

The Persistence of Nationalism in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: This paper aims to explain the persistence of nationalism in the Czech Republic and its political consequences. I argue (a) that the persistence can be interpreted as a matter of culture and cultural history is thus capable of explaining this phenomenon over various historical periods—from the 19th century, over the communist dictatorship to the present time; (b) that narrowly defined culture in the form of folk art, literature and science carried nationalistic features and developed into commonly shared values, habits, attitudes, i.e. broadly defined culture; and (c) that these shared values contain common understandings of various political concepts, such as democracy, state, etc., and if the formal institutions are to be aligned with the culture, they should also bear these specific cultural features. This brings political consequences which are addressed in the second half of the paper.

1. INTRODUCTION

“It’s the culture, stupid!”, Steve Pejovich (2003) argued when trying to explain the differences in the results of the transition from communism to market democracies of various Central and Eastern European countries. I will demonstrate that the persistence of nationalism can also be understood as a matter of culture. I use culture narrowly defined (folk art, literature and science) as a starting point and show how it developed into broadly defined culture, i.e. commonly shared values, habits, attitudes, values or prejudices. Not only do they govern the interactions between people within a specific group but also between various social groups. Culture became identical and commonly known through the process of socialization by which it is unified, maintained and communicated.

Once developed, unlike other social institutions, culture persists over time, changes less frequently and evolves rather spontaneously (Williamson 2000, pp. 597–598). Moreover, as James Scott puts it, culture is an important component of what he calls *Mētis* (Coyné and Boettke 2006, pp. 54-55) which also includes skills, norms and conventions. Since it is “common knowledge”, I would also add that it includes a common understanding of various concepts, such as democracy, state, etc. *Mētis* as such provides the knowledge necessary for individuals in various social groups to coordinate around specific aims and ends. In addition, *Mētis* has to be aligned with formal institutions otherwise they will fail. In this paper, I try to explain how nationalism became a part of the Czech culture and how it was

preserved over time. In this respect, the relation of culture (in the narrow and the broad sense) as a component of *Métis* to the organization of state and political institutions, is of high importance because nationalism is interlinked with other phenomena like populism leaning towards authoritarianism (Bieber 2018, p. 522). In other words, if formal institutions are to be aligned with culture, they should also bear specific cultural features. This conclusion brings political consequences.

Of course, the debate on nationalism is global. For example, Hazony (2020, p. 1) discusses the turn towards nationalism in Britain and in the United States. He claims that while many people are worried about this development, nationalism has some virtues too. This is, of course, informed by his understanding of nationalism as the opposite of imperialism and globalism (Hazony 2020, pp. 3, 6). In his view, the nation is a natural grouping of several tribes with a common language, religion and history of *acting as a body*. He even claims that the ideal of the national state is promoted in the Bible, and that the members of a nation should regard one another as brothers (Hazony 2020, pp. 18-19, 225-226). In contrast, liberal theories cannot provide any sense of nationhood, while he insists that “each of us in fact wants and needs something else in addition; which I suggest we call collective self-determination: the freedom of family, tribe; or nation. This is the freedom that we feel when the collective, to which we are loyal, gains in strength; and develops those special qualities and characteristics [...]” (Hazony 2020, p. 9). While nationalism should be a *natural position*, according to Bieber (2018, p. 537), there is no clear evidence that nationalism is on the rise globally despite the fact that there are many countries where we can observe the rise of nationalistic politics expressed by the rise of new nationalistic parties, the success of nationalist candidates or the shift of public discourse established parties.

Whether on the decline or on the rise, it is not my ambition to elaborate on the world-wide level of nationalism. Rather, I focus on the causes and mechanisms of the persistence of nationalism. I will try to illustrate this mechanism using the example of the Czech Republic, the former Czechoslovakia and Czech lands. However, this mechanism might be potentially applied to other post-communist countries because the formal institutional framework imposed by the Communist parties in the Eastern bloc affected informal institutions and culture (in the broad sense). The relation between cultural nationalism and communism will be discussed in Section 3, but simply said, the argument emphasizes the collectivist nature of both nationalist and communist culture. In this respect, a cultural argument might be developed for example in the case of Poland, where Jaroslav Kaszynski promoted the collectivist “Christian nationalist” value system (Magyar and Madlovics 2020, pp. 65, 190). In Hungary, the rise of nationalism is usually understood as a consequence of the Treaty of Trianon (Magyar and Madlovics 2020, p. 596), but it might have deeper causes. There is also potential to study Ukrainian nationalism which is often discussed with reference to the 2022 Russian attack. While it is usually argued that the motto “Glory to Ukraine” has its origins in Stepan Bandera’s nationalistic movement, its origin is in the 19th century cultural sphere (see for example Shevchenko 1860). Slovaks, as explained by Hilde (1999, p. 649), understand themselves as an interdependent cultural unit from Czechs. Moreover, the proposed historical-cultural mechanism can be potentially used for the explanation of nationalism within so called “collectivist” societies or countries (today’s developing countries). As Greif (1994, p. 913) explained, the structure of such societies is segregated in the sense that individuals socially interact mainly with the members of a specific ethnic, religious or familial group. These societal structures reflect specific cultures (Greif 1994, p. 914) and thus provide potential topics for further historical-cultural analyses.

The proposed mechanism should also be able to explain the political consequences observed in the past, which have persisted until the present day. When talking about past political consequences, I would especially point out the forming of the independent Czechoslovak state after 1918 and then the fall of the democratic regime in 1948. Of course, I am aware that the mechanism is not the only one that can explain the aforementioned historical events, but it brings a deeper understanding of these events. The same applies for current events; consider the recent debates over Czech nationality and whether it should be returned back to the constitution as a state-building principle or not. I will also elaborate on the observations outlined in Bieber (2018, p. 537) in the Czech Republic, especially the latest trends in the 2021 election with an

emphasis on the shift of the public discourse of established parties and the rise of new nationalistic parties. Moreover, the global Covid-19 pandemic and the increased anti-foreigner sentiments could play an important role here (Bartoš, Bauer, Cahlíková and Chytilová 2021, p. 10).

2. NATIONALISM AND CULTURE

The Czech National Revival movement in the 19th century is a natural starting point for the study of the roots of Czech nationalism. In this section, I will describe how Czech culture was intentionally built and promoted. Quite paradoxically, the Czech National Revival movement followed German philosophy and culture. Johann G. Herder's ideas played a crucial role here. In his understanding, culture is always a national culture and as such, culture is the framework of all the values; it is *Volkgeist*—the spirit of the people. But, what creates *Volkgeist*? In Herder's opinion it was folk literature, poetry and other forms of folk art (Blažke 1999, pp. 29-30) that gave rise to this phenomenon. Inspired by Herder, the Czech National Revival relied on collecting folk art and creating a positive image of Czech history and a well-developed culture.

