

A Populist World Order? Origins and Predictions

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INTRODUCTION

Rising populism¹ is a global phenomenon. While many scholars have written about the foreign policy of individual populist governments,² fewer have asked how populist governments might collectively reshape the world order. This essay explores just that question, examining how populism is changing the liberal world order.

Populism is often thought of as a bottom-up phenomenon: some harm (e.g. trade shocks, austerity, immigration, or cultural change) makes people rise up and embrace populist candidates. Instead, I argue that populism is predominantly about some elites³ taking advantage of opportunity structures for power and profit. By highlighting stark distinctions between the people and elites (and anti-people), a subset of elites can craft a consistent electoral base allowing them to retain power with a smaller, but more loyal electoral base. Populists often exploit the tensions in liberal democracy between popular rule and the protection of individual liberties. The liberal world order's reliance on transnational and technocratic governance has amplified that tension, binding pluralist parties to defend unpopular and inscrutable policies. Populists, free from such constraints, can craft more durable political coalitions around smaller minimum winning coalitions.

As populists gain power, they are reshaping features of the world order. Partly this involves moving away from formal institutions, and toward those characterized by personal leader-to-leader connections. In addition, populist parties tend to endorse foreign policies that follow similar fault-lines to those they rely upon in domestic policy. Collectively, both features entail new forms and patterns of cooperation and conflict among states.

This paper proceeds first by discussing the nature of world order, and the growing literature on populism on the world stage. Next, I establish a model of populism as an elite-led phenomenon. Finally, use emergent evidence to gauge what a populist world order might look like. The focus of this piece is primarily directed at those states most deeply embedded in the liberal world order, i.e. those in Latin America, Europe, the United States.

WHITHER THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER?

What is the liberal order? International relations scholars have long discussed world order, which I understand here as: “the distribution of power and authority among the political actors on the global stage” (Falk 1999, p. 29). The liberal world order, then, might be understood as the rules

and institutions that have governed the international system since 1945.⁴ This definition is broader than some others, in that it makes no assumptions about the aims of the order, nor the precise actors within it.⁵ Differing accounts often discuss order in terms of their own preferred master variables. Structural realists⁶ argue that international system is anarchic and thus order reflects the relative power of actors in the system. Liberals⁷ emphasize the presence of well-designed institutions that promote cooperation. Constructivists stress norms.⁸ But these are arguments about the causes of order, not definitions.

How do orders change? Many schools of thought posit that order is provided by a single dominant “hegemon,” whose primacy enables it to escape insecurity.⁹ There are dueling accounts of the precise nature of hegemony. Various, the hegemon might be militarily dominant in a given region (Mearsheimer 2001), the country with the largest GDP (Organski and Kugler 1980), or the leader in technology and power projection capability (Modolski and Thompson 1996). In some accounts, hegemons provide public goods and global governance (Kindleberger 1973). Other works argue that hegemons operate in tandem with other actors, forming a dominant club of insiders driving global governance decisions (Kim and Gowa 2005; Bailin 2005; Lascurettes 2020). Indeed, a common challenge has been the tendency to speak of a European or western order as *the* world order.¹⁰ A common theme among these works is the idea that world orders rarely outlive the hegemons that create them. Moreover, because economic capacity diffuses over time, hegemons cannot sustain their power indefinitely (Gilpin 1981). Hegemonic decline, in turn, brings about a return of great power competition and the collapse of old orders. In such estimations, the liberal world order is unlikely to survive American decline.

Others see order as less dependent on hegemonic power. Some scholars argue that institutions and interdependence can facilitate cooperation absent hegemony. Keohane (1984), for instance, argues that rational, self-interested states can overcome the problems of anarchy by constructing institutions with a series of desirable features (e.g. lengthening the shadow of the future). Ikenberry (2001, 2011) argues that rational hegemons at the apex of their power create constitutional orders, anticipating future decline. In his view, a liberal world order can survive by offering fair rules to rising states, much as democratic constitutions ease transitions of power domestically.¹¹ Yet his thinking faces some internal tensions—it is a liberal vision that relies on hierarchical power at least initially (and potentially on an ongoing basis to sustain the order). Other liberal traditions posit different pathways to order. The commercial peace envisions economic interdependence overcoming conflict and forming a basis for cooperative interactions (Gartzke 2007). Others emphasize the domestic features of liberal states as being conducive to cooperation. This includes the august democratic peace tradition (Oneal et al 2003). Elsewhere, Deudney (2007) revives republican security theory, positing that there is an alternative to hierarchy and anarchy that he calls negarchy, in which actors bind themselves internally in order to avoid both the extremes of anarchy *and* hierarchy. For instance, he argues that the early United States was a negarchy, resolving the challenges of anarchy among American states in the Philadelphian system.¹² Yet others have pushed against the strict understanding of power as zero-sum. For instance, states might hold *structural* power because of where they sit inside networks of interactions, and not necessarily because of their capabilities themselves. Although material capabilities might diffuse, structural power could exhibit considerable path dependence.¹³

A third group of scholars examine questions of identity and legitimacy to understand order. For instance, Wendt (1993) argues that anarchy is what we make of it—our view of ourselves and others, formed inter-subjectively, shapes how world politics play out. Others fuse the role of power and institutions with questions about legitimacy. For instance, Ruggie (1982) describes the emergence of an international regime after the Second World War defined by “embedded liberalism”. Keynesian ideas encouraged states to reconsider the legitimate purpose of power. The emergence of neoliberal ideas, in turn, may represent a reconfiguration of that order (Blyth 2002). Even some classical realist accounts have sought to include such factors. For instance, Lascurettes (2020) describes world order as an order of exclusion. Leading states set the rules in ways designed to forestall potential future material or ideological threats. Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2020) describe the ideational challenges faced by the American-led hegemonic order as rising powers wield increasing influence inside the order, establish a counter-order, while also promoting counter-hegemonic

ideologies that exist inside the United States and its allies. Diversity may not always mean conflict, however. Drawing from a broader study of world orders (including many non-western cases) Reus-Smit (2018) argues world orders are primarily structures that manage cultural diversity. For instance, he argues the US-led order in Asia stitched together states, such as South Korea and Japan, with directly clashing cultural memories of the Second World War. Orders manage difference by suppressing some cleavages, while highlighting others.

