Michael Oakeshott on Libertarianism, Conservatism, and the Freedom of the English

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Abstract: This essay revisits Michael Oakeshott’s classic critique of rationalism in politics and shows how it is relevant for his understanding of a specific notion of freedom which he associated with the English political tradition. Oakeshott was clear that English freedom must be understood contextually since it was not the same as German Freiheit or French liberté, both of which were related to ideological, purpose-oriented politics, including enlightened despotism, German Cameralism, French philosophes, fascism and socialism. By contrast, the English experience had revealed an economical method of government known as “the rule of law,” which Oakeshott defined as “the enforcement by prescribed methods of settled rules binding alike on governors and governed.” English freedom was thus characterized by a procedural way of approaching politics and an absence of overwhelming concentrations of power. By connecting Oakeshott’s essays collected sixty years ago as Rationalism in Politics (1962) with his other works, we can see that the English tradition of freedom was related not only to the ways in which he understood the Whig, libertarian and conservative political traditions, but also to his famous notion of civil association (societas) as theorized in his magnum opus, On Human Conduct (1975). This essay argues in conclusion that Oakeshott’s understanding of civil association and his criticisms of rationalism can just as easily be applied to the modern right as the modern left.

Keywords: Michael Oakeshott, political rationalism, conservatism, libertarianism, rule of law, common law.

Michael Oakeshott’s powerful portrayal of the political rationalist—one convinced that there are correct answers to political questions and impatient to remake states and indeed the world in terms of those answers—was first put forward in the immediate post-war period, as the Labour party expanded the modern welfare state, as a consensus was formed around economic planning in Britain, and as communists and capitalists locked horns about global hegemony (see Minogue 2012, Smith 2012, and Villa 2012). The picture of the rationalist is as relevant today as ever in the face of ideological hardening on the left and right on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Oakeshott, political rationalism had become so prevalent in the last four centuries of Western history that even challenges to central planning, notably F. A. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944), belonged to the same style of politics, as they offered plans to oppose planning (Oakeshott 1991, p. 26). Writing in 1947, in the
wake of the Beveridge Report and the Education Act of 1944, Oakeshott observed how the rationalist style of politics had recently become dominant in his native England. As he wrote, “the political habit and tradition, which, not long ago, was the common possession of even extreme opponents in English politics, has been replaced by merely a common rationalist disposition of mind” (ibid., p. 37). The “infection of Rationalism” was not entirely unopposed, however: England, “where political education of some sort has been much more widely spread than in some other societies,” its political tradition and history provided an alternative. This essay considers the significance of Oakeshott’s interpretation of the freedom of the English—the “common possession” that had been almost lost—and concludes by offering some remarks on how this is related to his understanding of the libertarian and conservative traditions.

The political rationalist believes that politics has premediated ends—for instance, full employment, economic growth, and social justice—and that political activity is the pursuit of these ends. The goals are usually perceived as self-evident, and in recent modernity most of them have become distributionist (although we may now want to add ecological sustainability to Oakeshott’s list) (Oakeshott 1993, ch. 8). Politics is about finding the right plan of action in order to reach a society’s goals. By stark contrast, Oakeshott viewed political activity to be better understood, not as a solution to a specific problem or set of problems, or a purpose-oriented activity of any kind, but rather as an open-ended (and never-ending) activity in which “men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; [where] there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place not appointed destination” (Oakeshott 1991, p. 60). Rather than technocratic training, then, political education entailed learning about the political traditions of one’s society and those of others, not in order to rank them, but rather to understand one’s own tradition better. This would have the benefit of making its resources more readily available. A key resource in the English tradition was the statesmanship of Halifax’s “Trimmer,” who hit the mean between the politics of faith and the politics of skepticism (Oakeshott 1996, pp. 122-5). It also helped to avoid the illusion that politics is progressive or teleological, in other words, the fallacy that there is a destination to be aimed for and reached. Echoing Edmund Burke, Oakeshott regarded political activity as a negotiation between those who are alive, those who are dead and those who are yet to be born.2