In the first wave of the National Revival (turn of the 18th/19th century), authors focused primarily on the defense of the national language by trying to show that the Czech language and its expressive abilities were comparable to other languages of nations with 'developed' culture. These authors wrote mostly textbooks and dictionaries, for example: *The Defense of the Slavic languages (especially Czech)* (1775) written by Bohuslav Balbín; *The History of the Czech Language and Literature* (1792) and *Grammar Textbook of the Czech Language* (1809) by Josef Dobrovský; *The History of the Czech Literature* (1825) and *Czech-German Dictionary* (1839) by Josef Jungmann. As Rádl (1909, p. 522) explained, the emphasis on language led to debates as to whether there is also a specific Czech culture and Czech science. "Czechness" was equal to "Czech language" which meant common history and roots. Both culture and science were *organically* connected with language and history. The German *Naturphilosophie* played its role here as well. While in Germany there was an attempt to Germanize Latin scientific terminology, there were similar attempts in the Czech lands. "National life was resurrected via science; while poets wrote about scientific mysteries, scientists like Purkyně¹ wrote poems", Rádl (1909, p. 529) ironically commented on the first wave of the revival movement. It is also worth mentioning that Purkyně used Darwin's work to explain the animosity between Czechs and Germans. In addition, another biologist Frič studied "Czech biology".

In later stages of the National Revival, these ideas were preserved, but the authors focused more on creating a positive picture of Czechness. In fact, it did not matter whether this picture was true or false. For example, Jan Kollár, one of Herder's followers, tried to create a picture of peace-loving Slavs that was obviously false. He also expected that Czech/Slavic culture would become the Europe-leading culture and "its science and folk culture would be popular from the Elbe to the Seine" (Kollár 2011, p. 47). According to Blažke (1999, p. 73), Kollár's ideas became the leading ideas of national collective memory/culture. In trying to build collective memory, his work was more history-oriented. Černý (1995, p. 19) understood his approach as "one huge historic nostalgia" rooted in the Czech feeling of inferiority. In addition to Kollár's picture of peace-loving Slavs, František Palacký, another one of Herder's followers, described the "Slavic spirit" as a "spirit of democracy" (Havelka 2001, p. 36). How this idea of a democratic spirit affected the presidents of independent Czechoslovakia will be shown later.

The democratic spirit and the peace-loving culture were not the only ideas that were preserved in the Czech intellectual environment. For example, Josef Kajetán Tyl also emphasized social aspects in his drama *John Huss* (1848). It did not matter that the drama was not historically accurate (Novák 1946, p. 234), but Tyl was able to present Czechs as radical democrats in the socialistic understanding of this term. This means democracy was not meant only as a political system; but economic too; including the democratization of property, for example. In this respect, John Huss was later pictured as the first Czech socialist/communist.

1 Physiologist, anatomist, biologists.

The continuity of democratic-nationalistic-socialist ideas in Czech culture are quite visible. Of course, it is necessary to understand the mechanism of how these ideas were preserved.

From what has already been said, the transmission mechanism starts with the intentional building of national culture and science. At this stage, I refer to culture in the sense of various forms of art, especially literature, poetry and plays. However, these artistic forms intentionally bore specific values in order to raise national awareness. Thanks to the intentional, everyday exposure to these ideas and values (in schools and public events), these ideas and values became culture in the broadest sense: shared knowledge, beliefs, values and attitudes. I especially want to emphasize the understanding of democracy which was embedded within the National Revival movement, explained in *organistic* terms under Herder's influence. Moreover, consider Tyl's drama, *John Huss*. Not only did it bear democratic-nationalistic ideas, it emphasized social questions as well. Later, John Huss's movement became a symbol of socialistic-nationalistic-democratic values of the Czech people not only by democratic parties; but by the communist party as well.

While the National Revival played a crucial role in establishing "national ideology", the ideology was fully politically utilized after the birth of the independent Czechoslovakia in 1918. In the following sections, I focus on the nationalistic ideas in Czech thinking as well as the political consequences of the post-war periods (1918-1938; 1945-1948). The emphasis will be focus on the ideology promoted by the first Czechoslovak president Masaryk and his successor Beneš. They intentionally sought to create a convincing popular narrative explaining the past (with the emphasis on the Czech relation to the Germans) and linking it to the building the post-war states, the new, 'purer' nation states (Wingfield 2000, p. 246).

3. NATIONALISM AND THE BIRTH OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE (1918)

The First World War and the fall of the Austrian Empire in 1918 led to the declaration of Czechoslovak independence and the creation of a new state. Despite the fact that we can hardly talk about a nation-state at this point, there were attempts to create an illusion that Czechoslovakia was somehow homogeneous. Firstly, Edvard Beneš (1918, p. 12) tried to downplay the issues with minorities claiming that there were 12 million Czechoslovaks in the newly created country. In fact, the official statistics were very different. According to the statistics from 1921, there were 13,6 million inhabitants in Czechoslovakia of which 6,79 million were Czechs, 1,97 million were Slovaks and the rest of the population were minorities, mostly of German nationality (Hájková and Horák 2014, p. 301). Secondly, the fact that there were almost 3 million Germans in the former Czech lands (without Slovakia) led to the need to create the idea of "Czechoslovakism", legitimizing the joint state of Czech and Slovaks and to define the relation to the German minority (Hudek, Kopeček and Mervart 2019).

Addressing the "Czechoslovak nation" for the very first time, President Masaryk defined the relation to the German minority as follows: "When talking about Germans in our countries, our program is well-known—the land inhabited by Germans is our land and will remain ours [...]. I repeat, we created our state and defined the legal status of our Germans which originally came to our country as colonists" (quoted in Rádl 1928, p. 205). While the basic rights minorities were protected, their participation in the organization of public life was limited. In other words, the legal and political system prevented "the tyranny of the majority" but definitely did not, and could not, solve the deeply rooted antagonism between Czechs and Germans (Rákosník and Noha 2012, pp. 219-221).

President Masaryk's statement illustrates quite well how the concepts of nation and nationality were transformed into the concept of state. It can, of course, be understood as a political consequence of culture since nationalism was an integral part of narrowly conceived (literature, science) and broadly (*Métis*) conceived culture as described above. In this cultural setting, there was almost no distinction between nation and state which can be illustrated via Czech antagonism towards Germans.

