamentary career” (Dutt 1902, p. 49).

In addition, prominent interpretations of the paper money policy of the French Revolution, according to Rebecca L. Spang, “bear an unacknowledged debt” to Burke’s criticisms of the French assembly’s profligate issuance of assignats (Spang 2015, p. 9). And we are reminded of the varying degrees of influence of Burke on Menger and Hayek, and on John Maynard Keynes as well (consult Helburn 1991, pp. 30-54). One additional avenue for further research on this subject is whether Burke’s thoughts on free trade or protectionism were used during the Corn Law debates in the 1840s.

Beyond whether Burke was a Smithian or vice versa, Jones raises a crucial issue: whether Burke should be seen as an “advocate” of Smith’s economic thought. I question this causal arrow (Collins 2020, pp. 318-22). Burke articulated his views on agricultural markets, laudable avarice, the counterproductive effects of prohibitions on the grain-trading activities of middlemen, the virtues of a limited number of foreign trade regulations, the nefarious influence of select merchants in shaping commercial policy, and the illusory riches of metals, among various ideas they held in common, years before he first met Smith and the publication of the Wealth of Nations.

For example, as one of the leading architects of the Free Port Act of 1766, legislation that created six new trade ports in the British West Indies, Burke helped initiate discussions with a wide array of merchants to glean their opinions on commercial policy (Collins 2020, pp. 240-41). In the Wealth of Nations Smith would characterize the commercial relations between Britain’s West Indian and American colonies, stimulated in part by the Act, as the “most perfect freedom of trade” (Smith 1981, IV.vii.b.39). Burke certainly read and praised Smith’s text, which was a far more searching investigation into political economy than anything Burke ever produced, and most likely learned a good amount from it. Burke also may have had a modest amount of influence on particular passages in the Wealth of Nations on Pownall’s Act of 1773, as documented by Jacob Viner and Francis Horner (Collins 2020, pp. 141-42). And Burke’s parliamentary activities addressed a number of matters relating to political economy that Smith discusses in the text, including those relating to the corn trade, Anglo-American imperial affairs, Anglo-French economic intercourse, and the East India Company, as well as the Free Port Act and Pownall’s Act.

Furthermore, we should remain mindful of the tensions between the Smith’s and Burke’s economic thought regarding topics such as Britain’s imperial project, the corn bounty, the Navigation Acts, the East India Company charter, primogeniture, and Anglo-French trade. Many of their positions on these subjects do not necessarily signify a difference in principle (primogeniture being one prime exception), but they do not seamlessly fit with one another, which is another reason to be cautious about reducing Burke to Smith’s economic thought, or vice versa.

ANNA PLASSART

Anna Plassart identifies an additional strand of Burke’s political economy that has retained some measure of influence in scholars’ examination of the early modern period: his conceptions of “the poor,” including the “labouring poor,” and poverty. Plassart skillfully locates these conceptions in wider eighteenth-century disputes over the meaning of poverty. She demonstrates that Burke’s thoughts on this topic in Thoughts and Details did not occur de novo but reflected a long-running debate in England over whether a distinction could be drawn between the deserving and undeserving poor. The prevalence of the phrase “labouring poor” in this decades-long debate calls into question Emma Rothschild’s bold claim that Thoughts and Details came close in particular sections to being an “open attack” on Smith, and in particular on Smith’s use of the phrase “labouring poor” in the Wealth of Nations (Rothschild 1992, p. 87). We are also reminded of Burke’s observation in the Philosophical Enquiry that abstract words that excited the passions—such as, in Burke’s time, “the poor”—could distort man’s sense of reality (consult Collins 2020, pp. 95-97).

As Plassart explains, Burke, like Smith and other contemporaries, celebrated the steady expansion of commerce as a means to better the condition of the poor, however defined, as well as the rich. Her appo-
site reference to Arthur Young’s (slightly exaggerated) comment in *A Six Months Tour Through the North of England* that the “labouring poor…is a term that means nothing” serves as a nice supplement to my discussion in *Commerce and Manners* of Burke’s thoughts on the poor, particularly because Burke and Young were companions and careful observers of the agricultural economy. I agree with Plassart’s conclusion that our mastery of Burke’s idea of poverty could be deepened by seeing his attempt to define the poor as a way of “adapting – and sometimes adopting – a series of novel arguments developed in enlightened Britain and Europe in the previous decades.” On this note, it would be worth exploring further whether Burke indeed provided a novel contribution to the conceptualization of “the poor” in the eighteenth century.