Against rationalist universalism, Oakeshott was convinced that political concepts must be understood in local contexts. As he wrote in an essay from around the same time as the pieces in *Rationalism in Politics and other Essays* (1962), every society “has its own manner of thinking about [freedom and power], a manner which springs from its native experience” (Oakeshott 2004, p. 242). English freedom was thus not the same as German *Freiheit* or French *liberté*. The latter were related to ideological, purpose-oriented politics, with eighteenth-century manifestations including enlightened despotism, German Cameralism and French *philosophes*, and modern ones such as fascism and socialism. They were fundamentally at odds with the English political tradition, or at least an ideal version of it. For Oakeshott, the history of English freedom was “not the history of an abstract idea, but the history of the establishment of procedures which enable men to enjoy their recognized rights” (ibid.). In the Middle Ages, legal rights had belonged to the barons, but these rights had gradually been transformed into the freedoms of modern England, as the politics of individualism replaced the politics of communal ties. This procedural notion of freedom escaped precise definition and could certainly not be “exported” to other settings under the catch-all heading of “democracy” (Oakeshott 1991, p. 55). Its particular and “unexportable” character differentiated English freedom from the abstract and universal idea of liberty of the French revolutionaries, as well as others wedded to political rationalism (including “neo-Girondins” such as Tony Blair and George W. Bush, we may want to add). It had certainly been threatened at times in England, however; Francis Bacon, the Puritans, Jeremy Bentham, and the modern left and right had taken turns to undermine it, with the latter competing for the spoils of victory in a modern, purpose-oriented state entirely dominated by political rationalism. Indeed, Bacon was a key source of inspiration for the *philosophes* and other rationalists, as he pioneered the understanding of the state as an economy—a way of thinking about politics that later came to overshadow all others (Oakeshott 1975, pp. 287-8). Moreover, the characteristics of English freedom had been neither wholly
present nor wholly absent, but the English called themselves free because their arrangements approximated the general condition (Oakeshott 1991, p. 397).

English freedom could be understood, while escaping precise definition. For most people, this understanding would be instinctive, but the job of the political philosopher was to make it intelligible. In “The Political Economy of Freedom” (1949)—an essay starting off as a review of Henry C. Simons’s *Economic Policy for a Free Society* (1948)—Oakeshott outlined the recipe for the freedom of the English from the perspective of the “English libertarian.” According to Oakeshott’s libertarian, English freedom did not spring from any single principle, whether private property, parliamentary government, or even the rule of law, but rather what all the characteristics of English society seemed to point to: “the absence from our society of overwhelming concentrations of power.” In English politics, authority was diffused between past, present and future—in other words, it had a strong traditional component, but not one that dominated all political considerations. Power was further diffused and shared among all the interests of the society, as well as between the administration and the opposition in parliament: “The secret of [England’s] freedom is that it is composed of a multitude of organizations in the constitution of the best of which is reproduced that diffusion of power which is characteristic of the whole.” The English experience had further revealed an economical method of government known as “the rule of law,” understood as “the enforcement by prescribed methods of settled rules binding alike on governors and governed.” It was the kind of government that made the “diffusion of power” possible, and it may thus be regarded as an English style of politics. While it was not its essence, the rule of law was the central precondition of English freedom, since it prevented “the fear of the power of our government” (Oakeshott 1991, pp. 388-90).

It is important to say that the English tradition of the rule of law was not necessarily synonymous with the common law tradition, with which Oakeshott had a somewhat complicated relationship (see esp. Gerencser 2012). In one early essay, published in the 1992 revised and extended edition of *Rationalism in Politics*, Oakeshott suggested that Bentham’s cardinal sin was his impatience with the English common law. Bentham’s first publication, *A Fragment on Government* (1776), was an all-out attack on William Blackstone’s defense of the English legal and political tradition. Oakeshott wrote:

> It was natural for a philosophe to hate the English common law and to be suspicious of judge-made law, for in both there is an element of uncertainty; on account of both English law can never be an artistic whole. But, in his contempt of the first, Bentham seems to have forgotten that law must change, that law is an expression of what is and not of what ought to be; he forgot, in short, what all benevolent despots forgot (Oakeshott 1991, p. 141).