3.1. German Origins of Czechoslovak Animosity Towards Germans and Their Political Consequences

From the political proclamations made by top politicians like President Masaryk or Edvard Beneš, it seemed there was an unbridgeable gap between Czechs and Germans. Martin Myant (1981, p. 7), a Scottish historian, described the new Czechoslovakia as an “Anti-German State” because of the intellectual direction set by first two presidents Masaryk and Beneš. According to both Masaryk and Beneš, to be a Czech was the antithesis to being a German. Moreover, there were specific values hidden behind the concept of “Czechism” and “Germanism”. While “Czechism” represented positive values, such as social progressivism, a democratic way of life and the rule of reason, “Germanism” represented the ideal of *junker* capitalism, imperialism, rule of sentiments, etc. (Brenner 2015, p. 195).

The aforementioned perception of Germans was based on the “official” interpretation of Czech history created mainly in the National Revival period and politically utilized after the creation of the independent state, but even in the very first Czech-written chronicle from the beginning of the 14th century, *The Chronicle of Dalimil*, there were strong cultural-nationalistic tendencies and elements of anti-Germanism. It is important to note that there were three versions of the chronicle—Latin, German and Czech. The characteristic feature of the Czech version is its understanding of “foreigners”, which differs from the Latin and German versions. “Foreigners” are interpreted only as Germans, but, even more importantly, this term only refers to Germans living and coming to the Czech lands as colonists; not Germans living in Germany or anywhere abroad (Uhlíř 2015, pp. 13-14).

According to the “official” history, this perception was also preserved during the period of Charles IV (1316–1378), John Huss’s era and all the oppression by Germans which culminated after the Battle of White Mountain (1620) when Germans/Habsburgs took control of the Czech lands (Uhlíř 1944, pp. 5-7). John Huss’s era also played a crucial role when forming Czechoslovak democracy after the birth of the state. The Hussite movement was interpreted as the precursor of people’s democracy, and the creation of the independent state in 1918 and also in 1945 understood as its restoration.

A crucial point of this official history was that the Czech-German animosity was not caused by oppression during their shared history but by the *innate instincts* of both Czechs and Germans (Beneš 1916, pp. 2-3). In other words, as explained by Presidents Masaryk and Beneš, the official history claimed that the differences and animosities are given by nature, i.e. by different nationalities.¹ Especially Edvard Beneš’s explanation of the concept of Nation is worth mentioning. I am intentionally using Masaryk and Beneš as examples since their ideas had real effect upon the policies of Czechoslovakia and thus “normalized” these ideas. Moreover, both became personified symbols of the independent state.

On Beneš’s understanding, when studying nations and nationalities, we have to start with racial issues. In his own words, “the basis for all national differences and nationalities is always race” (1909, pp. 1-2). To be more precise, the nation is formed by the blood-kinship starting with the family. As the family distended and personal ties weakened, tribes were created. And all tribes from the original family created a *Nation* (Hájková and Horák 2014, p. 98). Beneš continued his argument by mentioning that this knowledge of kinship and blood-relation is always supported by other features: members of a nation understand each other, due to the same language. To sum it up, the (natural) nation was interpreted by the blood-kinship with the common external sign in the form of a language. Of course, as Beneš realized over the course of history, no natural nation preserved its pure form. During the interaction of natural nations, so-called *artificial* nations were created. These artificial nations were represented not only by features like race and language; but also by shared history in the form of habits, traditions and national culture. While the identification of the members of natural nations is quite simple, the identification of the artificial nations has to be recognized via sentiments. In other words, the questions “Am I Czech?”, “Am I German?” or “Am I Jewish?” can be answered only via a sense of affiliation to a specific national culture (Beneš 1909, pp. 1-2). This does not mean that one can choose their nationality freely. As Beneš claimed, “In every case, we cannot talk about Czech Jews, German Jews, etc. [...] Everyone can only be either a Jew or Czech. I am either Czech with all my sentiments and existence, or I have remains of Jewishness and then I am not a Czech” (Hájková and

Horák 2014, p. 82). Moreover, according to Beneš, there was no culture other than national culture and only through the nation does culture become humane (Kessler, Pehr and Vašek 2015, p. 73). The strong elements of cultural nationalism are clearly visible.

Up to this point, I've only addressed the general concepts of nations and nationalities as explained by Czech leaders. The real issue here is that these concepts were also applied to the concept of the State. "The nation and the nationality are huge spiritual and cultural values and untouchable factors of modern state life and statesmanship [...]," Beneš (2005, p. 66) explained the role of nationality in the concept of the State. It is also important to note that Beneš admitted that Czechs adopted the concept of the relation of culture, nation and the state from Herder, who influenced the Czech National Revival as mentioned above.²

The blurred concept of the Nation and the State will be analysed in the next sub-section.

3.2. Nationalism and the Concept of Democracy

In the previous section, I explained that the basis of Czech animosity towards Germans was deeply rooted in the Czech concept of nation and culture. It is quite anecdotal that these concepts were mostly influenced by Germans, and therefore the Czech animosity towards Germans was of German origin. This is illustrated by Czech historian Jan Tesař (2014, pp. 144-145) who ironically summarized Czech animosity towards Germans during World War II the following way: "The Czechs hated the Germans not as the representatives of the occupational regime, as oppressors, Nazis and Henleiners, but simply because they were Germans."

In this section, I elaborate briefly on the relation between the concept of nation and democratic state because there is, of course, different versions of the concept of democracy. Various states can be considered as democracies, but the organizational principles may differ.

The constitution usually sets the fundamental principles of State organization and determines how the State is governed. The original Czechoslovak constitution can be used as an example of deeply rooted ethnic nationalism. When writing the Czechoslovak constitution, the original idea was to use the basic principles of the constitution of the United States of America, but there are significant differences even in the preamble. While the American constitution emphasizes the general ideals of justice, defence and welfare for all people, the authors of the Czechoslovak constitution were not able to transform these ideals into the Czechoslovak constitution. The famous "We, the People of the United States [...]" was replaced by phrase: "We, the Czechoslovak Nation, in order to strengthen the perfect unity of the Nation [...]" (Rádl 1928, p. 100). According to Rádl, even President Masaryk, recognized as a great humanist, was under the influence of so-called tribal nationalism. Let us recall his statement in which he claimed that "this land is ours". Moreover, he understood the State as the "uniformed organism with one (Czech) language". These principles were, according to Masaryk (1930, p. 528), the best expression of democracy. In other words, the State was the "Czechoslovak state" only for "Czechoslovak nationality" which arose from two tribes—Czechs and Slovaks. For all other nationalities, it was not possible to be an integral part of the national state although they were allowed to be minorities within the State. Rádl summarized that tribal nationalism was much stronger in Czechoslovakia than in Germany because the Czechs were not able to distinguish between the Nation and the State (Rádl 1928, p. 100). When using Czechoslovak historical terms, one needs to distinguish between American democracy, which was based on *contractual principles* (i.e. *contractual democracy*) and Czechoslovak democracy, which was strongly influenced by German democracy based on the *organismic principles* (i.e. based on ethnicity and national culture).

