The character of Burke’s political economy, barely remarked on until the Twentieth Century, has since the 1960s, become a central issue in the struggle over Burke’s political identity, and hence his legacy, on both sides of the Atlantic. Nor has this argument been conducted only within Burke scholarship but has been part of a wider political and cultural struggle.

The first shots were fired by C. B. Macpherson’s British Academy ‘Great Minds’ Lecture and his subsequent book (Macpherson, n.d., Macpherson 1980). Macpherson’s essentially Marxist interpretation drew attention to Burke’s defence of the free market in his ‘Thoughts and Details on Scarcity’ and argued that Burke’s aestheticisation of the English past and traditions was an ideological mask and salve for the raw and aggressive economic conditions that, at base, constituted his (and our) contemporary world.

However, in England the public argument really took off in the wake of Margaret Thatcher’s adoption of neo-liberal political economic policy and her appointment of avowedly Hayekian advisers and ministers. There followed a kind of battle for the soul of the English Conservative party. Thatcher increasingly excoriated and excluded as ‘Wets’ those who would not follow her in abandoning Keynesian economic policy and the Post-War welfare consensus to pursue a policy of privatisation of public assets and an extension of the role of the market. One of the main sites of contestation amongst Conservatives was the identity of Burke himself. Burke, in his own time an Irish Whig, had by then become so established as the ‘Father of Modern Conservatism’ (see Jones 2017), that any argument about the ideological character of English conservatism (now increasingly focussed on its economic policy) had, it seemed, to demonstrate that Burke had subscribed to it. A series of Conservative politicians set out, in scholarly-format writings, to show Burke’s views on the relationship between the government, economy and society as clearly placing him in either the ‘wet’ or the ‘dry’ camp of the party, thereby establishing one or the other position as ‘true’ and ‘original’ conservatism.

Meanwhile, In the US where Burke has often been celebrated (somewhat exaggeratedly) as a ‘supporter’ of the American rebellion against British rule, there had emerged a different kind of conservative reading of Burke. This, inspired by Straussian concerns with a relativistic modernity, and so not, originally focussed on market, drew on Catholic thought to locate him in a Thomistic natural law tradition. At the same time Burke was recruited into a more explicitly political and not specifically Thomistic campaign against aspects of modernity by Russel Kirk, writers for William
Buckley’s *National Review*, Irving Kristol, and the Locke Scholar Willmore Kendall. The ‘modernity’ that was being opposed here was a shifting one, from a utilitarian market capitalism through various kinds of cultural relativism to those who were flirting with socialist and communist projects. What these two strands shared was something largely missing in the British Burkeans, a foregrounding of religion as a focus of modernity’s attack, and in need of defence. The battle was against Jacobin’s modern avatar—Communism.

Although the issue of political economy was central to the English interpretive debate, its role in the American one is less clear. A utilitarian, market-oriented consumerism was one of American conservatism’s early targets. But the American right’s Burke too had its extreme libertarians—the most exotic perhaps being Murray Rothbard’s attempt to show that Burke’s early *Vindication of Natural Society* was not (as its author insisted in a second edition) a satirical exaggeration, but an earnest defence of a kind of libertarianism (Rothbard 1958). But the vigorous endorsement of a free-market economy would eventually join the defence of a version of Christianity (albeit one that Burke would barely have recognised and certainly not endorsed) as the two wings of American conservatism.

One touchstone in these ideological interpretive struggles was Burke’s attitude to the market. Strategically, arguments tended to presuppose that showing Burke’s enthusiasm for free trade and endorsement of market relations was enough to establish an identity between his position and the new neo-liberalism. By contrast, English ‘one-nation’ Tories (‘Wets’ in the new nomenclature) stressed Burke’s emphasis on the importance of cultural continuity, local identity and customary social relations—all threatened (as Burke himself acknowledged) by the commercialisation of life as the market penetrated more and more areas of existence. At a crude level such approaches foster obviously partisan readings of the texts, but in more subtle ways they drive anachronism through their presentist concern to find Burke not only coherent but right (ie in agreement with the writer’s beliefs). This is compounded in this case by an important feature of economics as a modern discipline, namely its loss of a sense of its own history. The attempt to force Burke into the ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ camp was an anachronistic exercise to be engaged in by the ideologue, but of no interest to, indeed subversive of, scholarship.