Less discussed is the question of whether one can change orders by fiat. Hayek's (1978, pp. 35-54) distinction between naturally evolving orders (cosmos) and constructed orders (taxis) is useful in this regard. In his view, the latter model was ill-suited to complex systems, many of which find themselves embedded in other systems. In particular, Hayek distinguishes between law, which he sees as a set of rules evolved to guide human conduct, and legislation, the act of writing down those rules. Some international relations theorists see world order as a taxis—order depends on a singular hegemon, set of shared rules, or shared idea. For Ikenberry (2001, 2011) order depends upon a singular constitutional order with fair rules, in practice created by a hegemon after a major war. Yet there are many rich traditions, such as the commercial peace (Cobden 1878; Gartzke 2007), balance of power theory (Morgenthau 1978), or the English School of international relations (Onuf 2002) that see order emerging over time via complex interdependence and interactions. At times, the single-minded pursuit of a specific objective may undermine the underlying systems that made that project possible. For instance, it might be possible in the short-run for some hegemonic actor to promote liberal democracy by coercion, but one wonders how ongoing war-making might undermine democracy inside the hegemon (Deudney 2007, p. 56).

The law of unintended consequences may well apply to international order. The international system tends to be governed weakly by a single state, allied with a club of insiders that gain special privileges from their association with the leading economy. Dominant states often seek to elevate particular institutions and principles in order to justify that order. Political eco-systems often grow out of those orders, shaping national incentives—at times in ways the designers of the order might not anticipate. The evolution of the liberal world order offers a useful illustration. American representatives (e.g. Harry Dexter White) at Bretton Woods sought to use American power to establish an economic order of “embedded liberalism” that would protect workers from global economic fluctuations (Ruggie 1982). However, by the 1970s, the costs of maintaining that order (e.g. maintaining the gold standard) grew too great. Declining relative material American power in the 1970s, saw the United States move away from the world of “embedded liberalism”, toward a new, neoliberal world order, enhancing American *structural* power. In a world of free trade, the United States—by far the dominant naval and air power—enjoyed the ability to cut off others from the bountiful global commons (Posen 2003; Lee and Thompson 2017). In a world of mobile capital, American centrality within global capital networks offered it outsized influence.¹⁴ In a world of open migration, too, the United States could remain the leading global innovator despite having only a small fraction of global population.¹⁵

The recalibration of the liberal world order shored up American structural power, but increased flows of goods, people, and capital; their aftershocks, and the new institutions required to govern them created new political constellations. The move toward neoliberalism entailed longstanding fights against those interests that had benefited from embedded liberalism (e.g. organized labor and import-competing industries). Often, the successful implementation of neoliberal policies depended on political jujitsu that split older coalitions. This could be economic, such as with Thatcher's sale of council homes to residents, shifting many Britons into being homeowners, but also racial (e.g. dog-whistle rhetoric on the welfare state). Transnational bureaucratic governance was an important force in the diffusion of such policies as well, from developing countries reforming under IMF management to European Union members adhering to EU accession criteria. Clever use of two-level games could allow politicians to launder unpopular policies to technocratic agencies and even gain politically from backlash against them (Putnam 1988). For instance, British Prime Minister David Cameron simultaneously courted Euroskeptic voters with the promise of a Brexit referendum, while using the threat of secession to negotiate with the European Union. The problem was that these

clever plans to implement (neo)liberal policies often undermined the long-term basis of liberal politics by uprooting civil society groups, or by cultivating political coalitions with a distinctly illiberal turn.

Populist parties have surged by seizing the opportunity structures created by neoliberalism, and are now reshaping world order themselves. From a standpoint of hegemonic power, the global flows of goods, people, and capital that undergird American structural power have received the ire of populists of different stripes. Many populist leaders have advocated shifts in longstanding alliance structures—from Hugo Chávez’s formation of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) to Donald Trump’s musings about leaving NATO (Burnes and Cooper 2019). Most populist leaders have been critical of international institutions and global technocrats, from a left populist critique of the International Monetary Fund, to Euroskepticism among populist radical right (PRR) parties. Some have concluded that populist ire toward the liberal world order indicates that populists are simply destroyers of order. Such a view is myopic, however. Although populists chafe at the liberal world order, one can find regularities in their behavior on the world stage.

POPULISM ON THE WORLD STAGE

What do we know about how populists operate on the world stage? Most scholarship has been focused on the question of why people vote for populist parties. In part, this attention has reflected a notion of populism as an aberration. Often, scholars have debated whether cultural or economic anxiety is to blame has raged for years without a definitive answer.¹⁶ Relatively less attention has been paid to the question of how populists govern.¹⁷ This is a significant omission as populists have long featured in many political systems (e.g. France, Argentina, and Italy).

Recent works have brought greater attention to the role of populists in foreign policy. Many draw from the idea that foreign policy is shaped by the domestic ideology of the state (Rathbun et al 2016).¹⁸ Following the notion that populism is “thin-centered” some works argue that populism will follow its *thick* features. If true, populist parties of different ideological stripes should act quite differently on the world stage. For instance, Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) examine the role of the Lega Nord as a junior partner in the Berlusconi government, arguing that the Lega was not especially opposed to international cooperation, when cooperation fit its core goal of reducing migration. Similarly, Coticchia and Vignoli (2020) compare foreign policy votes by the right-wing Lega Nord with the more ideologically ambiguous Five Star Movement (M5S), finding a considerable gap in most areas apart from migration.

Other works argue that the features of populism itself are also important. For instance, Destradi and Plagemann (2019) explore whether populists are more likely to provoke conflict, weaken international institutions, centralization and personalization of foreign policy, looking at the foreign policies of a number of populist leaders. They argue that populist leaders tend to centralize international decision-making, amplifying shifts toward a more multipolar international system. Other works stress ways in which populist leaders seek to emphasize populist themes in foreign policy, fomenting a sense of crisis, picking external conflicts that their preferred frame of “the people” versus “the other”, and general disdain for international law (Leslie 2017; Hall 2021).