There were, of course, political consequences both during the First Republic and during the period after World War II (so-called Third Republic). Right after the birth of the State, the debate about the rights of minorities took place. While Woodrow Wilson's famous principles of national self-determination were commonly accepted, there were several exceptions for the German and Hungarian minorities living in Czechoslovakia. For example, the Prime Minister Karel Kramář claimed that he fully respected self-determination according to national principles, but these principles could not apply to Germans because they were "only colonists" (Peroutka 1991a, p. 305). The famous Czech journalist, Ferdinand Peroutka (1991b, p.

707), argued that the limitation of the German right to self-determination was necessary due to economic reasons. Since Germans, as a minority, had their own state right next to the Czechoslovak state, self-determination was understood as a threat to the Czechoslovak economy. Moreover, Edvard Beneš and Rudolf Bechyně (a social-democratic politician), argued that the self-determination of the Germans would be unjust because their position and economic wealth was created by the Czech proletariat. A similar position was taken by President Masaryk (1930, pp. 703-704, 825-826). He added that the limitation of self-determination of the German minority was a matter of “historical rights” (Masaryk 1930, p. 525). On the other hand, when arguing against the self-determination of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, Masaryk and others were using natural rights arguments (Peroutka 1991b, pp. 706-707). Finally, it was admitted by President Beneš that the Czech “immaculate democracy” was not always fair to minorities (Kessler, Pehr and Vašek 2015, pp. 14-15).

Quite paradoxically, the aforementioned approach turned against the Czechs as well. During the Czechoslovak census of 1921, citizens had to choose their nationality, but the term nationality was not clearly defined. There were Czech-born citizens who self-determined themselves as Germans because their husbands/wives were German. They were speaking German at home and their kids could speak German better than Czech. However, the census commissioners did not accept such answers and these people were sentenced to prison for “lying” that they were German or selecting an “inappropriate nationality” (Kladiwa 2014, pp. 89-116). When preparing the census, there was an agreement to determine the nationality via native language, but there was a change in the very last moment stating that the nationality should be determined “directly” (without a clear definition of what “directly” means). Language was still understood as the main feature of nationality. This fact led to confusion and some people thought they could freely select any nationality they preferred. The disputable cases were decided in many ways by the census commissioners and the courts, but the decisive principles were of ethnic and racial origin. For example: 1) who speaks better Czech than German is Czech; 2) who was born to Czech parents is Czech regardless the language; 3) if the father is German and mother Czech, the children are Czech; 4) anyone with a Czech-sounding name is Czech; 5) physical appearance matters—there was a difference between a Czech and German “face”, etc. (Rádl 1929, pp. 47-48).

Moreover, Czechoslovak ethnic nationalism turned against Jewish citizens as well. In both the first and the third republics, the Jews were understood to be bearers of foreign culture and a threat to the national revolution and the national state (Strobach 2015, pp. 68-76). While after the First World War the major threat was seen as Jewish bolshevism, right after World War II, Jewish citizens were associated with a German type of capitalism. As Brenner (2015, pp. 167-168) explains, there was something like a parallel between the words “German—Jewish—capitalist” after World War II. During the periods after both wars, the aim was to eliminate all possible undesirable threats to national culture and in this respect, Jewish loyalty to the Nation and the State was perceived as rather low (Frankl and Szabó 2015, p. 123). For example, when discussing the restitution of Jewish property after World War II, the communist minister Nosek expressed himself as follows:

Not only will we deal with the enemy who harmed and destroyed our Nation in cooperation with Hitler, but we will also deal economically with those who subverted our national existence through the Germanization and similar acts, even though they did not cooperate with the Nazis. [...] Some of them were imprisoned because they were of Jewish origin and therefore also suffered under the Nazi terror, but we must also examine how these individuals behaved during the (first) republic, and if they Germanized or supported German schools, their property should belong the State and therefore must be confiscated (Brenner 2015, pp. 167-168).

Sergej Ingr, a minister in Beneš’s London government in exile, had a similar approach. On the one hand, he would allow Jews to move back to Czechoslovakia, but on the other hand, he would not allow access to their properties confiscated by the Nazis (Němeček et al 2014, p. 475). According to general percep-

tion, the Jews could not contribute to rebuilding the Czechoslovak state after World War II because they were just traders of dubious morality. Moreover, that someone was imprisoned in a concentration camp did not automatically indicate that he/she was a State-reliable person (Němeček et al 2015, p. 783).

Czechoslovak nationalism also had its “economic” features as well. Right after World War II, there was a consensus of opinion that Czechoslovakia should find its own specific brand of socialism. Even the Communist Party, closely cooperating with the Soviet Union, refused, at least officially, a simple overtaking of the Soviet experience with Marxist socialism. On the contrary, the Communist Party agreed that Czechoslovakia should choose its own national way (Marjinová 1997, p. 455). They even tried to convince people that the Communist Party followed up Masaryk’s humanitarian and democratic principles (Rataj 2003, p. 23). Klement Gottwald, a communist leader, claimed that the first post-war task was to complete the national revolution, not the socialist one (Gottwald 1949, p. 382). This illustrates just how deeply Masaryk’s ideas were rooted in Czechoslovak society, so much so that even the Communist party could not reject these ethnic-nationalistic tendencies.

President Beneš and his Czech National Socialist Party also followed Masaryk’s legacy. The party’s programme was based on the so-called inseparable trinity—Socialism, Nation, Democracy (Kuklík 2010, p. 283). One of the party members, František Kovárna, emphasized the role of the Nation in the future socialist development in Czechoslovakia. “We are not praising nationalisation as nationalists but as progressive socialists who know that the path to humanity is inseparable from the Nation and only via Nation it is natural and fruitful” (Kovárna 1946, p. 9). Moreover, fully in line with President Masaryk, President Beneš also understood nationalism as an “antechamber” of humanity and freedom (Hník 1946, pp. 89, 104). While the party agitated for socialism, they refused Marxism partially because of Marx’s German nationality. As Petr Zenkl, the leader of the party, reminded: “The Czechs basically have to decide between two types of socialism—between Marxism and [Czechoslovak] National Socialism. Marx was of German origin and what remained from his teaching is still close to the German soul” (Zenkl 1946, p. 1; see also Osuský 1925, pp. 30-31).