Gregory Collins’s work is the first major academic study to organise itself around Burke’s political economy. He has sought out and draws together Burke’s thoughts and comments on economic issues across the whole of his career on an unprecedented scale. It is a work of tremendous industry and a rich contribution to Burke scholarship. His attempt to integrate the recent thinking, pioneered by John Pocock’s (1982) emphasis on the role of manners in Burke, promises a way out of the rather sterile debate about whether Burke should be thought of as for or against free-market capitalism and into a wide range of other important issues of real concern to Burke himself and his contemporaries. Gregory expresses full recognition of the danger of the kinds of anachronism mentioned above, writing of his intention to ‘avoid when at all possible to depict Burke’s political economy as a doctrine of “capitalism”’ (Collins 2020, p. 11, hereafter *C & M*). He points out that the term only comes into use some time after Burke was writing, and that even what we would later recognise as the practice had ‘barely sprouted in his day’ (Ibid.). And he signals recognition of the difficulty raised by deploying some other key economic terms such ‘Liberal’, ‘Free trade’, ‘civil society’, and ‘political economy’ itself.

However, avoiding terminology not yet available to one’s subject doesn’t guarantee avoiding anachronism. One can also fall victim to it by ascribing anachronistic content to terminology that is shared by moderns and historical subjects. Despite the author’s intentions of avoiding the anachronisms of the ‘Burke and free market capitalism’ debate, they can surface in other ways. Indeed the decision to open the book with an assertive reading of *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity* [hereafter TDS] as ‘an account of Burke’s economic doctrine’ with the claim that it presages aspects of Hayek’s thought initially led me to think we were being led back again into that territory (*C & M*, p. 41). It is a trite but nevertheless repeatable point (of which Collins himself reminds us) that Burke was, through most of his life, a politician responding to issues of the moment. His ‘thought’ as we have it is expressed in a range of occasional and polemical texts which are not in any sense doctrinally systematic, but expressed pithily and epigrammatically. In consequence with
Burke, there is perhaps more danger than with any other political thinker, of the interpretive gleam in the scholar’s eye being mistaken for a doctrinal nugget. It is at least possible that a modern political theorist, who has probably spent more time reading these pieces than Burke did composing them, should find coherences there of which the author was unaware.

The TDS/Hayek doctrine functions as a recurrent standard throughout the study, Burke’s policy stances on American trade, domestic economical reform, the reform of the East India Company and the French Revolution are each discussed against this yardstick and in each case it is explained how and why EB deviates from this doctrine. The results are invariably sensible and illuminating expositions of Burke’s position. But the effect is an odd one as they present the independence of markets from government as the central ‘doctrine’ of debate within political economy. But for Burke and his generation, Political Economy was a much wider complex of issues centred on the capacity of Britain’s moderate, trading monarchy to survive in the struggle to prevent any European State from establishing ‘universal empire’. In this contest political and economic questions were hardly yet disentangled.

In assessing the prominence to be given to TDS we should also remind ourselves (as indeed Collins does) that, like two of the Four Letters on a Regicide Peace, it was not a work of Burke’s own fashioning but a text concocted by his literary executors, cashing in on the demand for Burkeana after his death. It was put together from two sources: copies of notes Burke had ‘hurriedly scribbled’ and sent to Pitt (on rumours that Government was about to intervene in the market for grain following two bad harvests) and three fragments of a letter from Burke to Arthur Young, agriculturalist, travel writer and secretary to the Board of Agriculture (which had been trying to elicit a pamphlet from Burke on the proposal to set minimum agricultural wage). Although the work does contain statements of economic principles, it perhaps has even less of a claim to being Burke’s systematic treatment of the field than most of Burke’s mature writings. So it is a bold move to set up this text from the very end of Burke’s life, that owes its origin to a very specific political problem, and was written for a very narrow purpose and audience, as the epitome of Burke’s economics, against which apparent departures need to be assessed.