SAMUEL GREGG

Samuel Gregg shrewdly outlines the many considerations statesmen grappled with in the design of imperial commercial policy in eighteenth-century British politics, including those intersecting with national security, parliamentary politics, foreign rivals, and electoral constituencies, not to mention supply and demand laws. His analysis of the Free Port Act illuminates this confluence of factors. It marked the attempt of Burke and other legislators to reconcile the mercantile interests of the North American colonies and West India colonies; to promote liberty of commerce within the British Empire; to consult the opinions of a wide swath of merchants in the drafting of the bill (as opposed to a privileged few, the infamous bête noire of Smith); to push back against the zero-sum economic reasoning of opponents of free trade within the Empire; and to loosen—though not eliminate—the system of mercantilist regulations that had characterized British imperial policy in the West Indies for generations. True to Burke’s vision of purpose, the Act encouraged the flow of goods while preserving the British Empire’s presence in the region. Gregg wisely characterizes Burke’s ability to synthesize such wide-ranging factors in the conduct of statecraft as his “combined awareness of political facts.”

Furthermore, Gregg calls attention to the element of prudence informing Burke’s approach to economic statecraft. Yet he rightly resists the temptation to reduce Burke’s prudence merely to “pragmatism” or “deal-making,” a connotation reminiscent of mid-to-late-nineteenth century interpretations of Burke as a statesman of calculating and expedient instincts.

Gregg thus highlights a critical motif of Burke’s statesmanship, his idea of reform, that I examine throughout the book. The conventional interpretation of Burke is someone who preferred gradual reform over widespread change. This gradualist interpretation is not wrong so much as it fails, I believe, to penetrate the core of Burke’s attitude toward reform. His notion of reform, as epitomized by his many efforts to alter institutions and practices throughout his political life, did not begin with the question of whether to pursue gradual or extensive change.

It rather started with a political temperament, keen on proportion, that wrestled with a number of questions: first, what were the alterations needed at that particular moment in time commensurate with the intensity of the defect pursuant to a moral or constitutional aim? Second, what were the social complexities and competing alternatives necessary to consider at that moment so that the proposed reform did not create counterproductive consequences and undermine its very purpose in the first place? Similarly, and third, how quickly could a statesman pursue this object without creating social disorder? After the weighing of such tradeoffs, an ethical judgment could then be drawn.

Burke’s efforts in crafting economic policy brought alive this conception of prudence, such as his economical reform program, the Free Port Act, Fox’s India Bill, and his plan for the gradual abolition of the slave trade and slavery. These initiatives ranged from phased approaches to more systematic alterations to existing political and commercial structures. In short, Burke’s exercise of prudence illustrated purposeful, deliberative attempts to preserve or reform existing institutions and customs proportional to the constraints of the moment in accord with a final objective, such as to preserve Christianity, promote trade, defeat France, restore the integrity of the East India Company, or strengthen the British Constitution.
Lauren Hall addresses Burke's attitude toward natural rights. She convincingly shows that Burke did not wholly repudiate the idea of natural rights, but rather believed they must be conditioned by broader social institutions and habits. Her analysis of Burke’s use of natural rights language in the cases of Ireland and the East India Company is astute. We could supply an additional quotation to this account from Burke’s *Tracts relating to Popery Laws* (which, admittedly, was drafted over two decades prior to the French Revolution): “Every body is satisfied that a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society…” (WS 9: 463). Denying that Burke held some conception of natural rights is almost as inaccurate as stating that Burke held a robust conception of natural rights.

Yet we should also note that Burke tended to summon the language of natural rights with reference to non-English peoples, exhibiting his modes of rhetorical persuasion as well as his political theory. Even in the case of the French during the French Revolution, as Hall writes, Burke invokes the “real rights of mankind.” It is worth further inquiry to discover if Burke at any point in his political life gestured toward “natural rights” when referring specifically to the English people. Burke did argue that his notion of prescription—which he applied to all forms of landed property, including English landed property—was rooted in the “law of nature” (Burke 1869, p. 80).