For Oakeshott, the “enlightened despot” represented a crucial figure in the history of rationalist politics in European history. We might thus be forgiven for thinking of Oakeshott as a rather straightforward defender of the English common law tradition, since he appears to applaud it in several places in *Rationalism in Politics*. One difficulty, however, is that perhaps the most prominent English critic of the common law was Oakeshott’s beloved Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* Oakeshott had edited and regarded as the only classic text of political philosophy in the English language.³ Oakeshott’s Hobbes was first and foremost a philosopher of the rule of law; as early as the 1930s Oakeshott had disagreed with Leo Strauss’s contention that “the distinctive innovation of Hobbes is…his rejection of law and his substitution of right or claim as the principle from which the State is to be deduced.” (Oakeshott 2007, p. 145). But in his impatience with the common law tradition and preference for codified law, Hobbes, as everyone apart from Oakeshott has been willing to admit, could certainly be as rationalist as Bentham (Hobbes 1991 [1651], pp. 192-3; Hobbes 1997 [1681]).

Oakeshott clearly kept his distance from the spirit of Hobbes’s political philosophy in emphasizing the importance of the diffusion of power as a precondition for freedom. Perhaps more surprisingly, considering his characterization of Bentham, Oakeshott would echo Hobbes in his own theoretical rule of law framework as formulated in a later essay, in which he argued that the authenticity of common law was de-
rived from the “sovereign legislative office,” and that its authority could not lie in its antiquity or its traditional acceptance (Oakeshott 1999, pp. 150-1). Oakeshott went so far as to call case law a “solecism.” For him, there could be no standard external to the office of the legislator that could determine the jus of the lex and consequently common law could not limit the sovereign legislature. In this respect, Oakeshott was clearly closer to Hobbes than to Edward Coke, according to whom common law could overrule statutes. At the same time, Oakeshott’s views are more compatible with the eighteenth-century common law authority Blackstone, who had sought to accommodate Hobbes’s absolutism within his theories of not only the common law but also the mixed constitution, by locating sovereignty unitarily in the king-in-parliament (see esp. Lieberman 1989).

Oakeshott argued in “The Political Economy of Freedom” that the libertarian tradition was poorly understood. The third part of On Human Conduct (1975)—building on his lectures on political thought delivered at the LSE in the 1950s and 1960s—can at least in part be read as an attempt to rectify this ignorance. There, Oakeshott outlined two distinctive ways of understanding the modern European state: as a civil association (or societas), in which those living under it are solely united by their recognition of the authority of the laws, or as an enterprise or corporate association (or universitas), whose members are united by a common purpose. He lucidly described a civil association as

an association, not of pilgrims travelling to a common destination, but of adventurers each responding as best he can to the ordeal of a consciousness in a world composed of others of his kind, each inheritor of the imaginative achievements (moral and intellectual) of those who have gone before and joined in a variety of prudential practices, but here partners in a practice of civility the rules of which are not devices for satisfying substantive wants and whose obligations create no symbiotic relationship (Oakeshott 1975, p. 243).

Though Part III of On Human Conduct was explicitly concerned with “the modern European state,” England’s potential distinctiveness as a societas is there described as an ambition of the Old Whigs (and some of their opponents), and a dream shared by Montesquieu and Jean-Louis de Lolme, who wrote about the English constitution in the eighteenth century. But the idea of civil association was something much broader. Crucially, Montesquieu described the modern monarchy as a mode of association which was purely legal and did not require any common purpose on the part of its individual components (ibid., p. 249). It was “pre-eminently human” and less demanding than associations with a common purpose, notably republics that depended on virtue. The modern European monarchy approximated the ideal of a legal association more than any other experience in human history. This experience was suitable for the moral disposition of modern Europeans, as it accommodated individuality. But it was not the only experience on offer in eighteenth-century Europe, and perhaps not even the most common one.