What is even more important is that President Beneš and the Czech National Socialist Party underestimated the economic problems of socialism simply because they just believed that the specific national characteristics of the Czechoslovak people were fully sufficient to make socialism viable.³ Brenner (2015, p. 100) summarized that the socialism of the Czech National Socialist Party was something like an *organistic fantasy* (using Rádl’s term)—Czech society freed from national enemies, social injustice, and ideological fragmentation. Their ideal of national homogenous commonwealth was deeply rooted in the 19th century’s nationalistic-psychological debates about the characteristic features of the Czech nation.

It is also important that Klicperová and Feierabend (2007, pp. 125-126) claim that ethnic nationalism, which was characteristic of Czechoslovakia, was incompatible with a democratic system. While I have interpreted the failure of Czechoslovak democracy as an issue of the incompatibility of the political (democratic) system with the economic (socialist) system (Nikodym 2020), my claim can be supplemented by Klicperová’s analysis. In this sense, it might be understood as one of the political consequences this paper deals with. To be more precise, I do not claim that it was only ethnic nationalism that was responsible for the fall of the democratic regime in 1948. My point is rather that these were the specific features of Czechoslovak democracy and its *organistic* understanding, which undermined democratic principles. While ethnic nationalism could not be responsible for the fall of the post-war democratic system on its own, it can be understood as one of the small pieces which led to the destruction of democracy. As explained by Rádl (2003, p. 100), for example, ethnic nationalism and its principles are not compatible with individual liberty and its intellectual principles, which are overlapping with the democratic principles in modern understandings of the term. These are mainly an individual’s independent mind, freedom of choice and conscience. In an *organistic democratic* state, these principles are suppressed in the name of the affiliation to the nation and the individual is defined only by this affiliation, as seen by the quote below:

Freedom! Freedom! Three hundred years of chains are broken, people shouted in the streets and read in the news. Three hundred years of the nation's bonds, the nation's freedom...what is this Nation? A natural force? National instinct? The heritage of ancestors? And lost in this freedom of nation, man wanders [...] freedom of the nation! Be it, but what about your own freedom? Freedom of your neighbour? Didn't you forget it? (Rádl 1928, p. 101).

This quote illustrates the suppression of individualism, the lack of confidence, the submissiveness, and the commonly shared belief that the world is ruled by effects outside the individual's own will and control. This is also in line with so-called "totalitarian" and "post-totalitarian syndrome" which was, according to Klicperová-Baker and Feierabend (2007, pp 71-72), typical for the Czech society during the communist and post-communist period—but I argue that it is actually a syndrome of the collectivist culture. One of the features of both syndromes is generalized distrust and the lack of commonality outside one's own social group. Moreover, one of the crucial features of post-totalitarian syndrome is the very simplified understanding of the world which leads to populism, xenophobia and strengthened nationalism.

4. COMMUNIST REVOLUTION: BREAKING THE CHAINS WITH THE PAST?

It might seem, at first sight, that the communist revolution simply meant to interrupt the continuity and set a new path for development of the country. In the communist revolution in Czechoslovakia of 1948 that was not that case: the ethnic/cultural nationalistic features rooted in the culture are of a collectivist nature. The same applies to communist ideology. In this respect, Rádl's aforementioned quote is quite important because it indicates the position of the individual within the State organized on *organic* principles. The individual is defined by an affiliation to a nation which is the highest principle in the organization of social life. As already mentioned, according to President Beneš, this affiliation cannot be denied by the individual because these features are given by nature and culture. As Rádl explained, the connection between socialism, fascism and national socialism lies in this conception of the state and the role of the individual within the state (Nikodym 2020, p. 50). The role was basically the same, but the justification differed: while in one system the highest principles were that of ethnic origin and national culture, in the second one it was an affiliation to social class.

From this point of view, Rádl's explanation was quite close to the interpretation later provided by Hayek (1964, pp. 191-206; 1976, pp. 167-180), who claimed that all forms of socialism regardless the ideology (national, communist/international), are of collectivist nature. Hayek tracked the history of this thought especially back to Hegel and later to Comte who, according to Hayek, even surpassed Hegel and claimed that only society as a whole is real, and the individual is only an abstraction (Hayek 1964, p. 198). Moreover, the role of Herder, who influenced not only Presidents Masaryk and Beneš; but also the Czech National Revival movement, is clearly visible in Comte's work because Comte understood himself as a follower of Herder (Hayek 1964, p. 248).

In this respect, even the communist revolution in 1948 did not break chains with the past and was fully in line with the collectivist nature of Czech culture where the individual was identified via affiliation to the nation / class. If this was true, then the roots of Czech culture were not questioned during the whole communist era because there was no possibility to reconsider the past and the culture, and there should have been consequences even after the fall of the communist regime.

A similar development can be observed in the former East Germany. Like the Czechs, the East Germans did not have a chance to reconsider their culture which they probably had in the former West Germany after World War II. Today, we can observe the success of the nationally-oriented *Alternative für Deutschland* party, way bigger in the East than in the West (Pesthy, Mader and Schoen 2021, p. 70). Also, the level of nativism, i.e. protecting the interests of natives over foreigners/immigrants, is significantly higher in the former East Germany in all age-categories (Pesthy, Mader and Schoen 2021, p. 85). The Czech election results will be discussed in the following sections.

Not only was communism and its culture not in contradiction with the Czech culture, but in fact it could strengthen the nationalistic effects of culture. As Berggren and Jordahl (2006, pp. 144-149) explained, there is causal effect going from the institutions of the free society to (generalized) trust, when one can trust people he/she does not know or know anything about. Since a communist society, according to the approach used in this paper, can't be understood as a free society, it has, in fact, a negative effect on trust in society. Together with nationalistic culture, the effect of communism even strengthened the distrust of unknown and foreign people. Let me also reiterate the totalitarian and post-totalitarian syndrome of Section 3 which seems to be in line with Berggren's and Jordahl's causal interpretation.

5. A FEW NOTES ON CZECH LIBERALISM

Before I move my attention to the contemporary trends, let me briefly comment on Czech liberalism (in the classical understanding of this term). On the historical example of Karel Engliš, one of the prominent liberals, I will try to illustrate how the cultural nationalist features were present even in the classical liberal thought. However, it should not be surprising since Czech liberalism was historically tightly linked to the ideal of political self-determination (Šíma and Nikodym, 2015, p. 275).