In addition, with regard to Hall’s essential observation that, for Burke, natural rights contained an inherent social dimension because human beings were naturally sociable, two additional insights of Burke augment her point. First, Burke provides a conception in the *Philosophical Enquiry* of man’s “second nature” (WS 1: 265) that melded fixed human nature with custom, an idea consistent with the thought of Hume and Adam Ferguson (consult Bromwich 2014, pp. 62, 91-92). Hence Burke’s notion of this second nature consciously included habit, custom, and tradition, as opposed to other such theories in the early modern period that imposed hard distinctions between the two, and that maintained that such practices militated against man’s natural state, as expressed most notoriously by Rousseau. Second, on a similar note, Burke wrote in *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs* that “[a]rt is man’s nature,” arguing that man’s fully formed civil relations in which the aristocracy exercises its capacity to reason and bears the responsibilities of public leadership are as natural as any pre-political state of nature (WS 4: 449). Third, pages 460-62 of *Commerce and Manners* do outline Burke’s conception of the “real rights of mankind” in the context of the French Revolution (Collins 2020, pp. 460-62). The book’s chapters on the Revolution attempt to emphasize that Burke was defending both prescriptive property rights and the right to industry.

With regard to Hall’s list of Burke’s “liberal” sentiments of his time, we may add: Burke’s comprehensive plan for the gradual abolition of the slave trade and gradual emancipation of slaves1; his compassion toward a man, accused of sodomy, who had died from a mob (WS 3: 584-85); his similar compassion toward Samuel Hoheb, a Jewish merchant whose property was viciously seized during the plunder of St Eustatius (Collins 2020, pp. 62-63); his openness toward abolishing the pillory as a punitive measure (WS 3: 585); his attraction to John Howard’s vision for prison reform (WS 3: 637-38); and his sympathy for men in debtors’ prison (Collins 2020, pp. 106-7).

Hall raises a good point: does my statement that “Burke’s life, however, displayed a greater effort to defend the imperatives of commercial liberty in a traditional, historically informed Anglo-American framework, not in conformity to the speculative theories of the Physiocrats or the contractarian notions of civil society championed by English radicals” minimize his efforts to defend the rights of the Irish and the Indians? One can certainly modify “Anglo-American” to “cultural,” or something to that effect, to accentuate Burke’s attempt to promote the liberties of non-English peoples in accord with their local customs and traditions.

On Burke’s intellectual kinship with classical liberalism, Hall’s many shrewd points are all well taken. My question “Was Burke a secular classical liberal in disguise?” carried a heuristic function to provoke self-reflection on the part of the reader rather than offer a nuanced analytic diagnosis of classical liberalism. I posed this question because one of the common criticisms of classical liberalism, especially in light of con-
temporary discourse in political theory circles on the influence of Locke in America, is that liberalism of whichever variety (early, classical, or progressive), whether intentional or not, contains within it a permanent tension with the exercise of religion, including the exercise of religion in public. Furthermore, all of the classical liberals Hall mentions, regardless of whether they embraced Lockean contractarian notions of society, including Locke, Smith, and Hume, nevertheless remain vulnerable to the criticism—fair or not—that their thought did not rest on a firm religious foundation but was rather influenced by, explicitly or implicitly, secularism (Locke), atheism (Hume), or deism (Smith).13

Similarly, there are fascinating parallels between Burke and Hayek, yet Hayek displayed far greater confidence in the efficacy of exchange, the price mechanism, and spontaneous order to drive and sustain the growth of civilization. Hayek did pay homage to the importance of families and tradition (Jerry Muller 2002, p. 385, has characterized Hayek’s growing fondness of tradition as “rhetorical warmth”), but his faint attention throughout his corpus to the contributions of individuals and groups who did not generate value through the competitive price system conveys, in my view, a gap between his thought and Burke’s.14 Furthermore, while Burke advocated for the rights of individuals (and associations), such a defense against oppression is not the exclusive domain of classical liberalism, and can be credibly claimed by variants of progressive and conservative thought.