Even bolder than the presentation of this text as the epitome of Burke’s economic thought on the market, is the striking decision to interweave it with a comparison of the doctrine drawn from it with the thought F. A. Hayek as a way of assessing Burke’s economic credentials. It’s not at all clear—given Collin’s declared concern to avoid anachronism—why one would do this. But what it allows to resurface is a pattern of argument that is shared by the much cruder Burke of the free-marketeers. The key presumption here is that ‘the market’ can function as a kind of trans-historical referent that enables precisely the kind of identification of Burke’s views—or even the plausibility of comparing them—with Hayek’s. In what follows I want to historicise ‘the market’—failure to do which has bedevilled this kind of discussion of Burke—and explore the questions that raises.

Let me start with TDS and broaden out the case. Given Burke’s continuing fulmination against the speculative market in government securities in France (near contemporary with TDS). It had always seemed to me problematic to read Burke as committed to the universal endorsement of market mechanisms that the more libertarian Burkeans sought to ascribe to him. I shall ask what Burke—and Hayek—could have meant by the market and their defence of it.

The immediate context and professed subject of TDS is agricultural policy. All the examples in the document relate to the relationship between agricultural wages and the price of agricultural produce. The contracts he discusses are exclusively those between labourers and farmers, and farmers and the purchasers of grain. So, despite what I acknowledge are the most abstract seeming claims, it is hard, without presupposing that any defence of a market in one field is a defence of it tout court, to read its claims as such. Burke’s discursive comments in that text all refer to detailed features of agricultural production, indeed they go as deeply into the specific features of cultivation, as into the contractual relations between the peculiar and specialised roles that had developed within agricultural production; a field of which Burke was, of course, not only a keen observer, but in which he was practitioner. If we did not live (as Burke did not) in a world where every day public reference is made to ‘the market’ as a universal abstraction, it might be more natu-
ral to read Burke’s remarks as comments on the observable facts of the matter in the case of actual empirical agricultural markets. And in fact, in this same document, Burke makes clear that he thinks different markets have their own unique properties. He argues that it is agriculturalists’ experience of agricultural markets that entitles such producers to dismiss as dogmatic claims by city dwellers (who themselves have their own experience of other kinds of markets) that food prices need government intervention. Indeed so far from generalising from the features of agricultural markets to trade and manufacture, Burke explicitly contrasts the distinct bodies of economic knowledge that might be drawn from the two sectors. Burke’s recognition of the specificity of the characteristics of particular markets suggested to him the implausibility of generalising across all markets.

This notion that economic knowledge is knowledge about the specific economic activities in, and properties of, particular markets is less odd when we consider the concept of the market in a more historical light. Aboriginally the market was thought of as a physical space to which sellers brought objects for sale, a space that in early modern England was specifically licensed to allow such assembling to take place. In such empirically experienced markets all sorts of roles, conventions, and patterns of exchange and obligation emerged, influenced by the particular features and properties of the commodities exchanged there. By contrast, within most modern economic thinking, the market is a logical and increasingly mathematical abstraction. It designates a purely theoretically defined space in which agents, to whom is described a limited rationality, interact under certain legal side-constraints. Unlike conceptions of markets that draw on the experienced properties of actual markets in particular commodities, it is a way of modelling exchange relations precisely in abstraction from the specific properties of commodities.

Tracing the process by which the concept of the market has been transformed and abstracted in this way is an appropriate object of historical investigation—Ricardo’s Corn Model and the marginalist revolution are clearly important stages. The question for the Burke historian is where along this (possible bumpy) continuum is Burke to be situated? My concern is that any collapsing of this conceptual change affects the kind of questions that might be considered appropriate in relation to Burke’s economic views, which in my view is not, ‘were there any exceptions to Burke’s opposition to government intervention in private economic activity’ (C & M, p. 77) but: ‘on what cultural and rhetorical resources could Burke have drawn on in his political economy writings and what were his preoccupations in deploying them?’.

Once we recognise the historicity of key terms, such as ‘market’, even the relationship between propositionally identical claims becomes problematic. Burke certainly talks about markets in abstraction from particular physical spaces, but it is far from clear (and seems historically implausible) that Burke had any conception of the market as a formal model defined by the properties ascribed to it by modern economic thought. Burke, in short recognised a market, as an (often very specific) pattern of exchange in a particular field, but he didn’t subscribe to a general conception of the market, as an abstract, universal set of principles capable of modelling behaviour, and thereby generating policy across a range of economic sectors.