The understanding of the modern state as a societas coexisted and competed with another ideal type: the state as a corporate or an enterprise association, that is to say, a universitas. It emerged from the lordly projects of the Middle Ages, was theorized by Francis Bacon, and given force in a religious context by Puritans and Calvinists in England, Scotland, and Geneva, especially in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, Oakeshott singled out the philosophe movement in Paris as key, and as fundamentally at odds with the preoccupations with civil association of the Scottish Enlightenment, as well as German Aufklärung (ibid., p. 297). The crucial political movement for understanding the state as an enterprise was also German, however: Cameralism, the German science of administration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This science focused on the apparatus and bureaucracy required by the manager of the state understood as an enterprise. In Oakeshott’s narrative, the Cameralists pulled together various aspects of the European administrative state since the fifteenth century into a novel totality composed of boards, commissions, bureaux, research institutes, ministers, accountants, surveyors, and inspectors, all of whom collaborated “to draw up plans, to devise projects, to give managerial advice, and to implement the deci-
sions of the ‘rulers’” (ibid., p. 300). Thanks to the Cameralists, the characteristics of the modern, managerial state were thus already “half-revealed” in the eighteenth century:

substantial command over the resources of the state, including the energy and the talents of its inhabitants; the directions of productive activity controlled by agreements, subsidies, exemptions, licenses, penalties, man-power, budgets, or orders, etc.; full employment or a guaranteed income; taxation transformed into a means of acquiring direct control over a large part of a “national income” to be expended in favoured projects or distributed in the form of “truck” or notionally tied income; a so-called rising standard of life; a concern for compulsory generalized education and technological training; the status of “subject” receding before that of servant or pensioner of the corporation secured against debilitating vicissitudes of life; civil law receding before instrumental rules and the adjudication of civil disputes before the administration of instrumental rules and orders; the receipt of assured benefits taking the place of the pursuit of chosen satisfactions—all the lineaments of the Servile State (ibid., pp. 300-1).

In other words, the state had become a machine of political rationalism. Only England and Hanover—which were conveniently united after the Hanoverian Succession in 1714—remained relatively “untouched,” according to Oakeshott. For Montesquieu and De Lolme, this was due to constitutional mechanisms, but according to Oakeshott it was rather a result of the belief in civil association, theorized by Hobbes in England, and before him by Jean Bodin in France and Hegel in Germany, the latter being Oakeshott’s other major philosophical interest besides Hobbes (ibid., p. 301).

For Oakeshott, it was lordly engagement (or management) rather than absolutism that distinguished the European despot in the eighteenth century. Far from being citizens, the inhabitants of this modern, rational state were not even subjects: in times of war, entire populations were transformed into “servants of a compulsory corporate enterprise” (ibid., p. 305). In peacetime, the poor were made useful to the state through apprenticeships and thus turned into human capital. The children of the nation became its property, as La Chalotais contended in *Essai d’éducation nationale* (1763). When governments changed from lordly monarchs to representative republics, and factories replaced landed estates, little changed in the understanding of the state. Accordingly, democracy played no role in Oakeshott’s story of the modern state.

In 1961, Oakeshott published an essay on the fate of the “mass man,” entitled “The Masses in Representative Democracy,” which he “just forgot” to include in *Rationalism in Politics* (Oakeshott 1993, p. vii). In this essay, Oakeshott summarized a story similar to the one he had told in his Harvard lectures a decade earlier, and which looked forward to his grand narrative in *On Human Conduct* a decade later. The *individual* was a historical character who began to emerge in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, at the beginning of “modernity,” when the dissolution of the communal ties of the Middle Ages enabled the experience of self-determination in conduct and beliefs. Hobbes was the first philosopher to theorize the experience of individuality, and this is also the relevant context for Kant’s philosophy, which centered on recognizing each person as an end in himself (Oakeshott 1991, p. 367). However, alongside the individual emerged the anti-individual, the “mass man”, who was made uncomfortable rather than happy by the dissolution of the medieval community. Anti-individuals were not disposed to make their own choices, and needed a leader to lead them rather than a ruler enforcing the law. They were made for the “godly prince” of the Reformation, as well as the “enlightened despot” of the eighteenth century, since they wanted to *enjoy* rather than to *pursue* happiness. The idea of the state as a corporate association (*universitas*) spoke directly to their preference for security over liberty: when seen this way, the state responded to their needs, and, if necessary, guided their activity.