More broadly, Hall draws an interesting distinction between early modern liberalism, characterized by Locke, and later developments of classical liberalism, characterized by Smith, to suggest that Burke is in fact in the same classical liberal tradition as Smith.15 She wonders why I reference Locke in my discussion of Burke and classical liberalism. I do so because he is one of the predominant points of departure for discussions about the origins of classical liberalism—and I would further dispute her claim that Locke is “not really a classical liberal at all.”

Typically, “classical liberalism” includes both of these earlier and later varieties of liberalism, which share many of the same commitments as Burke: the virtues of liberty, the primacy of the rule of law, the importance of property rights, and an antipathy to arbitrary rule and social engineering. While recognizing these similarities, however, we should also note their tensions with Burke.

The Lockean strand possesses the sharpest tensions: Burke attacked contractarian notions of society and abstract state of nature thinking; he did not reduce the purpose of government to the security of man’s life, liberty, and estate; similarly, he did not conceive government as necessary only insofar as it secured individual liberties, established the rule of law, provided for the common defense, and built selective public works and institutions; and he did not think consent was the basis of social relations.

If we did locate Burke in one of these two classical liberal traditions, he would certainly be closer to the Smithian-Hayekian strand, with its emphasis on organic growth and gradual change. Yet he even holds tensions with this strand of classical liberalism (and a fortiori with Lockean liberalism). Burke’s idea of “manly, moral, regulated liberty” (WS 8: 57) went beyond Hayek’s conception of liberty as the absence of “coercion by the arbitrary power will of another or others” (Hayek 2011, p. 58); Burke possessed a teleological conception of society; he held that God willed the state; and he displayed less confidence in pluralism to sustain the moral and religious ethos of a people.16

Furthermore, Burke was a proponent of public religion with a state-established church (while leaving room for the exercise of individual conscience) and did not think worship should be relegated only to the private sphere17; he believed the state—not just the rule of law—should be imbued with an element of sacred reverence; he maintained a robust conception of a social hierarchy and a distinction of ranks (one albeit that allowed for movement among classes and fostered a moral equality); and, while recognizing the importance of the individual, the moral sense, and the stimulating effect of enlightened self-interest, his views on the religious nature of man position him closer to Aristotelian-Thomistic intellectual traditions than to classical liberal presuppositions of man (which is not to say that he himself was an Aristotelian or Thomist). There is even an argument to be made that Hume and Hayek were conservatives, not classical liberals.

Taking into account the more libertarian strands of classical liberalism, Burke certainly did not envision the individual-state dichotomy; his conception of government exceeded notions of the night watch-
man state; he did not lower the purpose of man in civil society to the imperatives of self-preservation and the protection of his life, liberty, and estate; he did not dismiss taxation *tout court* as a form of theft or forced labor (even though he was aware of the additional costs imposed by heavy taxes); he did not subscribe to the rationalistic rigidities of later classical economists such as David Ricardo; he never went as far as John Stuart Mill in asserting that the “only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way” consistent with the harm principle (Mill 2002, p. 14); and, of course, his ambivalent embrace of natural rights doctrine presses against prominent schools of classical liberalism today. Many of the foundational premises of secular-progressivism pose even greater tensions with Burke’s philosophical outlook.

In sum, Burke’s thought harbors a level of friction with classical liberalism that should give us pause before placing him in that intellectual tradition—but I am open to being convinced otherwise, and Hall has provided an earnest argument in favor of this conclusion. At the very least, Burke’s sharp emphasis on Europe’s ancient heritage that predated classical liberalism could be used an intellectual resource to enrich and enlarge this tradition.

**Stephen Davies**

Stephen Davies nicely classifies the main themes of *Commerce and Manners* and introduces other fruitful questions about the significance of Burke’s political economy. With regard to the Davies’ compelling remarks on the Adam Smith Problem or Edmund Burke Problem, I concede that introducing such problems as a heuristic, as I do, reveals more about late modernity’s tendency to compartmentalize different segments of society, including economics, history, and moral and social philosophy, than about the question of consistency in the thinkers themselves. These varying complexions of human affairs of course were merged in their time and did not succumb to the specializing trends of today.

Perhaps, then, there is “the Modernity Problem,” taken in this sense of reflexively separating such subjects, rather than an Adam Smith or Edmund Burke Problem. Similarly, while much ink has been spilled about Burke’s supposed breach of consistency in opposing the French Revolution and granting sympathy to the American colonists, I did not come across contemporaries of Burke accusing him of inconsistency (as Rothschild, Judith Shklar, Alfred Cobban, and Gertrude Himmelfarb have done) in opposing the Revolution and supporting a free internal grain trade.