Whatever the goals of populist parties, they must weigh those goals against domestic and international constraints. For instance, some scholars have looked at the role of populist parties inside coalition governments, finding that even when they disagree with their partners on larger questions, populists do not cause the collapse of the government over foreign policy issues (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 2018). In a similar illustration of the primacy of domestic politics, McDonnell and Werner (2020) look at the formation of party groups inside the European Parliament by PRR parties. They explain the persistence of three different populist groupings in EU parliament. In their view, the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (which included the British Conservatives) was a “respectable marriage” legitimizing populist parties in their home countries for electoral advantage. However, the maintenance of respectability required the bloc not to admit more controversial parties. The European of Freedom and Direct Democracy was a “convenient marriage” consisting of divergent parties—the United Kingdom Independence Party and

the M5S—in search of the institutional advantages of being a larger party. Only in the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) was a “marriage of love” among PRR parties that genuinely wished to advance a larger populist project.

Similarly, populist parties navigate an international system that may enable or limit their freedom of action. Many great powers promote friendly ideologies in order to pursue their goals. Some great powers may view populists as better partners than their pluralist counterparts. Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted populist parties when their euroskepticism aligned with his strategic goals (Polyakova 2014; Chryssegelos 2017). Nexon and Cooley’s (2020, pp. 137-158) similarly examine China and Russia’s promotion of counter-order movements as part of a larger attempt to reshape world order. Putin was happy to engage with organizations like the World Congress of Families bringing together right-wing activists around the world to engage in activities like framing, shaming, naming, and pressure politics discussed by scholars like Keck and Sikkink (1998). However, China and Russia have also promoted left-wing populist regimes at times. For instance, both provided aid to Venezuela and sought to uphold the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro, the successor of Hugo Chávez, in the face of competing claims of legitimacy from Juan Guaidó (Herrero 2019). External factors can also constrain opportunities for populists. For instance, Sagarzazu and Thies (2019) examine how the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Chávez depended on high oil prices.

At times populist leaders do not just navigate constraints, but reframe the foreign policy landscape. For instance, Boucher and Thies (2019) examine the social network of Trump tweets and retweets on trade. Populist frames figured highly in the tweets by the cluster of Trump supporters. Indeed, this might explain the dramatic shifts in voter attitudes toward trade within the United States following Trump’s entry into the 2016 Republican primary. Republicans shifted from leaning towards free trade to endorsing protectionism.¹⁹ Of note, the effects of populism are not limited to supporters. Opponents of the populist leader may oppose policies specifically because the populist leader supports them. For instance, Democrats increased their support for free trade as Trump campaigned against NAFTA. Nor are these effects confined to the originating country. Boucher and Thies (2019) found that a number of pro-Brexit accounts also frequently retweeted Trump. Foreign policy may not always flow smoothly from abstract beliefs or national interests, the polarizing impact of populism may align voters (populist and non-populist alike) primarily on the basis of whether a given issue is for or against the populist leader. For instance, Hanania and Trager (2020) found American liberals and conservative views on humanitarian intervention depended greatly on the identity of the perpetrators and victims, and how they mapped onto American politics.²⁰

While extant works have done a good job of exploring the foreign policy of individual populist parties, recent years have seen the simultaneous rise of *many* populist governments. The presence of many populists may surpass critical thresholds that change the way world politics operate. A single state operating in a system where most other states has opposed ideologies (e.g. Revolutionary France, the Soviet Union pre-1945, and post-1979 Iran) will face significant limits on its action. However, when many states share a common ideology, they can command collective weight, construct favorable institutions, and legitimize their core ideas.

POPULISM AS AN ELITE-LED PHENOMENON

Populism often confuses scholars. While populists frequently argue that politics should follow the popular will, they understand democracy differently from most contemporary democratic theorists. Populist leaders are not simply listeners-in-chief, rather, they seek to rhetorically embody the people as *Vox Populi* (Urbinati 2019). Strikingly, the forums that populist leaders create to “express” the will of the people—from Trump’s Twitter account to Beppe Grillo’s blog to Chavez’s *Alo Presidente*—generally lack a means for popular input beyond popular acceptance of the themes embodied there. Even where populists create such mechanisms, the result is often wanting. For instance, the Rousseau voting system was often manipulated by leaders to influence the outcome (Mosca 2018).

Since populists often fail to follow the will of the people, some scholars have instead focused on the “thick” aspects of populism (Art 2020). Yet populist leaders are notoriously inconsistent in their political beliefs. Viktor Orbán entered politics as a liberal, before embracing an agenda of *illiberal* democracy (Lendvai 2018, pp. 9-24). Argentina’s Justicialist Party was a somewhat pro-worker populist party under the Peróns, a neoliberal populist party under Carlos Menem, and finally a pink tide populist party under the Kirchners (Finchelstein 2019, p. 102). Before governing as a tax-cutting president, Donald Trump had floated a Reform Party presidential run with a platform that featured a 14.5% wealth tax (Hirschhorn 1999). The thick element of populism is rather thin.

Populism is not about the people, and it is only secondarily about “thick” agendas. Rather, populism is about *interests*. It is a strategy adopted by some elites to exploit the tensions within liberal democracy in order to gain power and its attendant benefits. Selectorate theory is useful for understanding the political problem of liberal democracy combined with transnational technocratic governance (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Broadly speaking, governments serve the interests of the selectorate—the group of people necessary for a government to take office. In an authoritarian regime, the selectorate might be quite small (e.g. the military and a few regime insiders). In a democracy, the selectorate is larger, entailing at least a substantial plurality of voters. Policies that benefit only a narrow group (e.g. rent-seeking) are more difficult to implement in such an environment.

But liberal democracies are not *only* democratic. They also uphold the rule of law and the protection of basic rights of citizens and non-citizens even against majority will. Norms of forbearance between parties, too, might limit the scope for political action, at least among pluralist parties committed to liberal democracy.²¹ Practical considerations limit majority rule as well. Certain functions, from the judiciary to central banks might be better performed with an arm’s length from political control to avoid political business cycles or self-dealing. At times such bodies may even be transnational, further limiting the influence of ordinary citizens.²²

Although citizens are the only ones empowered to decide who rules, leaders committed to liberal democracy must also serve the interests of non-citizens, bound to honor international agreements, or to adhere to the monetary policy selected by independent central bankers. In other words, liberal democrats are bound to do things that are unpopular—to serve interests that are outside the selectorate. Populists can often craft more politically compelling programs by attacking those policies that reflect international compromises, the inscrutable decisions of experts, or unpopular judicial defenses of individual liberty.