It is of course, difficult to prove such negatives conclusively, particularly since the claim hinges in part on the argument that claims apparently cast in grammatically universalist terms must be understood as limited on the grounds of historical context. Nevertheless there are two prominent examples, both discussed by Collins, where, quite apart from considerations specific to the particular issue, Burke rejects arguments not just that make universal claims about the eligibility of the free market, but because they make such claims—as we should expect from one who waged a lifelong campaign against the over-confident deployment of human rationality.

In the conflict with America, triggered by the introduction of taxes on British goods imported to America, Burke opposed the argument that the Navigation Acts should be repealed, allowing free trade between Great Britain and the Colonies, and instead drawing any necessary revenue for imperial administration by direct taxation; which, it was acknowledged, might require American Representation in Parliament. Burke’s reaction was to repudiate the recourse to taxation and to return to the status quo, supplying colonial expenses from the trading monopolies provided for in the Navigation Acts. But Burke
doesn’t just reject the (Smithian) policy, he does so on the very grounds that it is drawn from abstract arguments, urging instead proven, customary, (but nevertheless monopolistic) practice:

I am not here going into the distinctions of rights, nor attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it. They and we, and their and our ancestors, have been happy under that system. Let the memory of all actions in contradiction to that good old mode, on both sides, be extinguished forever. Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done it. Let this be your reason for binding their trade. Do not burden them by taxes; you were not used to do so from the beginning. Let this be your reason for not taxing.\(^{25}\)

Burke’s presumptive principle of imperial political economy here is that the reversion to proven practices (even in monopolistic) should trump abstract argumentation to the contrary.

Next, in discussing what was to be done about the East India Company’s monopoly of Trade in his ‘Speech on Fox’s East India Bill’, Burke seems to address Smith’s argument against allowing merchants monopoly political control of the Indian trade:

I do not presume to condemn those who argue a priori against the propriety of leaving such extensive political powers in the hands of a company of merchants. I know much is, and much more may be said against such a system. But, with my particular ideas and sentiments I cannot go that way to work. I feel an insuperable reluctance in giving my hand to destroy any established institution of government, upon a theory, however plausible it may be (Burke 1981, pp. 386-7, my italics).\(^{26}\)

Once again Burke objects to deciding such policy issues on claims that are derived a-prioristically from an abstract theory about the proper relationship between political power and (even monopolistic) merchants.

But if Burke parts company from Smith on this issue, his distance from Hayek on it is of another order altogether. Collins’ commentary on the symmetry between Hayek and Burke suggests more than discerning ‘in the background of Thoughts and Details a faint silhouette of F. A. Hayek’ (C & M, p. 53). The core of the symmetry lies in his ascription to both Burke and Hayek the belief that ‘the free flowing price system in market economies channelled disparate pieces of information in a way that steered commerce towards efficient ends’ (C & M, p. 54) and that for both, it was government ignorance of this information that underpinned their objection to government intervention in commerce. But the claims by Burke and Hayek that governments do not possess the knowledge to intervene effectively in the market are logically different claims, resting on historically very different conceptions of the market. Burke’s is an empirical claim. For Burke there may conceivably be such knowledge, indeed, we can agree with Collins that part of Burke’s claim is that parties to wage contracts (uniquely) have such knowledge as is ‘necessary to arrive at an informed opinion about whether employment contracts will satisfy their particular preferences in the agricultural economy’ (C & M, p. 122). And it is because such knowledge is known only to the individual contractors—that only the parties to the contract are in a position to assess their needs and opportunities with respect to what is being offered—that governments or third parties intervening are ill placed to second guess the prices arrived at. But this is essentially a practical question: the ‘knowledge’ that the agents possess does actually exist, it’s just that government (at least no eighteenth-century government) could hope to assemble and process such knowledge.