Nonetheless, let me start with an etymological note which can partially explain the Czech inclination towards nationalism. Language, as an integral part of culture, may affect the social development in specific language areas. Some examples include the paper by Bergh and Bjornskov (2011), which shows how language affects social trust, or the paper by Chen (2013) which explains the country differences in rate of savings by the number of tenses in specific languages. According to Brouk (2011, pp. 27-28), the Greek and Latin word for *Liberty* was derived from the Indo-Germanic word *leudheros*. In its original meaning, the word *leudheros* meant "arising from the tribe", or "from the nation". In German and Slavic languages, this word did not transform into the word "liberty", but into "people" (*Leute* in German, *lidé* in Czech), while, as mentioned above, in Latin it was transcribed as *liber/libertas* and was later used in various modern Romance languages. From English, we also know another term for *Liberty* with a Germanic origin: *Freedom*. As Brouk explains, its origin was in the Indo-European word *pri* which meant "to love", but in German "to love" was related only to the members of the family, tribe and nation. Moreover, the same applies to the Slavic word *svoboda*, which was derived from *svŭj* meaning a relation to family, tribe and nation. Not only is this fully in line with the intellectual environment described above, but these features can also be found in the works of Czech liberals.

For example, Karel Engliš was, and in fact still is, rightly considered one of the prominent classical liberals (Nikodym 2020, pp. 89-90; Šíma and Nikodym 2015, p. 278). Nevertheless, even in his work are we able to find significant features of ethnic nationalism. "The nationality is a mighty state-forming component", Engliš stated (1923, p. 3). What is more important is that even in his understanding, nationality was based on the blood relations of its members and common culture. He interpreted culture not only as common history (determined by a racial basis), old national literature, etc., but also as the contemporary feature of a nation. The nationalistic feeling, Engliš claimed, is one of the deepest and the most powerful sentiments which could control men's behavior. All the other sentiments such as family love, material needs and even the love of an individual's own life is subordinated to the love of the Nation. To secure the harmonic development of national culture, Engliš (1923, p. 7) believed that the Nation needs its own State, through which the Nation cares for its national culture. There was, according to Engliš, an indivisible relation between the Nation and the State. Moreover, when Engliš was talking about protecting culture, he had in mind not only culture in the broad sense, but also in the specific sense of folk art, music, folk costumes, architecture and social manners (Engliš 1923, p. 11). One can argue that Engliš's statements were made during a euphoric time just after the birth of the independent state; but when reading Engliš's work carefully, it is obvious that he was consistent throughout his career. In his book called *The Eternal Ideals of Mankind*, written in 1956, Engliš distinguished between various forms of government via the relation of the nation and the state. If a nation rules itself, it is democracy, while if the nation is a subject to another's rule, it is tyranny, dictatorship or au-

thoritarian regime (Engliš 1992, pp. 115, 142). The nation, as an ethnic and cultural commonwealth of people, has to be protected by the national state. National self-determination was, according to Engliš (1992, p. 142), possible only within the national state.

In addition, it is understandable that after the First World War Engliš had a deep respect for President Masaryk, who already became a symbol of the Nation during his presidency. He was one of members of parliament who proposed the establishment of a Czech-speaking University in Brno and named it after President Masaryk. As described in the document deposited in the foundation stone of the University, the University should, among its other aims, foster the scientific and cultural development of the Nation and the State (Engliš 2021, p. 25). In his memoirs, Engliš reminisced about his talks with Masaryk as follows: “When I talk to the president, I feel like I am talking to God” (Engliš 2021, p. 50). Of course, this deep respect for the president cannot fully explain the elements of ethnic-cultural nationalism mentioned above, but together with his understanding of the relation of the Nation and the State it indicates that these ideas were deeply rooted even in the mind of a prominent liberal.⁴

It is also worth mentioning that Engliš is considered to be one of the members of the so-called *Bráf’s school* because he was a student of the “first Czech economist” Albín Bráf. Both Bráf and Engliš believed there were collective agents (social entities/organisms) that had their own will. In Bráf’s understanding, social organism was not just an aggregate of individuals but some kind of *higher entity* (Gruber and Horáček 1913, p. 11; pp. 18-19; Bráf 1908, p. 6). In this respect, both Bráf and Engliš rejected the individualism of the Austrian school, while they are still often associated with the school; Bráf is often linked to Menger (methodologically) and Engliš to Hayek and Mises (through teleology). Bráf in fact emphasized the necessity to *create* the nation and to organize its economy on national principles and to limit German influence over the Czech nation. The similar applies to another Czech economist, František Čuhel, who was widely recognized by the members of the Austrian school including Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, Robbins and Machlup (Hudík 2007). He is currently often considered a liberal just because of his recognition by the members of the Austrian school. He is, for example, listed in the book called *Enemies of the State* (Tětek 2021). In fact, he was an economic nationalist and tried to diminish German economic influence via nationalization (Jančík and Kubů 2011). Even contemporary liberals are probably trying too hard to find some “national liberal heroes.”

6. CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

In the introduction, I mentioned hostility towards foreigners during the Covid-19 pandemic (Bartoš, Bauer, Cahlíková and Chytilová 2021), but as Klíperová (2022) points out, the cultural setting of specific parts of the population affects other matters, such as willingness to be vaccinated or the propensity to believe in hoaxes concerning Covid-19. In her research, Klíperová discovered that the part of population, which identifies itself with the Slavic/Eastern culture, is about twenty percent less vaccinated than the part which identifies itself with Western democratic culture. In addition, people who identify themselves with the Slavic culture, are up to three times more prone to believing hoaxes (Dohnalová 2022). Finally, Klíperová put these trends together with the support of Czech political parties. People, who identify themselves with the Eastern culture are also voters of parties like *Free bloc*, *Tricolor* or *Freedom and direct democracy*—parties of a nationally-oriented inclination (Klíperová 2022). Leaning towards Eastern culture, Slavism and Putin’s Russia are amongst the trends described by Craiutu and Kolev (2021, p. 820). In my opinion, this inclination lies in a similar cultural setting to that of the Eastern European countries. These are rather collectivist cultures with strong emphasis on the national element. As, for example, Verkhovsky (2007, p. 125) explains, ethnic nationalism is on the rise in Russia under Putin’s rule. Some would rather explain the inclination towards Putin’s Russia as nostalgia for the communist regime, but, in my view, it is a matter of cultural similarity.