What do populist programs look like? Populists craft a vision of “the people” that excludes large swathes of the electorate. This is clearest for PRR parties whose vision of “the people” implies the legitimacy of some ingroup, and the illegitimacy of various outgroups. Left-wing populists may not be as exclusive, often drawing on the poor for support. However, they often denounce their political opponents as fundamentally illegitimate. For instance, when Bolivian President Evo Morales, he attacked them as inauthentically indigenous (De la Torre 2017a).

Populist leaders reap political benefits by attacking both domestic and international institutions that pluralist politicians are bound to defend. As a result, voters will increasingly associate pluralist parties with technocrats, elites, and the anti-people. Mass clientelism—emphasizing economic policies that redistribute resources to supporters while excluding opponents—is one avenue by which populist leaders can craft durable political coalitions (Müller 2016). For instance, let us contrast the economic bargain offered to voters by neoliberal and PRR parties. The former urge voters to support free market policies—some on the basis of direct benefits (e.g. tax cuts), but also others on the basis of positive spillovers (that will benefit non-supporters too). In contrast, by dispensing with universal access and embedded international institutions, PRR parties can offer more targeted benefits—welfare chauvinism for ingroup members or targeted protection for workers in strategic areas (e.g. Donald Trump’s efforts to push China to purchase American soybeans) (Swanson and Rapoport 2020). Moreover, populists can adopt more efficient coalition-building strategies because they are less constrained, appealing to groups of single-issue voters with stances on social

issues that violate liberal norms, the rule of law, or international law. In some cases, these positions involve shrinking the electorate further by disenfranchising portions of the electorate.

Why build a small winning coalition? Following selectorate theory, a smaller base of support gives elites more leeway. Absent restraints, elites aligned with the populist party are freed up to engage in rent-seeking. Understanding populism as a means to expand rent-seeking opportunities inside a democracy can help account for a stylized fact about populism that other approaches cannot: populist regimes are uniquely corrupt even by the standards of their own countries, and certainly in direct contradiction to populist rhetoric. Critically, populists are often successful at rent-seeking *without* experiencing significant political consequences.

Hungary's Viktor Orbán is an illustrative case,²³ Explicitly advocating a vision of *illiberal* democracy,²⁴ Orbán's rule is characterized by rhetoric distinguishing “the people” from elites and the anti-people. This involved appealing to Hungarian irredentism (e.g. invoking the Treaty of Trianon) and attacks on Muslims, the Roma, or anti-semitic allusions to the power of financier George Soros.²⁵ In office, Orbán administered an agenda of welfare chauvinism—mixing heterodox and orthodox policies so as to favor supporters and exclude opponents. For instance, he nationalized the pension fund, while imposing special taxes on foreigners (Szrika 2014). However, supporters of the regime were often shielded from austerity. For instance, Orbán eliminated taxes on women with more than four children, arguing that doing so would reduce Hungary's reliance on Muslim immigration.²⁶ Simultaneously he subsidized firms associated with his party as part of an effort to create a “patriotic cohort of entrepreneurs.”²⁷ Institutions critical of the government often found themselves under attack—Central European University was even forced to relocate to Vienna.

Although a full accounting is beyond the scope of this paper, similar stories abound for other populist leaders—including Donald Trump,²⁸ Italy's Silvio Berlusconi,²⁹ Lega Nord leader Umberto Bossi (Brechenmacher 2017). Austrian Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache (Scheutze 2019), extensive pursuit of Russian assistance by PRR parties,³⁰ Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro,³¹ (Corrales 2020), the Kirchners in Argentina,³² Rafael Correa (Cabrera 2020) in Ecuador, and Evo Morales (Lehoucq 2020) in Bolivia. The point is not that populists alone are corrupt, but that the ways in which they reshape politics facilitate corruption with fewer political consequences because of their reliance on a smaller deeply committed base, as opposed to a broader less intense one. Armed with a model of populism, let us turn to the world stage.

A POPULIST WORLD ORDER

While numerous works have examined populist foreign policy, none has examined what would a populist world order look like. Populist parties themselves present conflicting visions—from the Chávez's anti-neoliberal ALBA,³³ to the hypercapitalist Singapore-Upon-Thames of the Brexiteers (Baker and Lavery 2018). From the Front National's “Euronat”³⁴ to the M5S's visions of cosmopolitan direct democracy.³⁵ Despite these stark contrasts there are common themes.

Let us focus on two important aspects of world order. First, world orders differ in their reliance on formal rules. While the current liberal world order is strongly formal, less formal rules can also provide the basis for order (Lascurettes 2020, pp. 20-22). Would a populist world order rely primarily on more or less formal rules? Second, as both Reus-Smit (2018) and Lascurettes (2020) note, an important aspect of a world order lies in the forms of diversity and types of conflict that the order suppresses or elevates. For instance, the Liberal World Order sought to suppress fascism and communism (Lascurettes 2020, pp. 173-178). What patterns of cooperation and rivalry would a populist order suppress or elevate?

To answer these questions I turn to what is fundamental to populism. Populists take power by elevating a binary distinction between “the people” and elites/anti-people. Their aim is to stay in power, while maximizing rent-seeking opportunities. I contend that populists on the world stage benefit by developing informal, personalistic connections over formal ones in order to maximize rent-seeking opportunities, and secondly, that they seek to heighten those distinctions that correspond with their definitions of “the people”

and the elite/anti-people. Each of these features are summarized below in **Table 1.1**. Let us take each point in turn, with a particular focus on PRR parties in the United States and Europe, and Latin American populism.