Hayek’s claim is a much stronger and qualitatively different claim; it is an ontological one. For Hayek, the prices arrived at in the market are signals that together comprise such economic knowledge as might be needed to (per impossibile) intervene.\(^{27}\) For Burke, a labourer or farmer might know what bargain they
would be prepared to strike—even in the absence of a partner to the deal. But Hayek’s point is that in the absence of a market of free contractors economic knowledge simply does not exist. It is the prices that constitute it. Reference to economic knowledge, or ‘market data’, Hayek (1988, p. 99) observes

often leads economists to assume that this knowledge exists not merely in dispersed form but that the whole of it might be available to some single mind. This conceals the character of competition as a discovery procedure…. The problem is not how to use given knowledge available as a whole, but how to make it possible that knowledge which is not, and cannot be, made available to any one mind, can yet be used, in its fragmentary and dispersed form, by many interacting individuals …

For Hayek the incompetence of government intervention is not (as it is when asserted by Burke) a matter of practicalities. For Hayek it would be logically impossible for a government to acquire the kind of knowledge that would enable it to intervene beneficially in a market, because on his account such knowledge is only generated from freely contracting individuals, moreover it only exists in this dispersed, piecemeal fashion as contracted prices, and is hence unavailable in principle to any one. Intervention by government falsifies the price signals that would otherwise have constituted the knowledge.

My critique here is tangential, and an invitation to reflect on how difficult it is with an historical subject such as ‘the market’ to combine the identification of ‘principles’ with an historical understanding of its development. An evolving practice, or our reflections on it, such as ‘the market’ may (and periodically has) from time to time been presented as exhibiting ‘principles’ by abstracting from its then current practices. But we can surely only understand earlier versions of those principles (and hence their changes) by first making the huge effort to think away our contemporary versions of them; rather than starting off by proleptically identifying, in those in whom we seek origins, their modern descendants. And something similar goes for ‘Political Economy’ itself which was, as Collin’s individual discussions ultimately show, at this time a field of contestation between the different demands—strategic, demographic, moral, and cultural as well as economic—made on those seeking policy solutions for the survival of the European states; and not a single principle drawn from what we have now come to call ‘economics’, which Burke then integrated into those wider concerns.28

NOTES

1 http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/staff/hampsher-monk/
2 There were some Conservative Politicians, such as Enoch Powell and Rhodes-Boysen, members of the Mont Pelerin Society, who had long subscribed to Hayekian positions. But the most prominent and influential amongst Thatcher’s entourage was Sir Keith Joseph, a self-described and sudden ‘convert’ to Hayekian political economy, Secretary of State for Industry and subsequently for Education and Science and creator and Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, a think-tank for the Conservative Party closely aligned with Hayek. Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer in Thatcher’s Cabinet, were also influenced by Hayek.
3 Sir Samuel Brittan, the distinguished political commentator and economics correspondent of the Financial Times wrote “Hayek’s book [The Constitution of Liberty] is still probably the most comprehensive statement of the underlying ideas of the moderate free market philosophy espoused by neoliberals”. The many faces of Liberalism, Financial Times, January 22, 2010. Thatcher sniffily referred to ‘the progressive consensus’ that she sought to disrupt (Green 2002, p. 216).
4 Michael Gove, currently Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the UK Cabinet Office, points out that ‘Edmund Burke [has] been conscripted as often in battles between Tory factions as in battles against other parties’… ‘Burke’s words, like a medieval crown, used to lend legitimacy.’ And he notes ‘The invocation of him was heard more frequently at those points in the seventies, eighties and nineties when the Tories became more attuned to ideology and, indeed, riven by it’ (Gove 1997, p. 152).
Successive treatments of the conservative tradition by politicians that seek to give centre-place to Burke (although for very different ideological reasons!) include Gilmore’s *Inside Right: a study of Conservatism* (1977) and Willetts’ ‘Modern Conservatism’ (1992). The former sought to depict Burke as resisting, the latter as advancing, the strand of economic liberalism in Toryism. John Redwood claims Margaret Thatcher saw society ‘in Burkeian terms, favouring the small battalions and voluntary associations rather than massive extensions of state power to try to solve social problems’ (Redwood 2005). See most recently Norman (2013, pp. 284, 289), who urges modern politicians to take seriously Burke’s critique of a kind of utilitarian individualism and insistence on the importance of ‘society as a basic category within politics’… rather than ‘the individual atom of much modern economics’; and to recognise Burke’s attempt to teach us that ‘the simplifying assumptions required to push economics towards the hard sciences … import logical error’ … there can, and must be debate about … free markets’ (pp. 253-4).