Other contemporary trends described by Craiutu and Kolev (2021) are in line with Bieber’s (2018, p. 537) conclusions about the rise of nationalism in some countries, especially in the form of the shift of public

discourse of established parties and the rise of new nationalistic parties. According to Craiutu and Kolev (2021, pp. 819-820, 822), it is surprising that many conservative thinkers, who defended constitutionalism and limited government in the past and who are currently loudly supporting *illiberal democracy*, come in fact from the Central and Eastern European region. In the Czech Republic, they are using Václav Klaus, the former president who openly supported free-market liberalism in the 1990s and turned into a sympathizer of far-right politics (for example the German *Alternative für Deutschland* party), Putin's Russia or Orbán's type of "authentic statesman who truly represents his nation." Even Hans-Olaf Henkel, one of the founders of the *Alternative für Deutschland* party who left the party when it turned openly racist and nationalistic, wondered how it was possible that Václav Klaus did not pay attention to the intellectual shift of the party from liberalism to racism and nationalism (Břešťan 2019). I have to emphasize that it is not my intention to suggest that this development is always necessary, but I claim that the cultural mechanisms described above can explain these "surprising" shifts in the intellectual development of people like Klaus. They simply recognized the cultural setting in society and tried to utilize it in politics.

An exceptional attempt to utilize the cultural settings in politics was carried out by the former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. A few months before the 2021 elections, he published a book in which he aggressively tried to convince voters to vote for him and his party which he proudly calls "the movement". In this book, Babiš (2021) stressed the importance of national-cultural heritage and played on a very nationalistic note when opposing, for example, solidarity with immigrants. According to Babiš (2021, p. 8), these are people with "different thinking and culture" and anyone who supports immigration is "voting against one's own country." He also emphasized his own contribution when rejecting the migrant-quotas in the EU. "No! No!! No!!! [...] Not even one migrant. Just NO," Babiš wrote (2021, p. 9) trying to arise fear amongst the voters.⁵ Moreover, Babiš asked Viktor Orbán (2021, p.10) to write a note praising Babiš's anti-immigration policy: "It is clear that he [Babiš] is one of those who are not followers of any ideology which should save the World. He prefers simple things like Nation and Family." Moreover, he emphasized the financial costs of integration of immigrants into society and, while quoting the Dalai Lama, he proposed to send all immigrants to their former homes and to rebuild their own countries. Regarding migration, it is important to note that almost all anti-migration statements were against migrants from countries with "different culture", mainly Muslim countries. The usual argument is that different cultures are incompatible with each other and thus it is not possible to assimilate such migrants into society. When comparing different migration waves, there were striking differences, and not only in numbers. During the massive 2015 European migrant crisis, 1,235 migrants applied for asylum in the Czech Republic (Bourgeois and Juchno 2016, p. 2). While it was unacceptable for the majority of people to even imagine a peaceful cohabitation with a small number of Muslims, in the case of the migration wave from Ukraine due to the 2022 Russian attack, the reaction was completely: people were supporting migrants from Ukraine in various ways—from sending money and material help to offering accommodation in their homes. According to the statistics (Migrants in numbers, 2022) of *People in Need* NGO, over 300,000 migrants came from Ukraine to the Czech Republic. An explanation of this kind of extensive support was that these migrants are culturally closer to Czechs. However, when Ukrainian Roma people came to Czech Republic, the reaction was rather negative with reference to them being a different culture.

Babiš (2021, pp. 44-69) then moved his attention towards the demographic problems of Central and Eastern Europe. He showed that the low natality rates in the region, inspired by Orbán's birthrate measures, explained that an ideal family is a family of three kids, while at least 2.1 kids per woman would ensure that "the nation will not have died out." Finally, Babiš also emphasized the role of cultural heritage in both understandings used in this paper. Amongst others, he stressed the role of Charles IV who built famous castles, bridges and squares and also founded Charles University in 1348. According to Babiš (2021, p. 280) he also established "our national identity". In the following page (2021, p. 283), he highlighted the importance of the builders of the National Museum, who were "the biggest brains and talents of the nation, who fought for our national identity". To summarize the book as the core of the election campaign, it strongly emphasized the role national identity, national state and traditional values of the society. Why? In Babiš's case,

the explanation should be straightforward. While he is known as “the man of no values,” he simply tried to utilize the cultural-nationalistic tendencies within the Czech society. It does not really matter whether he really believed in the national idea or not, he simply believed that this strategy would win him the election.

According to various pre-election surveys,⁶ the voting potential of Babiš’s party was about 30% before the elections, therefore he simply believed that these are the topics and ideas which are of interest for a large segment of the population. With the voting potential of the newly established nation-conservative and nationalistic parties (*Free bloc*, *Tricolor* party for which democracy is “a national matter” and seeks inspiration in Orbán’s Hungary and conservative Poland) and the established parties with shifted public discourse (*Party of Free Citizens*, formerly classical-liberal/libertarian party) and already existing nationalistic parties (*Freedom and direct democracy*), the “nationally oriented election potential” was usually slightly above 40% from 2017 to 2021. The voting potential was almost fully utilized, as the parties together received 40.77 % of votes and Babiš’s party had the largest number of mandates in the House of Commons. Moreover, one of the slogans of the Communist party was “Patriotism is not a crime”. The communist presidential candidate also described himself as the “candidate of Czech Patriots”. As in the 1940s, today’s Communist party recognizes the cultural setting of the large part of Czech population as well.

Despite the difference among these parties, they have at least something in common; they are offering simple and fast solutions for all social problems. They are offering specific nationally-oriented types of policies; from anti-immigration policy to proposals of food and energy self-sufficiency. Bryan Caplan has noted that almost all democratic countries have policies that harm their own citizens; for example, protectionist and anti-immigration policies. This is because voters are choosing the parties and programs under false ideas of efficiency of these policies. Therefore, while some people criticize democracy because it *will not give people what they want*, according to Caplan (2006, pp. 1-4), democracy fails because *it gives people what they want*, even if it is a harmful policy like protectionism. If this is true, then nationalism has significant political consequences as shown in the example of 2021, when even “the man of no values” Babiš and his party recognized and tried to utilize the nation-oriented cultural setting. The same applies to the former classical liberals Klaus and Miroslav Ševčík, one of the founders of the *Czech Liberal Institute* in 1989, who was a candidate for the *Tricolor* party in 2021 elections. When criticizing the anti-covid measures, Ševčík also used the aforementioned anti-Germanism so popular in Czech public debates: “Following Germany’s or Austria’s anti covid measures? Let me remind you of the history. Ševčík expressed himself (Tran 2021) as follows “Germans brought Marxism, Nazism and two World Wars to us. It is [in anti-covid measures] a German thing and it is used in the same way as the Nazi ideology. It is an ideology of covidism [...]”.