Table 1.1: Forms of Cooperation across different world orders, 1944-

	Embedded Liberal World Order (1944-1971)	Neoliberal World Order (1974-2018)	Populist World Order (2019-)
International Institutions	Formal	More formal	Less formal
Patterns of cooperation	Regime type	Commercial	Civilizational (PRR) or South-South

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The liberal world order operates through formal organizations with specialized, professional bureaucracies. This alphabet soup of organizations includes the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, the European Union, the WTO, and the G-7. Simultaneously, the United Nations offers a second layer of technocratic global institutions that are more inclusive but hamstrung by internal division. The emphasis on formal rules and technocratic governance is not an accident—such structures can increase interstate cooperation even in the face of the prisoner’s dilemma.³⁶ Rule-based systems are a natural way to try to uphold universal human rights and comprehensive frameworks for global commerce. Such organizations are not without biases—insider states (e.g. the United States and its core allies) receive favorable treatment in global governance,³⁷ and bureaucrats represent a powerful interest unto themselves.³⁸

Although democratic publics might like the outcomes produced by the rules-based world order, its processes are inscrutable to most. Consider the response of the Federal Reserve to the crises of 2008 and 2020: the Fed created swap lines to provide other countries with dollars as needed, while also engaging in quantitative easing to provide liquidity to the global financial system (Helleiner 2014). Few voters understand monetary policy,³⁹ and few seem inclined to cheer the idea of unelected central bankers seemingly sending billions of dollars to foreigners. At times, international and bureaucratic channels are employed specifically *because* they can enable governments to do unpopular things. International institutions enable governments to delegate decisions, while also laundering blame (Putnam 1988). Scholars of the European Union are well-acquainted with the ritualized dance by which leaders delegate difficult decisions to the European Council, and then complain about the results (Goodhart 2007). The rise of populism itself owes itself in part to the discrepancy between notions of popular rule and the practice of transnational governance. The liberal international order relies on rational-but-inscrutable actions that are easy targets for populists (Pevehouse 2020).

There are good reasons to believe that populists will pull back from engagement with formal international institutions, particularly where such engagement requires the creation of bureaucratic specialists. The vast majority of successful populist parties are hostile toward multilateralism.⁴⁰ For instance, in the 2019 Global Party Survey, major⁴¹ populist parties around the world averaged a score 2.8 out of 10 in their attitudes toward multilateralism (zero indicating strong opposition, and ten indicating strong support) (Norris 2020).

Rather, personal diplomacy offers significant advantages to populist leaders. One-on-one meetings between populist leaders (or affiliated elites) and foreign actors can enable some bargains that formal negotiating processes would ordinarily exclude. Most importantly for populist leaders, personal diplomacy offers

them the possibility of expanding the agenda to include their personal political and financial interests. On the political side, populist leaders can take direct credit for outcomes, particularly if they occur amidst the spectacle of global summitry.

Populist governments on the world stage often push against formal global governance. The Trump presidency offers some of the clearest examples. Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate agreement (Friedman 2019), refused to staff the World Trade Organization (Swanson 2019), abandoned the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (Baker 2019), and pulled out of the World Health Organization amidst the COVID-19 pandemic (Hinshaw and Armour 2020). Although Trump backed away from more extreme ruptures (e.g. leaving NATO or abandoning NAFTA) he levied tariffs on friend and foe alike (Swanson and Austen 2020). It is difficult to square these moves with the American national interest. For instance, tariffs on intermediate goods produced by close trading partners like Canada raise production costs for key American industries.

Despite his antipathy to formal institutions, Trump was not against negotiations when they benefitted him politically. For instance, in negotiating a pause on the trade war with China, Trump insisted that China directly purchase soybeans, crops grown in politically important American states (Swanson and Rapoport 2020). So important was this deal to Trump, that he avoided criticism of China early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Trump's border agreement with Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) allowed Trump to shift some of the political challenges of immigration enforcement to Mexico (Agren 2020). Informal deals with authoritarian leaders abroad enable populist leaders to give up policy concessions for politically or personally beneficial gestures. Jared Kushner's gulf state diplomacy is a notable example. Kushner negotiated the normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, just before the 2020 election, while the Trump administration pushed for the sale of advanced F-35 fighters to the UAE (Mazzetti and Wong 2020). Such informal, unenforceable agreements do not always deliver, however, and may push populist leaders to become apologists for authoritarians abroad. For instance, President Trump and North Korean President Kim Jong Un made an agreement that entailed North Korea ceasing long-range nuclear tests. When North Korea carried out short-range nuclear tests soon after, President Trump downplayed the violation, arguing that Kim wouldn't "want to disappoint his friend, President Trump" (Salama and Jeong 2019).

For European PRR parties, hostility to the European Union is a uniting factor. The most obvious case of this is in Britain, where Euroskeptics pushed the governing Tories into holding a referendum on EU membership. In Italy, Lega leader Matteo Salvini similarly campaigned as a Euroskeptic. As the Lega and M5S negotiated a coalition government, Salvini wanted the author of a plan for an Italexit as his economy minister (Fabbrini and Zgaga 2019). In France, Marine Le Pen also expressed support for a "Frexit" (Le Pen 2016). Yet international institutions sometimes present opportunities to populists. As McDonnell and Werner (2020) note, different PRR parties engaged in diplomacy inside European parliament, with some parties forming alliances in order to maximize resources (the EDD), or to gain legitimacy (the ECR), or to advance a populist vision of Europe (the ENF). More recently, many PRR parties have opted for the latter route. For instance, Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen recently met to attack the "ideological brutality" of the European Union amidst criticism of democratic backsliding in Hungary.⁴² At times, the PRR has also sought to use other institutions to accomplish its policy goals. For instance, Salvini once called on NATO to help Italy deal with flows of migrants. In other words, in instances of common strategic goals (e.g. overcoming *cordons sanitaires* against PRR parties) or shared policy goals, PRR parties often cooperate inside institutions.

Left-wing populists are suspicious of the Bretton Woods institutions they see as tools of American capital. Hugo Chávez paid off Venezuela's debts early and left the IMF (Swann 2007). Similarly, Rafael Correa expelled the World Bank country director for Ecuador upon taking power.⁴³ At times, populist leaders have even undermined their domestic agendas in pursuit of international autonomy. For instance, AMLO largely avoided passing stimulus measures during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pérez 2020), fearing the sovereignty-reducing impact of a debt crisis.

Yet opposition to the Bretton Woods institutions does not imply opposition to all formal institutions. For instance, Chávez launched ALBA and the Bank of the South. In practice, however, these institutions did not alter existing patterns of economic interaction. ALBA members predominantly consist of raw materials exporters—there are limited prospects for trade along comparative advantage lines. The Bank of the South, in turn, has yet to be capitalized.

Initially, high oil prices funded Venezuelan petro-diplomacy, diffusing the “Bolivarian” political model. Chávez funded candidates in other Latin American countries, promoted civil society organizations, created informational systems (e.g. Venezuelanalysis), and provided loans of oil to other countries through Petrocaribe (De la Torre 2017b). However, Venezuelan largesse dried up when oil prices fell. Rather, it may be more useful to see ALBA as an epistemic community through which populist leaders in Latin America collectively approached policy challenges.