Davies writes that my argument is that *Thoughts and Details* “sets out a rigorously laissez-faire position.” As mentioned, I believe that *Thoughts and Details* should not be read through a narrow *laissez faire* lens. A reader might arrive at this conclusion if he strips away all other moral, religious, social, and institutional considerations in Burke’s thought, when in reality, as Davies notes elsewhere in his response, Burke integrated these myriad concerns in his portrait of England’s agricultural economy. Even in *Thoughts and Details* Burke mentions religious establishments, the magistracy, state revenue, the military, and chartered corporations as necessary constituents of a state, and conceded the possible utility of public granaries in small jurisdictions such as Geneva. He also was a defender of the corn bounty, which tended to benefit the landed interest. And Burke certainly detected an element of “emergent spontaneous order” that arose between farmers and laborers—but, once again, such order was embedded in wider constitutional, aristocratic, and religious structures of English society, many of which were deliberately built.18

In addition, Davies astutely notes that the hazard of anachronism leaves Burke and other thinkers to be seized in a “political tug of war.” This is quite true. I think it is safe to say that Burke, if one had to speculate, would reflect the attitudes and temper of modern conservatism (and the Smithian-Hayekian strand of classical liberalism) more than of secular progressivism. But I also believe that at least some of his key insights are implicitly shared by this latter intellectual strand. The left’s criticism of the monetization of many aspects of society accords with Burke’s awareness that human relations should not be reduced to a utilitarian calculus. And the prevailing strand of left communitarianism—which admittedly is in tension with progressives’ competing faith in the redemptive power of the state—is certainly harmonious with Burke’s
defense of corporate social institutions as refuges that provide men and women spiritual meaning, moral purpose, and material welfare. I could also imagine that Burke would be critical of various schools of conservatism today for, among various possibilities, imposing a binary between the individual and the state and prioritizing individual autonomy above religious and moral considerations of a polity; and of other schools for seeking to strengthen the state at the expense of local forms of social organization and market exchange.

If we shall pursue this path of speculation further and compare Burke to twentieth-century thinkers, who are the best representatives of Burke’s capacious approach to political economy today? Davies wisely mentions George F. Will as one example. In the economics discipline, I would add Thomas Sowell, who throughout his intellectual life has carefully integrated economic considerations within wider social, moral, and institutional contexts. We could of course include Hayek as well in this list, with the proviso that Hayek’s (and Will’s and Sowell’s) economic thought holds some tensions with Burke’s.

Yet another name to add to this list is Wilhelm Röpke, the primary intellectual influence behind Germany’s economic recovery plan following World War Two (see Röpke 1960 and Gregg 2020). Röpke balanced a desire for commercial vibrancy with a sensitivity to the importance of farming communities, a consideration that is often neglected in mainstream discussions on economics today. He was keen on reconciling industrial expansion with traditional forms of social life, as manifested in agrarian communities, an imperative in agreement with Burke’s effort to merge commercial society within a preexisting social and religious order.

Attempting to identify Burke’s economic heirs invites the question of anachronism again, since such twentieth-century thinkers were living in a post-agrarian age in which mass industrialization had displaced many immemorial patterns of living. If Burke were living today, would he attempt to tip the balance back in favor of agrarian communities? Given his appreciation for husbandry and understanding of its critical function in providing nourishment to the masses, I suspect at the very least that he would caution proponents of generating economic efficiency through the mechanization and financialization of society not to forget the natural origin of economic resources: the gifts of the earth.

Accordingly, on the matter of whether Burke, as Davies writes, “clearly favoured a relatively more urbanized and commercial society,” the word “relatively” is key here: Burke’s steady endorsement of commercial activity throughout his legislative career indicates he did not cling to a romantic conception of agrarian life. I think the best way to frame this inquiry is that Burke favored a balance between urban and farming communities that harnessed and reconciled their distinctive qualities—such as, respectively, change and tradition, efficiency and leisure, and energy and moderation—to serve the common good.