The centrality of Natural Law to Burke’s thought was first argued by a group of Catholic commentators, notably Stanlis (1958), and Canavan (1960) and Pappin (1993). Although no American political party identifies so closely with Burke as do the British Conservatives, there have been a number of associations and foundations, academic and political, which broadly identify with Burke’s thought.

For a sympathetic account of Burke’s affinities with the American right, see Henrie (1997). For an intricate and more critical overview of what he calls an increasingly Disneyfied version of Burke, see Deane (2013).

Calling into question the ‘liberal modernity’ view of the ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Sister’ revolutions of France and America as parallel moves into the modern world.

Ironically a deconstructed version of C. B. Macpherson’s analysis of Burke’s political philosophy as a kind of ‘mask for modernity’.

It seems, nevertheless worth briefly rehearsing this contested terrain between polemic and scholarship as a context alluded to but largely passed over by Collins in his aspiration to present an academic study.

These sensible remarks often seem to withdraw from the claims made about the centrality of free trade: ‘Burke always calibrated his support for trade within larger constitutional, prescriptive, and imperial contexts’ (C & M, p. 381) and ‘Much like social relations between men should be governed by principles beyond transactional barter, political relations between nations should be influenced by considerations that surpassed commercial activity’ (p. 508).

This approach has generated a considerable literature that hardly surfaces in Collins’s work. Pocock’s is only one such. The work of Winch (1996) and Hont (2005), Bourke (2015) and Whatmore (2012) enlarge on this wider conception of the subject.

See, the introduction to TDS in W & S IX, p. 119. Burke received Young at his Beaconsfield estate on 29th April 1796, but it is not clear that anything substantial emerged from the meeting (Burke 1969, vol IX, p. 459).

As a good rhetorician Burke knew that audiences ‘love to hear stated in general terms what they believe to be true in particular’ (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1395b).

Such as: ‘The balance between consumption and production makes price. The market settles, and alone can settle, that price. Market is the meeting and conference of the consumer and producer, when they mutually discover each other’s wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any reflexion what the market is, without being astonished by the truth, the correctness, the celerity, the general equity which the balance of wants is settled’ (TDS, W & S, p. 133.).

Town and City dwellers, Burke writes, ‘are to be heard with great respect and attention upon matters within their province, that is on trades and manufactures; but on any thing that relates to agriculture, they are to be listened to with the same reverence which we play to the dogmas of other ignorant and presumptious men.’ (TDS, W & S, p. 129).

Indeed Collins account richly details Burke’s recourse to evidence: ‘In his view, general claims about political economy, and political life overall, should be verified by the sanction of political experience’ (C & M, p. 257). So I
am at a loss to understand why our author sets up Hayek as a standard and insists that Burke subscribes to a universal doctrine, when so much of his excellent analysis shows him to be operating empirically.

Both the hiring of agricultural labourers and the buying and selling of corn and stock still, and well beyond Burke’s time, took place in physical spaces, where actual Farmers, labourers, bags of corn and animals were displayed and bargained for.

Economic anthropologists have long demonstrated the emergence of such patterns in markets that appear to approximate to the economic models of the ‘perfect market’. I discuss some of these, and wider issues on the identity (and status) of claims made about and on behalf of markets in Hampsher-Monk (2015).

Although of course such properties can be re-introduced into the model, just as the side constraints or presuppositions (notoriously, perfect knowledge or barriers to entry) can be varied.

To put it tendentiously, that is to say, ‘how much, and on what grounds did Burke deviate from a yet-to-be-formulated conception of market universalism?’

There are numerous uncontested historical cases where this is accepted to be the case. Take for example the numerous historical claims of a universal right to the franchise, which nevertheless have to be understood to exclude women, and even, in earlier cases men in service; or extensive early-modern claims to freedom of conscience, which commonly presumptively (even where they do not explicitly) exclude atheists, Jews, Muslims—and even Catholics.

Advanced by Smith, Knox and Tucker. See Winch’s (1996, p. 138) reconstruction of the opposing sides on which Burke and Smith found themselves.


W & S, V. These examples are part of a more extended discussion of Burke and Smith on Empire and Market in my (Hampsher-Monk 2015, 2009).

The claim is the focus of the calculation debate with socialist planners such as Oskar Lange in the 1920s and 30s.

This essay draws on two previous publications in which I have discussed the relationship between Burke and conceptions of the Market (2015, 2009).

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