One way Latin American populists have found an alternative to Washington-led institutions was through less formal interactions with China. China often provided large loans to Latin American countries, with few explicit strings attached. Chinese aid (Dreher et al 2018) and foreign direct investment from China’s state-owned enterprises⁴⁴ follows political patterns, requiring that recipients take particular stances (e.g. not recognizing Taiwan). However, many populist governments might prefer those stances anyway, as they help lock in their pivot away from Washington. Some evidence suggests that Chinese aid promotes corruption (Brazys et al. 2017; Isaksson and Kotsdam 2018). This too seems unlikely to deter rent-seeking leaders. Just as countries have long attracted foreign aid by adopting institutions complementary to American legal norms, the rise of China as a donor and investor creates a similar impetus for states able to join the transnational networks that define China’s business elite (De Graaf 2020).

In short, most populists exhibit an antipathy to formal multilateral organizations. At times this antipathy is related to the “thick” ideological commitments of populist parties, for instance, PRR opposition to cosmopolitan institutions and left-wing opposition to pro-capital institutions. Although populists sometimes cooperate inside formal institutions, their common goals are often limited, and the results are lacking. Populists have broadly favored personal diplomacy over formal technocratic governance, because it enables them to take credit for positive developments, while also bringing their personal agendas to the bargaining table.

PATTERNS OF COOPERATION AND RIVALRY

A populist world order would also entail different patterns of international cooperation and rivalry. The Cold War saw cooperation follow ideological lines, with democratic/capitalist states forming one bloc, and communist states forming another. The neoliberal era, in turn, saw greater cooperation along commercial lines transcending ideological divides. I predict two outcomes in a populist world order: greater interstate cooperation along lines corresponding with populist distinctions between “the people” and elites, and secondly, greater authoritarian-democratic cooperation at the elite level. Let me turn to the logic of each, providing examples of these emergent phenomena.

Governments of all political stripes use foreign policy to tie future governments to their preferred political policies.⁴⁵ The most critical element of populism is the ability to slice the electorate into two distinct groups. Since PRR parties often draw an ethnic distinction between the people and elites/anti-people, they have strong political incentives to align with states with similar ethnic ties, and against states whose populations consist of outgroup members and institutions tied to cosmopolitan elites. For left-wing populists, “the people” are the poor, and the “elites” are the forces of global capital. Populist governments often advocate alignment strategies corresponding with these ideas, albeit subject to constraints (e.g. interest group pressure, national interest considerations).

PRR parties have aligned and balanced along the fault-lines they wish to heighten at home. In the west, that has often entailed alliances with majority-white countries, while invoking rivalries with majority-Muslim countries. The Russophilia of PRR parties is a striking example. Russia is not an obvious strategic ally

to the west—it is a declining petrostate with goals that threaten the sovereignty of Eastern Europe. Russia is also allied with China, a country frequently cited by PRR rhetoric as a threat.⁴⁶ However, numerous PRR leaders openly advocate pro-Russian policies. During his 2016 primary run, Trump questioned whether the United States would intervene in the case of attacks on NATO allies, while musing about closer relations with Russia (Sanger and Haberman 2016). When Trump was constrained in pursuing this course of action by the near-universal opposition of the defense establishment, he instead reframed America’s existing alliances along civilizational lines. For instance, in a speech discussing America’s commitment to defend Poland, he made frequent references to Poland as part of “our civilization” and went on to say the following:

What we have, what we inherited from our — and you know this better than anybody, and you see it today with this incredible group of people — what we’ve inherited from our ancestors has never existed to this extent before. And if we fail to preserve it, it will never, ever exist again. So we cannot fail.⁴⁷

ENF members in EU parliament have consistently favored a pro-Russian foreign policy, despite inconsistencies with their prior positions. Even Eastern European states threatened by Russia have seen instances of populist Russophilia.⁴⁸ The Bulgarian populist party Ataka threatened to leave a coalition government if Bulgaria endorsed sanctions against Russia (Polyakova 2014), and Victor Orbán’s Russian-friendly attitude is well-documented (Hopkins, Peel and Foy 2019). Although PRR Russophilia is partly instrumental—the Kremlin has actively sought to support Euroskeptic parties—the fact that Russia represents a conservative, white-dominated European country fits into PRR conceptions of ingroup and outgroup. Political scientists would do well to understand the ways that authoritarian regimes too can exercise soft power (Cooley 2015).

Alternately, a proposal to create CANZUK (a trade bloc including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain) is one project of post-Brexit British populists (Bell and Vucetic 2019). The idea of uniting the white dominions evokes nostalgia for the British Empire, and could reconcile the desire to create Singapore-Upon-Thames with the hostility of some Brexit supporters toward migration and trade. Simultaneously, by deepening economic ties other than EU-UK ones, such a move could forestall later efforts to rejoin the EU.

PRR leaders also invoke rivalries that highlight the ingroup-outgroup distinctions that run through their politics. In the United States and Europe this has often meant invoking civilizational conflict (Huntington 1993; Coker 2018). Anti-Muslim policies and rhetoric feature prominently. One of Donald Trump’s first acts as president was a ban on immigration from six majority Muslim countries (Shear and Cooper 2017). Despite his own ostensibly anti-interventionist inclinations, he also played up the conflict with ISIS, and the rivalry with Iran—launching missile strikes on Iranian general Qasem Soleimani (Crowley, Hassan and Schmitt 2020). Notably, by targeting individual Muslims and the state of Iran, Trump was able to both reap the political benefits of stoking anti-Muslim sentiments while simultaneously engaging in profitable personal diplomacy with Iran’s gulf state rivals. Trump’s tenure was also characterized by hostility toward China, including the launch of a trade war against China, and hostile rhetoric attempting to blame China for the spread of COVID-19 (Restuccia 2020). In Italy, Salvini takes a similarly hostile line toward China, describing China both as a security threat and an economic one.⁴⁹ In France too, Marine Le Pen has called for greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific region to counter a rising China (Pene-Lassus and Shiraishi 2021).