This topic sheds light on Davies’ acute insight that the “main point of policy and judgment for Burke was not to maximise economic efficiency and output” and that “pure economic efficiency was not the ultimate criterion for the statesman.” Efficiency was an important consideration for Burke, but certainly not the decisive one. Furthermore, the better angels of the modern economics discipline often employs empirical data in a modest and sensible manner reminiscent of Burke’s consultation of statistical data in his own political life. But, as Davies and Hampsher-Monk rightly observe, the discipline stands to benefit greatly from approaching the study of economic activity from the perspective of Burke: as a human endeavor threaded into a weave of social, moral, institutional, and religious contexts.

Davies appropriately highlights one of the more underappreciated dimensions of Burke’s thought as a whole: his shrewd analysis of the debilitating consequences of resting a nation’s economy on the slippery foundation of financial speculation, unmoored from the stable anchor of land. For Burke, the detachment of mobile property from immobile property represented a revolution in the possession of wealth, undermined social and moral norms, spread distrust among the people, encouraged novelty at the expense of tradition, and provoked instability. More important, as Davies observes, undisciplined financial speculation did not rely on manners, as practiced in specific human relations, and therefore threatened to dissolve the moral basis of society in Burke’s view.
RICHARD BOURKE

Bourke eloquently describes Burke's idea of ancient chivalry as a habit of civility that allowed men and women to tame man's baser passions and cultivate a European milieu disciplined by moral and social self-restraint. Bourke’s and my interpretation of this subject may be closer than he suggests.

On the question of whether Burke's reprimand of “oeconomical politicians” (and “oeconomists”) was referring to Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, I agree with Bourke that Burke was not. Rather than claiming in Commerce and Manners that he had in mind such philosophers, I provide a number of plausible alternatives, including the Physiocrats, Turgot, Josiah Tucker, and Richard Price (Collins 2020, pp. 493-94). The alliance of the monied interest, of which Turgot was its most notorious representative, with the philosophers may be the likeliest culprit, especially in light of Burke's comment in a private letter in February 1790 that “manners,” derived from the “chivalrous spirit” that promoted the veneration of women, were “extinguished in so shocking a manner, by means of speculations of finance, and the false science of a sordid and degenerate philosophy[,]” (Burke 1870, p. 473). The phrase “oeconomical politicians” could also quite possibly accommodate French revolutionary legislators who were influenced by this alliance, leading them to be corrupted by the monied interest, seduced by the assignats, and charmed by abstract theory. It could even more generally denote Burke's dismay over the progressively calculating spirit of his age.

Far from denying that Burke's contemporaries understood commercial society to rest on ethical (and constitutional) foundations, I of course affirm the point. I briefly outline a number of representative quotations from John Millar (Bourke uses the same quotation) and William Robertson that illustrate Scottish thinkers’ recognition of chivalry in the development of European civilization (Collins 2020, p. 502). The point is not that such thinkers did not appreciate the social and moral basis of modern market relations, nor that they did not identify the presence of moral behavior prior to the advent of the modern commercial economy. As Bourke notes, Hume expounds the virtues of gallantry in “The Rise of Arts and Sciences”21 and Millar in The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks. We may add to this discussion Hume's remarks on chivalry and point of honor in the History of England, as well as similar comments on chivalry from Lord Kames (Sketches of the History of Man), Robertson (A View of the Progress of Society of Europe), and Ferguson (An Essay on the History of Civil Society), among their various writings.

Such philosophers and historians all understood the function of chivalry and gallantry to civilize relations between the sexes, inculcate care and submission, and preserve a distinction of ranks. Burke underlined these effects as well. Before proceeding, however, we should note that the Scots retained varying degrees of ambivalence over the efficacy of gallantry in modern society—see, for instance, Hume's deleted passage in "Rise of Arts and Sciences,” which was originally kept in the essay for over twenty-five years (Haakonssen 2003, p. 293n34)—and typically drew attention to the influence of chivalry on the conduct of battle and the treatment of the female sex, not on commercial society. Millar went so far as to state in An Historical View of the English Government that the “customs of chivalry” produced “certain punctilios of military honour” that were “plainly contrary to the manners of a commercial people...” (Millar 1818, pp. 187-88). Gilbert Stuart observed that the “solicitudes, and the mercenary spirit which rise up with commerce” were “unknown” in a feudal milieu governed by the medieval code of manners and interdependent affections (Stuart 1778, pp. 70-71). Hume’s idea of chivalry, moreover, was a secularized version cleansed of religious connotations.