The question of Czech nationality was also discussed before and during the Senate election campaign in 2018. One of the candidates, a former dean of the Faculty of Law in Prague, proposed to return to the definition of “nation” as the basis for statehood back into the Constitution. He argued that even in the Czechoslovak federation, the constitution stated that Czechoslovakia was a state of two brotherly nations—the Czech nation and the Slovak nation. Moreover, he also referred to the aforementioned preamble of the first Czechoslovak constitution (Šulcová 2016). In addition, he argued that while the rights of minorities are protected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the protection of Czech nationality and Czech language is underestimated (Martinek 2018). According to Gerloch, this protection is even more urgent in a time of globalization and extensive migration (Veselovský 2016). When trying to explain why he proposed such a measure, Gerloch argued that it is unusual that everyone can freely choose whether to be part of the Czech nation or the national or ethnic minority. He stressed the importance of history and the contribution of Czech nationality to the building of the independent state. With a proper definition of Czech nationality and acknowledgment of Czech language in the Constitution, Gerloch believed that the Czech national identity would be restored: “The major impact of this change will be that we are going to realize that the Czech Republic is not only a sum of citizens, that means whoever is in any relation to the Czech Republic, but also that there exists a historical element—the Czech nation” (Janáková 2018).

7. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I've showed how nationalism, in its cultural/ethnic understanding, has become part of national culture, and how it has persisted over various historical periods and how it still has political consequences. The historical-cultural approach used in this paper can provide a deeper understanding of the persistence of nationalism. For example, Ochsner and Roesel (2020) show how an influx of Austrian Nazi extremists escaping from Soviet occupation zone to the American zone affected election results until the present time. This is an extremely valuable study showing the intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs, but it is rather limited to transmission within families and local party branches than within society via culture (Ochsner and Roesel 2020, p. 1138). Another approach to the study of nationalism was recently suggested by Jurajda and Kovač (2016). According to their study, names carry an informative signal about nationalist values. This approach focuses on cultural expression and religious identity through name choices rather than via the effect of culture itself. Given names can be also used as a measurement of the success of intentional nation-building policies as suggested by Kersting and Wolf (2021). The focus on nation-building by the elites is quite similar to the approach used in this paper, but I emphasize that the culture itself provides the basis for the elites' behaviour. Moreover, the latter approach does not attempt to explain the persistence of nationalism over time. In this respect, the historical-cultural approach used in this paper helps to explain it.

Regarding the nationalistic ideas of the Czech Republic, the cultural origins were identified in the intentionally built culture via various forms of folk art and specifically "Czech" science, and became politically utilized after the birth of the independent state after the First World War in 1918. Even the communist revolution in 1948 and the following 41 years of the communist era did not break the chains with the past and in turn the development of culture. On the contrary, it preserved its collectivist nature. In the euphoria after the fall of the communist regime, it seemed that the "national idea" lost its importance and transformed into civic nationalism (Klicperová 2007, pp. 126-149). But in the past few years, the "national idea" is slowly returning to its cultural understanding. It was shown how the "national idea" was utilized in various elections in the past few years. This utilization is probably a worldwide trend in the time of large migration waves (see the overview of literature on effects of migration in Gorinas and Pytlíková 2017, pp. 419-421) and worldwide globalization (see the overview of literature on effects of globalization in Rodrik 2021). These trends, globalization and mass migration, were discussed very critically in Czech public discourse and the contemporary trends are integral part of defensive response of Czech society. The reaction, due to the nationally oriented cultural setting, is very strong; one would say even inadequate to the actual state of affairs. Moreover, only the negative aspect of both globalization and especially mass migration are being discussed, while the positive effects are underestimated in public discourse (Stojanov, Klvaňová, Seidlová and Bureš 2021, p. 3). Adéla Jurečková (2020) asked, how it is possible that the hostility toward foreigners could come from any part of the political spectrum; from the right-wing openly nationalist parties to the left-wing Social democracy or Communist party. According to her explanation, aversion toward immigrants is rooted in the "post-revolution ethos of individualism". This explanation, in my opinion, is wrong and as argued in this paper, there is a strong nationally-oriented element with collectivist leaning in the Czech culture which could lead to the outcomes described by Jurečková.

Can cultural history also bring a better understanding of what nationalism is? Unlike other approaches, cultural history emphasizes not only the intellectual contributions of the elites, but also focuses on the shared values of "ordinary people". Nationalism/nationalistic thinking today is not fashionable among a few intellectuals, but it is deeply rooted in the shared values within society. In this respect, the cultural-historical approach is capable of building a bridge from the intellectual contributions of elites' intentional building of the national culture to the commonly shared and persistent values of society. It integrates culture in the form of folk art and science (culture in narrow sense), but also shared habits, attitudes, values or prejudices (culture in a broad sense).

NOTES

- 1 A similar point of view was also taken by Beneš' foreign biographers. From the biographies written by Compton Mackenzie and Edward Hitchcock it looked as if Beneš was born anti-German. Mackenzie (1947, p. 39) emphasized Beneš' nationalistic and anti-German poems written at a young age, his fights with German boys, etc. Hitchcock (1947, pp. 3, 23) also mentioned that "Beneš sounds like a good Czech name so everyone immediately recognizes that he's Czech," or that "[...] intact blood of his ancestors flows in his veins. Beneš is Slav and Czech.
- 2 See the detailed interpretation of Herder's work on the concept of Nationality see Iggers (1988, pp. 7-35).
- 3 See the debate over Czechoslovak socialism in Nikodym (2020, pp. 53-74).
- 4 As Křištofory (2017) points out, Czech historians of (economic) thought interprets Engliš' work in the Czech/Czechoslovak context. For example, his complex work was interpreted as the beginning of "the new era in the scientific work of our Nation". Also, his later student Vencovský understood Engliš' systems as the development of the original Czech system of economics. Křištofory (2017) adds that Engliš had close contacts not only with the younger German historical school, but also with people like Othmar Spann—an Austrian nationalist (as described by Weyr), who was Engliš' contemporary in Brno before the First World War. In his preliminary analysis, Křištofory shows the similarities in the works of Engliš and Spann, especially in the classification of the sciences and meaning of sociology (society/Nation as organism). Both authors referred to Georg von Mayr's *Begriff und gliederung der Staatswissenschaften. Zur Einführung in deren Studium* (1910). Later, Engliš referred directly to Spann.
- 5 As Mošovský (2021) points out, the debate about Czech migrant-quotas was completely overvalued. According to the quotas, 2,978 migrants moved to the Czech Republic, equal to 0.03 % of the population.
- 6 For the summary of the surveys see here: <https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/pocitame-sance-kdo-vyhraje-volby-144566>. The website contains surveys of surveys and election models as well as the overall election results.

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