The civilizational logic of the PRR does not always exclude non-white regimes, however. India, a country with a long-standing rivalry with Muslim Pakistan and neighboring China, looms more positively in populist rhetoric. For instance, as Boris Johnson’s government called for deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific highlighting the importance of the UK-India relationship (PMO 2021). For his part, Modi has been increasingly open to closer ties with western states, as he confronts a rising China. He and Trump enjoyed warm relations and a complementary style (Menon 2020). And his shifts away from India’s pro-Palestinian stance,⁵⁰ may enable deeper ties with pro-Israel PRR leaders.

In contrast, left-wing populists have tended to favor south-south cooperation both via organizations like ALBA but more importantly through engagement with China and Russia. For instance, the tenure

of Rafael Correa saw 90% of Ecuador's oil exports flow to China (Alvaro 2011). China, in turn, provided Ecuador ample credit, a hunger for natural resources and also Chinese surveillance technology (Mozur, Kessel and Chan 2019). The Maduro regime is an even more direct case of left populist orientation toward China and Russia. Faced with crashing oil prices, Maduro attempted to pay for Chávez era policies via monetary policy, resulting in hyperinflation (Pittaluga et al. 2021). Economic difficulties soon became political ones as Maduro faced a constitutional crisis. While China and Russia continue to back Maduro, the United States and its allies support the claim of opposition figure Juan Guaidó. Chinese and Russian support has enabled Venezuela to continue exports of oil, even in the face of US sanctions (Corrales 2020).

New patterns of engagement between leaders are important, not only materially but because of how they reshape norms and ideas. The spread of populism has created a great populist laboratory—populist leaders can observe how different frames sink or swim abroad. Simultaneously, populist governments can coordinate deliberately, legitimizing one another. For example, when Donald Trump advocated the use of hydroxychloroquine as a cure for COVID-19, he was joined by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro (Casarões and Magalhães 2021).

The interactions of populists and non-populists can also serve populist interests. Populists and authoritarian leaders may share attitudes about the restraints imposed by the liberal world order. This can include both the restrictions of global technocracy, but also liberal norms about human rights. For instance, when Donald Trump announced that he would consider rocks thrown by asylum-seekers as weapons, the Nigerian Army—under criticism for killing 42 protestors—happily posted Trump's speech on their Twitter account (Segun 2018). Much as Kim and Sikkink describe transnational activist networks overcoming blockages at home, populist leaders can work with leaders of countries with weak institutions to manufacture political realities. President Trump's attempt to press Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (or his oligarch backer Ihor Kolomoisky) to investigate his political rival, Joe Biden is a signature example (Becker, Bogdanich, Haberman and Protes 2019).

The landscape of a populist world order might well involve the strange combination of stark interstate rivalry, at times softened by personal business ties between leaders. Shared offshore accounts between elites in rival states might represent one way that conflicts could be papered over. Typically, IR theory has explored the idea that interdependence will lead to peace from the standpoint of the nation-state, but the question of whether inter-elite economic interdependence can also forestall war has not received scholarly attention.

CONCLUSION

World orders are characterized by a marriage of power and norms about the legitimate purpose of the state. The rise of numerous populist parties inside the liberal world order is reshaping the present world order. Domestically, the modus operandi of populist parties is to promote a Manichean division between the virtuous people, and corrupt elites (or associated anti-peoples). The liberal world order has given populists no shortage of opportunities to make this argument, by relying on modes of transnational governance that are inscrutable to the public, or inclined to defend unpopular policies. In practice, the aim of populists is often to craft political coalitions that are large enough to win but small enough to overlook rent-seeking. When populists turn their attention to the world stage, it is primarily for two purposes: to heighten the divisions that animate their politics, and to expand the opportunities for rent-seeking on the world stage.

Populists seek a world order defined by personal leader-to-leader interactions, and less by a rules-based order. If successful they will reshape world politics. For instance, the maintenance of economic globalization depends in part on institutions aimed at say, overcoming prisoner's dilemmas and solving public goods problems. Simultaneously, less formal cooperation opens up new opportunities for cooperation that transcend geopolitical fault-lines. The leaders of two rival states, might share personal financial interests. Many authoritarian regimes, and particularly China also contain networks of actors who conduct politics in a

compatible manner to populists. International relations theorists need to do more to understand personal connections and how they impact world politics.

Simultaneously, populists often seek to raise the salience of their preferred distinctions between “the people” and everybody else. Here, right and left-wing populists each have a different set of natural friends and enemies. PRR parties have often viewed Russia as a natural ally, with China and the Muslim world as natural foes. In contrast, left-wing populists have emphasized south-south cooperation, and hostility to the United States. Inter-populist and populist-authoritarian dialog can reshape the bounds of legitimacy within the world order, while introducing new ideas into public discourse.

Some may object that populism is just a flash in the pan. Italy’s M5S-Lega coalition government soon broke apart. Donald Trump lost the 2020 election. The populist-friendly Austrian Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz dropped his populist coalition partners following the Ibiza scandal, before resigning himself. In Orbán’s Hungary, opposition parties formed a united front against Fidesz. The days when Venezuela’s Bolivarian revolution was a polestar to emulate are gone. Yet, populist parties endure inside the liberal world order. Populists made significant gains in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Despite Trump’s defeat, the American Republican party appears strongly committed to Trumpism—House Republican Conference Chair, Liz Cheney, lost her leadership position after challenging Trump’s account of the 2020 election (Edmondson 2021). Much as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system reshaped the liberal world order, populism in the 21st century is doing the same thing.