The Scots generally conceived of manners and progress of the arts as coextensive in one steady progressive movement (though they were careful not to be tempted by the millenarian inclinations of French revolutionists), and that manners improved as the socialization process of commerce developed as well. In "Rise of Arts and Sciences,” Hume himself writes that “nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy” (Hume 1994, p. 119). Indeed, the tendency in Hume’s thought is to connect the increasing commercialization and urbanization of society with the growing sentiments of humanity and polished manners (consult, for instance, Hume (1994, p. 271).
The crucial point here is that Burke traced a firm causal connection (and with his own distinctive flair of pen) between the emergence of modern commercial society and its pre-commercial foundations—chivalry, religion, and so on—that Smith, Hume, and the other Scottish thinkers, in my reading, do not clearly draw. Burke writes in the Reflections that both the nobility and the clergy “kept learning in existence”—and that “commerce, and trade, and manufacture” grew “under the same shade in which learning flourished.” Hence, commercial society grew under the shade of two specific sources: the “spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion” (WS 8: 130). Even if commerce and trade were absent in a people, sentiment preserved by this spirit of religion and the nobility “supplies, and not always ill supplies their place” (WS 8: 130).

With Smith in particular, he, like Burke, was quite aware of the crucial function of local affections and friendships in man’s kinship networks. One could easily copy particular passages from the Theory of Moral Sentiments on this subject and seamlessly weave them into the Reflections. Yet Smith’s conception of socialization places more emphasis on fellow-feeling and mutual approbation as the basis of social relations, and did not trace the roots of commercial society to ancestral religion and habits of chivalry in his writings. Smith recognized a distinction of ranks, but his idea of socialization carried a more egalitarian touch than Burke’s hierarchical and premodern notion of social attachments. And the Annual Register’s review for the Theory of Moral Sentiments, most likely written by Burke, strongly praised the book for propounding “one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory, that has perhaps ever appeared” but also observed that “with regard to morals, nothing could be more dangerous” (The Annual Register 1760, p. 485). It is also not clear that Burke would have agreed with Smith’s belief in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, as communicated in the poor man’s son parable, that the ambitious yet deceptive pursuit of wealth, greatness, and recognition was the chief spur to industry (Smith 1984, p. 183).

Furthermore, Burke laid greater metaphorical stress on foundations, edifices, and structures as the necessary grounds for the kinetic movements of commerce and social activity. This is not to impose an impenetrable gap between Burke and Smith—and both were sensitive to the drawbacks of commercial society—but the varying degrees of weight they assigned to different parts of a flourishing commonwealth shed light on their most treasured and distinctive religious, moral, social, and economic convictions. Smith’s project was to imagine a system of natural liberty, rooted in sympathy and fellow-feeling, steered by the benevolent hand of Providence; Burke’s was to imagine a system of “manly, moral, regulated liberty” (WS 8: 57), rooted in the Christian religion and ancient manners, realized in a divinely ordered state willed by God (WS 8: 148).

I thus find Pocock’s interpretation more convincing. As he writes, “Manners, then, offer us a key to [Burke’s] argument; but a strictly progressive theory of manners, such as Burke might have derived from his Scottish acquaintances, presented them as arising, and fulfilling the natural sociability of man, only in the course of the commercialization, refinement and diversification of society” (Pocock 1985, pp. 209-10). In addition, Ryu Susato, who has written one of the most detailed expositions of the idea of chivalry in the Scottish Enlightenment, explains, “Burke was to emphasize the traditional values of chivalry, together with those of the Christian religion, more positively and consciously than any who had discussed the subject previously” (Susato 2007, p. 169). More recently, Sora Sato, in her study of Burke as an historian, has concluded, “What was unique [regarding Burke’s views on chivalry and Christianity] was the link he established between ancient manners and commercial arts” (Sato 2017, p. 93).

I agree with Bourke that there is much in common between Burke and the Scottish philosophers. And this debate, admittedly, can verge on the pedantic and rely on overdrawn qualitative distinctions. We should also mention that Burke’s argument itself is vulnerable to the criticism that it understates the shift in beliefs and rhetoric that facilitated the rise of commercial society; this additional consideration has been accentuated by Deirdre McCloskey and Joel Mokyr, among others (McCloskey 2016 and Mokyr 2009).