According to Oakeshott, the key gain in understanding the state as an enterprise association or a *universitas* was the enjoyment of assured benefits, but this came at the expense of both freedom and pluralism. One of the greatest benefits of understanding the state as a civil association rather than a corporate associa-
tion was that a societas can incorporate private associations of all kinds as long as they respect the authority of the laws of the respublica (Oakeshott 1975, pp. 265-6). As Oakeshott put it in his essay on the conservative disposition in *Rationalism in Politics*, being conservative in politics enables radicalism in all other spheres of human experience (Oakeshott 1991, p. 435). The enterprise state, by contrast, is not suitable for radicals but for people who “are disposed to prefer substantive satisfactions to the adventure and the risk of self-enactment.” (Oakeshott 1975, p. 276). In such states, individuality is mainly available for leaders.

We have to recognise that the essays in *Rationalism in Politics* and the book *On Human Conduct* are written in different voices; the former are more political with a clearer focus on England, whereas the latter is not only more philosophical but also about the modern European state as such. However, there is justification for juxtaposing Oakeshott’s writings from both eras. This is because there is an evident connection between English freedom as Oakeshott understood it and societas. Societas is a European idea—as we have seen, Bodin, Montesquieu, and Hegel are listed as theorists of societas along with Hobbes—but it is an English experience and tradition in a way that has never been the case on the continent. This way of life has been challenged since the days of Francis Bacon, but even though rationalism in politics had become increasingly dominant in the twentieth century, partly as a result of the world wars but ultimately as a consequence of much longer-term developments, it remained alive as an idea and as an ideal.

Many of a certain disposition—which some prefer to call conservative, others libertarian, and yet others simply liberal: terms without fixed and agreed meanings—will find the state understood as a civil association instinctively attractive and the purposive, enterprise state terrifying. It is not difficult to locate where Oakeshott stood on the question. Though the understanding of the state as a corporate, teleocratic association had made enormous advances in the twentieth century, Oakeshott hoped that the pendulum would swing back towards a civil association, which he defined as “moral” in the Kantian sense that it recognized the individuality of each of its members. But the point behind Oakeshott’s dichotomy of the state as civil or corporate association was not to suggest that this is a choice that we are, or have been, faced with. His point was rather that even though they are to a degree mutually exclusive, at least theoretically, the experience of the European state since the Middle Ages has involved a mixture of both. Moreover, they correspond to two distinctive parts of modern human nature: the individualistic and the collectivist (see also Oakeshott 1993). In the West, voters, leaders, and political parties continued to feel the pull of these two poles, and move between them. Even socialists remained wedded to the idea of individual freedom, in apparent contradiction with their views on a compulsory educational system and a planned economy (Oakeshott 1975, pp. 321-2, note).

Oakeshott’s contemporary Hayek—who also spent much of his career at the LSE, albeit in a different department (Philosophy rather than Government), and not contemporaneously with Oakeshott—wanted to distinguish the liberal or “Whig” tradition from the conservative in his famous essay “Why I am not a conservative” (Hayek 1960, pp. 343-55). Whether Oakeshott is better thought of as a liberal, a libertarian or a conservative has been heavily debated (see, e.g., Carrino 2022; Gamble 2012). Within the English political tradition, however, these terms did not necessarily represent different camps for Oakeshott as they did for Hayek. Indeed, the English libertarian in “The Political Economy of Freedom” has much in common with the conservative disposition in ‘Of Being Conservative” (1956). They were both attached to the state understood as a civil association, with the conservative disposition being described as