NOTES

- 1 Populism is notoriously difficult to define, but much current work by political scientists uses the minimal definition of Mudde (2004, 2007). Populism is a thin-centered ideology that starkly divides the populace between the “virtuous” people and “corrupt” elites, emphasizing that the popular will should drive policy. Populism itself is often a vessel for other ideologies, which could be on the right or the left. In addition to being opposed to “elitism” the emphasis of the people as singular clashes with pluralism (Müller 2016). “The people” could be defined in ways that are more exclusionary (e.g. ingroup members), or more inclusionary. Frequently, populists also attack non-elite “anti-peoples” (e.g. unpopular outgroups) as being corrupted by elites (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Debate continues over the relationship between populism and democracy. Some argue that populism is good for democracy (Laclau 2005), others that it undermines the institutions that shore up political equality (Urbainati 2019). See also Finchelstein (2019).
- 2 See Chryssegolos 2017, Destradi and Plagemann 2019.
- 3 By elites I mean a broad grouping that includes leading politicians, heads of government agencies, business leaders, labor leaders and also the leaders of consequential mass movements.
- 4 I leave open the question of whether the liberal world order is desirable, or even whether it is particularly liberal. For instance, Pabst (2018) argues explicitly that the present world order is illiberal.
- 5 For instance, Bull (1977, p. 8) argues for a purposive definition of order, entailing a host of goals including the sustenance of the goals of the society of states, the protection of state sovereignty, and the minimization of interstate violence.
- 6 For instance, see Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981) and Mearsheimer (2001). Note that classical realists also emphasized the role of power in international relations, but saw leaders as exercising agency inside a system. See, for instance Carr (1939), Morgenthau (1978), Kissinger (2014) and Lascurettes (2020). Neoclassical realists, in turn, bring factors like domestic politics into the equation. See Rose 1998.
- 7 For liberal visions of order, see in particular Keohane (1984) and Ikenberry (2001, 2010).
- 8 See Wendt (1993, 1999). English school approaches also emphasize the role of norms, albeit alongside coercion and other forces. For instance, Buzan (2004) recast the English school as a structural theory, with a synthesis between English school ideas and constructivist ones. See also Goh (2013) and Reus-Smit (2018).
- 9 Many classical realists differed, viewing a multipolar system as preferable, for instance see Morgenthau (1978).

- 10 For instance, the present liberal world order contains a set of more inclusive institutions (e.g. the United Nations) and more exclusive ones (e.g. the Bretton Woods institutions). Some scholars have argued that these are complementary parts of the same order (Ikenberry 2001, pp. 107-114), while others disagree (Lascurettes 2020, pp. 173-178).
- 11 For a structural realist critique of the idea of liberal hegemony see Mearsheimer (2018).
- 12 See Christensen (2020) for a proposal for a version of interstate federalism using the Philadelphian system as a model.
- 13 For instance, see works on financial power including Strange (1990); Oatley et al (2013); Cohen (2018); Norrlof et al (2020).
- 14 See, for instance, Helleiner (1996); Oatley et al (2013); Lee (2020).
- 15 Foreign-born individuals represent 37.8% of all science and engineering workers requiring a doctorate (NSF 2020).
- 16 Arguments emphasizing economic globalization, austerity, or neoliberal policies as driving populism include: Colantone and Stanig (2018), Rodrik (2021), Brown (2019), Majlesi, Dorn and Hanson (2020). Works emphasizing cultural anxiety include Goodwin and Milazzo (2017); Sides, Tesler and Vavreck (2019); Norris and Inglehart (2019); Kaufmann (2019) and Fording and Schram (2020). For a more mixed view, see Howell and Moe (2020).
- 17 See Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015.
- 18 see Chrysogelos (2017) for a summary.
- 19 For instance, see Jones 2017.
- 20 The piece does not explicitly look at the effects of populism, but was contrasting conservatives and liberals during the Trump presidency. Similarly, Hanania (2021) finds that voter attitudes toward accepting refugees are mitigated considerably by the partisan leanings of those refugees.
- 21 See Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018.
- 22 See Goodhart (2007) and Brown (2019). Indeed, many of the key neoliberal and ordoliberal thinkers whose ideas are reflected in the present world order were cognizant of these tensions. See Hayek (1944) and Nientiedt and Köhler (2016).
- 23 Some might object that Orbán has a *large* minimum winning coalition—he has at times won a majority of the vote in Hungary. The stark divisions Orbán has emphasized within Hungarian politics enable him to maintain office (and even implement constitutional changes) while cutting the opposition out nearly entirely.
- 24 See Orbán 2014. See also Uitz (2020) for a discussion of Orbán’s systematic constitutional changes.
- 25 See Lendvai (2018, pp. 111-125, 195); Forman 2018.
- 26 See Walker 2019.
- 27 This is a quote by Fidesz ideologist Andras Lanczi. See Buckley and Byrne 2017.
- 28 Wee 2018. See also Abutaleb and Paletta (2021, pp. 193-210) on irregularities in PPE procurement.
- 29 See McNally (2016, pp. 979-982).
- 30 See McDonnell and Werner (2020, pp. 211-213).
- 31 See Corrales 2020.
- 32 See Manzetti 2014.
- 33 See Attar and Miller 2010.
- 34 See McDonnell and Werner (2020, pp. 32-33).
- 35 See Casaleggio Associati 2008.
- 36 See Keohane 1984.
- 37 For instance, see Busch and Reinhardt 2000; Kim 2008; Copelovitch 2010; Kim 2010; Young 2012.
- 38 For instance, see Buchanan and Tollison 1984; Barnett and Finnemore 2012.
- 39 For instance, a recent survey of Dutch households found that the average person scored below 5/11 in a quiz of knowledge about ECB objectives (see Crujisen et al 2015). Considering that some may have guessed correct answers, this speaks rather dimly of public knowledge.

- 40 The 44 populist parties holding at least 10% of the seats in their respective legislatures averaged a score of 2.8/10 (0 indicating strong opposition to multilateralism, 10 indicating strong support) in terms of their attitudes toward multilateralism (Norris 2020).
- 41 Defined as those parties holding at least 10% of the seats in their respective legislatures.
- 42 France24, En Hongrie, Marine Le Pen fait bloc avec Viktor Orban contre l'Union Européenne. October 26, 2021, <https://www.france24.com/fr/europe/20211026-en-hongrie-marine-le-pen-fait-bloc-avec-viktor-orban-contre-l-union-europ%C3%A9enne> <Accessed November, 2021>.
- 43 Ecuador expels World Bank representative. April 26, 2007, *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ecuador-worldbank/ecuador-expels-world-bank-representative-idUKN2644851220070426>
- 44 See Stone et al (2021) for FDI.
- 45 See, for instance, Narizny 2007.
- 46 Orbán is a notable exception.
- 47 Cited in NBC News. "Here's the Full Text of Donald Trump's Speech in Poland," July 6, 2017, *NBC News*. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/here-s-full-text-donald-trump-s-speech-poland-n780046> <Accessed July 2021>
- 48 One notable exception is Poland's Law and Justice Party.
- 49 See Verbeek and Zaslove 2015.
- 50 See Blarel 2020.

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