But I tend to lean on the side of Pocock, Susato, and Sato: Burke’s acute emphasis on the traditional function of manners and chivalry, imbued with deep Christian undertones, as a necessary precursor of commercial society in particular—beyond the fact that these traits were coterminous with it—leads to me to resist approaches that reduce to Scottish Enlightenment thought Burke’s conception of the link between
the nexus of chivalry, manners, and religion and the rise of commercial society. Like the question of Burke’s classical liberal credentials, I hesitate to collapse such distinctions.

Beyond the topic of Burke’s relationship with the Scots, Burke’s relevance for contemporary debates over economics highlights the crux of the markets-and-morals debate. Few people would deny the importance of moral and social norms for market activity. A shortcoming of many contemporary and influential defenders of market competition, economists and otherwise (and I was guilty of this pattern of thinking as well for a time), however, is their dismissal of the pre-commercial religious and traditional foundations of modernity, as demonstrated by their celebration of the demise of organized religion and agrarian society, their primary focus on the hockey stick graph of GDP growth as the definitive mark of human advancement (something that critics of markets, on the other hand, understate), and their portrayal of society prior to the explosion of wealth as backward-looking, ignorant, and insular. The effect of this picture is to imply an absence of human progress before the 18th century, and that only the Enlightenment project rescued humanity from the depths of poverty and superstition.

We therefore witness many moral arguments in favor of market exchange that hinge on ideas often attributed to modern political thought, such as individual rights, autonomous reason, rational self-interest, the harm principle, emancipation from traditional social, moral, and religious constraints, mutual consent, voluntary contracts, the limits of the intellect, the conceptualization of man as a producer and consumer, the overthrow of privilege, secular morality, earthly satisfaction, and utilitarianism. In my best reading of his economic thought, I believe Burke concluded that political economy should be rooted in something older and deeper.

NOTES

1 I will use “economic thought” and “political economy” interchangeably, with the awareness that the former phrase did not exist in Burke’s day.
2 All references refer to the volume and page number of The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (1970—).
3 Hont himself hardly discusses Burke in Jealousy of Trade (2010).
4 I will return to Burke and Smith in the final section.
5 One could of course have summoned the same argument against Britain throughout the 1700s.
6 See, for instance, Hayek’s citations (2011) of Burke, including on pages 110, 119, 120, 261, 482.
8 Perhaps Hampsher-Monk’s apprehension over this decision derives from a preference in methodological approach. My aim was not to trace the chronological development of Burke’s thoughts on political economy, although I do hope readers can get a sense of this development when reading the book. It was, first and foremost, to answer the question: what was Burke’s conception of political economy?
9 Collins, “Spontaneous Order and Civilization.”
10 Attempts to understand distinctions between these two groups trace back through Gratian’s Decretum and the medieval canonists to Augustine and Scripture and Paul the Apostle’s admonition to work in 2 Thessalonians 3:10.
11 For a recent study of Burke’s idea of prudence, see Weiner (2019).
13 I say this with the awareness that there of course classical liberals who are religious and those who are not, and that there is much debate about these thinkers’ religious views.
14 Yet do see my comment in the Hampsher-Monk section on Hayek’s remark on the role of independent men of wealth to promote culture and the arts.
15 Hall’s remarks prompted me to consider an additional point of inquiry that is worth studying further: tracing classical liberal thinkers’ conceptions of the role of tradition and custom in their thought.
See also my comments on Bourke.

This raises the interesting question of whether Burke would have supported a national church in America. I think it is safe to say, at the very least, that he would endorsed individual states’ support for churches.

Of course, fiat money could negatively influence manners.

We may also in this light pay heed to the contributions of early modern Anglican clergy in understanding the integrated dimensions of market activity and their relation to Anglican political theology, a connection I perhaps should have explored further in Commerce and Manners. Consult Rashid (2020, pp. 107-28).

Here Hume projects a more positive interpretation of the concept than in his early essay on chivalry.

See Sato’s more comprehensive list in Edmund Burke as Historian (2017, p. 93n570).

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