the propensity to make our own choices and to find happiness in doing so, the variety of enterprises each pursued with passion, the diversity of beliefs each held with the conviction of its exclusive truth: the inventiveiveness, the changefulness and the absence of any large design…And the office of government is not to impose other beliefs and activities upon its subjects, not to tutor or to educate them, not to make them better of happier in another way, not to direct them, to galvanize them into action, to lead them or to co-ordinate their activities so that no occasion of conflict shall occur; the office of government is simply to rule…The image of the ruler is the umpire whose busi-
ness is to administer the rules of the game, or the chairman who governs the debate according to known rules but does not himself participate in it (Oakeshott 1991, pp. 426-7).

James Alexander has argued that Oakeshott’s definition of “conservative” is so thin that it must be a trick (Alexander 2016, pp. 218-19). Read perhaps less rigorously and more charitably, and alongside On Human Conduct, it becomes more specific, however: Oakeshott’s conservative is someone who is suspicious of rationalism in politics, and concerned with conserving a libertarian heritage centered on the idea of the state as a civil association and the politics of individualism. Looking at Oakeshott’s post-war essays collected in Rationalism in Politics alongside his other works in this way challenges the idea that “Oakeshott’s political philosophy moves in a decidedly more liberal direction,” away from “conservatism,” in the period from the early 1950s to the mid-70s, as has recently been argued (Devigne 2012, p. 273). As late as 1978, Oakeshott believed that the Conservative Party was the British home for the understanding of the state as a civil association. His review of Conservative Essays (1978), edited by Maurice Cowling, further underlines his continued commitment to the English contribution to the notion of government as the custodian of a civil mode of association:

Such a view of the office of government, which owes perhaps more to the Whigs than the Tories, is deeply embedded in our constitutional arrangements, and it has never had any exact counterpart in Continental politics. But if it now has a home anywhere in our politics it is surely in the Conservative party (Oakeshott 2008, p. 281).

For Oakeshott, this conception of government ought not to be confused with laissez-faire, as he viewed the rhetoric about rolling back the frontiers of the state among Conservatives in the Thatcher era as “a near-disastrous blunder” (ibid., p. 282). The question was not about whether the state should be strong or weak, but rather about what it should do, and more specifically whether there was any space for managerial activity in a civil association. Famously, Oakeshott declined the offer from Margaret Thatcher to be made a Companion of Honour in 1981. Perhaps her Hayekian “rationalism,” small-state rhetoric, and propensity to centralize power in 10 Downing Street was not to Oakeshott’s taste. In any event, we can safely say that the idea of the state as a civil association and the conservative disposition in general have certainly not been shared by all Conservatives, either of the remote or recent past, or of the present. As illustrated by modern political actors such as Nigel Lawson and Dominic Cummings, Tory radicals are not just radicals, but also tend to be susceptible to the “infection of Rationalism.” For this reason, Oakeshott’s conservatism and criticisms of rationalism can just as easily be applied to the modern right as the modern left. It may be retorted that the right’s major problem today is populism rather than rationalism, but one only needs to consider Oakeshott’s distinctions between a ruler and a leader and between the individual and the “mass man” to recognize that this is not necessarily a problem separate from rationalism in politics.

NOTES

1 However, Leslie Marsh (2012) has shown this to be somewhat of a caricature of Hayek and that he and Oakeshott were in fact much closer philosophically.
2 On Oakeshott and Burke, see Devigne 2012.
3 On Oakeshott and Hobbes, see Malcolm 2012 and Tregenza 2012.
4 On civil association, see O’Sullivan 2012.
5 Lawson’s autobiography is entitled The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (1992).
6 The author would like to thank James Alexander, Robin Douglass and Janet Chan for feedback on earlier drafts of this essay. The usual caveats apply.
REFERENCES